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Résumé 
L’itinérance est un domaine à la fois passionnant et exigeant de la politique publique. 
C’est un domaine nouveau, très complexe, mal défini et mal compris. Du milieu des années 
1990 au milieu des années 2000, l’itinérance chronique a augmenté au Canada, et jusqu’ici, 
tant le gouvernement fédéral que les provinces n’ont pas réussi à la contrer sérieusement. En 
l’absence d’initiatives de la part du fédéral et des provinces, les groupes locaux de partout au 
pays se sont unis pour lutter contre ce qui était de plus en plus appelé la crise de l’itinérance.  
L’ampleur de l’itinérance chronique est très similaire dans les grandes villes du 
Canada. Confrontés au même problème, les décideurs locaux des quatre plus grandes et plus 
importantes villes du Canada – Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto et Montréal – se sont unis pour 
constituer différents modèles de gouvernance de l’itinérance. En d’autres termes, il existe 
différents pourvoyeurs de protection sociale pour les itinérants chroniques, soit l’autre 1 %, 
dans chacune de ces villes.  
Les modèles de gouvernance locale présentent deux différences principales : le rôle du 
gouvernement local, et la centralisation ou la fragmentation du modèle. À Vancouver et à 
Toronto, le gouvernement local est très impliqué dans la gestion de l’itinérance et y a fait 
d’importants investissements politiques et financiers. Tandis qu’à Montréal et à Calgary, le 
gouvernement local joue un rôle bien moins important. Ensuite, la gouvernance de l’itinérance 
est centralisée dans un seul organisme ou une seule agence à Calgary et à Toronto, alors 
qu’elle est divisée en plusieurs intervenants à Vancouver et à Montréal. Je me penche sur ce 
qui pourrait expliquer cette grande différence entre les modèles de gouvernance de 
l’itinérance, et j’analyse les conséquences théoriques et pratiques que cela peut avoir sur la 
protection sociale au Canada. 
Je conclus que le rôle du gouvernement local dans la coalition gouvernante est 
déterminé par les pouvoirs des villes en matière de logement et par l’engagement des 
politiciens locaux pour lutter contre l’itinérance. À Vancouver et à Toronto, il y a soit des 
pouvoirs importants en matière de logement, soit un engagement politique solide à l’égard de 
l’itinérance, soit les deux. À Montréal et à Calgary, il y a comparativement moins de pouvoirs 
formels en matière de logement, et l’engagement politique à l’égard du problème est 
relativement faible.  
Dans chaque ville, c’est l’organisation des forces sociales locales qui détermine la 
fragmentation ou la centralisation de la coalition gouvernante. À Vancouver et à Montréal, les 
forces locales et sociales sont fortes et organisées, mais elles sont divisées, ce qui fait que la 
gouvernance de l’itinérance est fragmentée. À Calgary, les forces sociales locales sont 
dominées par le secteur privé, alors qu’à Toronto, les forces sociales locales sont mal 
organisées et la Ville est un intervenant fort, et en quelque sorte dominant. Cela explique la 
centralisation de la gouvernance de l’itinérance dans ces deux villes.  
Malgré leur engagement et leur créativité, aucun des modèles de gouvernance locale 
n’a réussi à réduire fortement l’itinérance. Aucun ordre de gouvernement seul ne peut résoudre 
le problème de l’itinérance, et l’absence du gouvernement fédéral des discussions concernant 
les politiques en matière de logement et d’itinérance était suffisante pour limiter le succès des 
initiatives menées à l’échelle locale. 
Ces deux conclusions à la fois confirment et remettent en question les théories 
existantes de l’État-providence. D’une part, cela confirme l’argument que l’évolution de l’État 
providence est le reflet l’évolution du fédéralisme, et qu’il y a de plus en plus un nouveau 
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concept du capital social et humain en politique sociale. D’autre part, toutefois, il met au défi 
ces écrits, en soulignant le rôle que joue le niveau local dans la production de la protection 
sociale. Les études sur l’itinérance et l’État providence devraient accorder une attention 
particulière non seulement aux paliers de gouvernement fédéral et provincial, mais également 
au niveau local aussi. 
 
Mots clés : État providence ; itinérance ; gouvernance urbaine ; gouvernance multi-niveaux ; 
relations intergouvernementales ; politique canadienne   
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Abstract 
Homelessness is a challenging and fascinating area of public policy; it is new, very 
complex, poorly defined and poorly understood. From the mid-1990s to mid-2000s, chronic 
homelessness was growing throughout Canada, yet federal and provincial governments failed 
to respond to it in any meaningful way. In the absence of federal or provincial leadership, local 
groups across the country have come together to fight against what was increasingly called a 
crisis of homelessness.  
The scale of chronic homelessness is very similar in big cities across Canada, yet 
facing the same problem, local actors in Canada’s four biggest and most important cities – 
Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal – came together to form different models of 
governance of homelessness. In other words, there are very different producers of social 
protection for the chronically homeless, the other 1%, in each of these cities.  
There are two main differences in the local governance models: the role of the local 
government and the centralization or fragmentation of the model. In Vancouver and Toronto, 
the local government is highly involved in governing homelessness and has made significant 
political and financial investments, whereas in Montreal and Calgary the local government 
plays a much smaller role. Further, the governance of homelessness is centralized in one single 
body or agency in Calgary and Toronto, whereas it is divided among a number of actors in 
Vancouver and Montreal. I ask what explains these very different models of governance of 
homelessness, and I consider the theoretical and practical consequences this has for social 
protection in Canada. 
I conclude that the role of the local government in the governing coalition is 
determined by its housing related powers and the local political commitment to homelessness. 
In Vancouver and Toronto, there are either significant local housing related powers, a strong 
political commitment to homelessness, or both. In Montreal and Calgary, there are 
comparatively few housing related powers and the political commitment to the issue is 
relatively weak.  
The fragmentation or centralization of the governing coalition is determined by the 
organization of local social forces in each city. In Vancouver and Montreal local social forces 
are strong and organized, but divided, making the governance of homelessness fragmented. In 
Calgary, local social forces are dominated by the private sector whereas in Toronto, local 
social forces are poorly organized and the city is a strong and somewhat domineering actor. 
This explains the centralization of the governance of homelessness in these two cities.  
Despite their commitment and creativity, none of the local governance models has 
been successful at significantly reducing homelessness. No one level of government alone can 
solve homelessness, and the absence of the federal government from policy discussions 
regarding housing and homelessness has been enough to limit the local level successes.  
These conclusions both confirm and challenge existing theories of welfare state. On 
the one hand, it confirms the argument that the evolution of the welfare state has mirrored the 
evolution of federalism, and that there is increasingly a new human or social capital paradigm 
of social policy. It challenges this literature, however, by highlighting the role that is played by 
the local level in the production of social protection. Studies of homelessness and the welfare 
state should pay careful attention not just to federal and provincial governments, but to the 
local level as well. 
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Chapter 1: Puzzle and Research Design 
 
 “For a growing number of Canadians, the city is their safety net.”  
Mending Canada’s Frayed Safety Net  
The Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2006. 
 
In the last three local elections in Vancouver (2008, 2011, 2014), homelessness was 
front and centre in mayoral campaigns. This was particularly the case for Gregor Robertson 
and his political party Vision Vancouver, who campaigned in the 2008 campaign on a promise 
to end street homelessness by 2015. After Robertson and Vision Vancouver were elected to 
City Hall in 2008 (and subsequently in 2011 and 2014) homelessness has been one of the 
city’s top three priorities. Immediately following their election in 2008, Robertson and 
Vancouver city council began acting immediately, first by opening a number of new low-
barrier emergency shelters and eventually implementing a 10-year housing and homelessness 
plan. Compare these local political dynamics with Calgary, a city with as much if not more 
homelessness than Vancouver; Calgary’s city council is comparatively very silent on the issue 
of homelessness. Homelessness does not come up often in local political campaigns, and city 
council does not have a homelessness plan or strategy. Rather, it is a non-profit foundation 
with strong ties to the oil and gas sector called the Calgary Homeless Foundation that has 
taken on responsibility for fighting and ending homelessness in the city. Looking around the 
country, it is clear that big cities and other local actors are involved to very different degrees in 
the governance of homelessness. 
This dissertation considers how local actors are responding to chronic homelessness in 
four of Canada’s biggest cities: Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal. These four cities 
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are all responding to the same problem of chronic homelessness at a similar scale, but the 
governance model, the question of who is developing and implementing the response to 
homelessness, varies from city to city. There are two main differences in the governance 
models. First, local governments are involved to varying degrees in the fight against 
homelessness. Vancouver and Toronto make significant political and financial commitments, 
whereas Calgary and Montreal do not (though this is changing in Montreal). Second, in 
Calgary and Toronto, the governance is homelessness is centralized in one body or agency, 
whereas in others, it is fragmented between a number of different actors in Vancouver and 
Montreal. 
In this dissertation, I ask what explains these different models of governance of 
homelessness in these four big Canadian cities. Through semi-structured interviews, archival 
research and participant observation, I conclude that the degree of involvement of the city 
governments is determined by their very different housing and homelessness related powers 
and incentives to use them. Further, building on theories of urban governance, I conclude that 
the centralization or fragmentation of the governance of homelessness results from the 
organization of local social forces, meaning the private sector and the third sector. Where local 
social forces are divided, there are multiple actors and plans to govern homelessness, which is 
the case in Vancouver and Montreal. In Calgary and Toronto, local social forces are 
dominated by one particularly powerful force, which explains the centralization of the 
governance of homelessness in those cities. 
The pages that follow will mostly focus on explaining why these four cities have such 
different governance models. The conclusion, however, will consider briefly whether one local 
governance model works better than any others when it comes to the objective of reducing or 
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ending homelessness. The short answer is that, while there are some benefits to each model, 
there are also important flaws in all four governance models. There have been important 
achievements in the fight against homelessness to be sure, such as reducing the rapid growth 
of homelessness in Calgary. However, no major Canadian city has come close to the goal of 
ending or even significantly reducing homelessness.  
To suggest that this is the fault of local actors, however, would be unfair and untrue. A 
“wicked” problem, homelessness is too complex for one level of government, or one sector of 
civil society, to solve on its own. Because it touches in a wide range of policy areas – 
including housing, health, justice, income support, to name just a few – it requires the support 
of all levels of government. For over 20 years, the federal government was largely absent from 
discussions related to housing and homelessness. This alone, given the federal government’s 
share of taxation power, is perhaps enough to ensure the failure of local or even provincial 
efforts to end homelessness. This thesis will end on an optimistic note, however; a new federal 
government with a commitment to investments in social infrastructure and an understanding of 
the needs of Canada’s major urban centres, is a very good sign for those fighting 
homelessness. 
My conclusions show that while city governments continue to be extremely 
constrained by provinces in terms of their autonomy and financial powers, some cities are 
nevertheless innovating and have made themselves important policy actors in the fight against 
homelessness. Cities are not merely creatures of the provinces, implementing provincial social 
policies, but many are acting like governments and are developing their own policies. But 
local governments are not the only local actors who are innovating; the private sector and the 
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third sector are also crucial producers of social security for the other 1%. To understand the 
welfare state and how it has evolved, we must also look at the local level. 
Definition of Chronic Homelessness  
The word homelessness is itself very vague and can mean different things to different 
people. Every year in Canada, an estimated 235,000 people experience homelessness (Gaetz, 
Gulliver, and Richter 2015). For these 235,000 Canadians, the other 1%, public policy has 
failed and they have fallen through the cracks in the welfare state. The majority of these 
people, around 85% (Aubry, Farrell, Hwang, and Calhoun 2013), experience one brief episode 
of homelessness; for a few days, they have nowhere to go so they spend a brief amount of time 
in on the street or in an emergency shelter. The reason people experience this type of 
“transitional” homelessness varies, but is most often economic. Very quickly, these people 
find somewhere to live and they never again experience homelessness. A very small minority 
of the homeless population, 2-4% (Aubry et al 2013), is chronically homeless, meaning they 
are on the street or in emergency or other provisional housing for 1 year or more. This is often 
the group of people we associate with the word homelessness; they tend to be most visible on 
the streets and suffer frequently from severe mental illness and/or substance abuse. Groups 
seeking to raise awareness of homelessness will often use an image of an iceberg to send the 
message that what we see on the streets is a mere fraction of the broader problem of 
homelessness. While this thesis considers primarily what has been done regarding chronic 
homelessness, it recognizes that homelessness takes many shapes and forms, and that people 
experience homelessness for a variety of reasons but far too often due simply to poverty.  
The chronic homelessness that we see in major urban centres throughout the country is 
a new problem of public policy. Canadians, and citizens of other developed countries around 
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the world for that matter, did not always experience chronic homelessness (Hulchanski 2009). 
True, over the course of Canadian history, there have been people living in extreme poverty 
and who have relied on front line, emergency support. Some of these people were so poor that 
they did not have permanent, safe, adequate housing of their own. Indeed, the Old Brewery 
Mission in Montreal, the city’s largest homeless serving organization, has existed as an 
emergency shelter for over 125 years. But it would be a mistake to say that the homelessness 
we know today has existed for 125 years.  Fallis and Murray note in their book Housing the 
Homeless and the Poor, “a cynic – or a person with a strong historical sense – might well ask 
if homelessness is just the 1980s’ word for poverty” (1990, 12). Answering their own 
rhetorical question, they insist, “things are not the same; things are qualitatively different” 
(ibid). Hulchanski agrees, writing, “while it is true that all societies through history tend to 
have some people who are homeless – without a home – we have not always had the set of 
social problems we associate with the word homelessness” (2009).  
Given the vagueness of the term, it is difficult to know exactly how much 
homelessness there is today compared to 125 years ago, but Canadian and international studies 
alike clearly show an increase in all types of homelessness throughout the 1980s to the mid-
2000s. In other words, there has been a quantitative increase in the number of people 
experiencing all forms of homelessness (Gaetz, Donaldson, Richter, and Gulliver 2014; 
Hulchanski 2009; Layton 2008). But there has also been a qualitative change; the profile of 
homelessness, or the question of who experiences homelessness, is also different today than it 
was prior to the 1980s. The people who relied on emergency shelters and other front line 
services before the 1980s and 1990s, such as those provided 125 years ago by the Old 
Brewery Mission, were mostly white men in their 40s and 50s who were unable to work due to 
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physical injury or alcoholism. Beginning in the 1990s, this began to change rapidly, and today, 
a wide variety of people experience chronic homelessness, including women, youth, children, 
aboriginal people, and seniors (City of Toronto 2013; Gaetz 2015; Latimer, Macgregor, 
Méthot, and Smith 2015).  
An advocate who was interviewed for this dissertation recalled seeing this change take 
place right before his eyes. He said of his work as an advocate in the 1980s, “I was a good 
advocate. I was out on evenings and weekends. I never, ever, ever, ever saw children 
homeless. I never saw seniors homeless” (interview #50). Fast forward to his future work in 
the mid-2000s, he spoke of the shock he felt when he saw a pregnant woman living on the 
streets of Toronto for the first time. Today in Canada, babies are born into homelessness, and 
children are raised in homelessness; a Canadian shelter recently tweeted a request for 
donations of soothers, saying there are many babies staying with them. This is new; babies, 
seniors, youth, and women have not always experienced homelessness, but they do today.  
This changing profile of homelessness has been directly linked to government action 
and inaction (Fallis and Murray 1990; Hulchanski 2004, 2009; Turgeon 2009). Following the 
Second World War up until the 1980s, the government built approximately 10,000 units of 
social housing per year, and provinces had the resources and the freedom to offer social 
assistance levels that provided an adequate living income. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
however, the federal and most provincial governments cut funding in housing and social 
assistance. The provinces of Quebec and BC invested much more in affordable and social 
housing than other provincial governments, but as the remainder of this dissertation will show, 
this did little to stop the growing problem of chronic homelessness in those two provinces. 
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There was, by the mid-1990s, a gap in all provincial safety nets through which homeless 
people fell.  
Community groups and local governments began to fill this gap and respond to what 
was increasingly called a crisis of chronic homelessness (Layton 2008; Monsebraaten 2012). 
The local level is not often associated with the development and implementation of social 
policy in Canada, so it is interesting to see leadership and innovation to end homelessness 
coming from local actors. But the lack of provincial and federal response to the new social risk 
of homelessness made the local level – including city governments, the private sector and the 
third sector – more relevant and important producers of social protection in Canada. This can 
be seen from a quick scan across Canada. In big and medium sized cities in Canada, from 
Halifax to Vancouver, local actors are doing what they can to end homelessness, making 
significant political and financial contributions to that end. This dissertation compares local 
governance models of homelessness in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montréal, but these 
are by no means the only cities with local plans on homelessness. Halifax, Winnipeg, 
Saskatoon, Victoria, and many other cities are doing what they can do reduce or end 
homelessness.  
Puzzle 
The model for governing homelessness in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal 
varies significantly. The two main differences are the role of the local government in the 
model and second the centralization or fragmentation of the model. This is puzzling, because 
local groups are responding to the same problem at a similar scale; homelessness is not just a 
Vancouver problem, or even just a Downtown Eastside problem, but it touches all four cities 
under study fairly equally. Table 1 presents the results of the most recent Point-in-Time 
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homeless counts in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal. The first set of numbers (Total 
and Ratio [total]) presents the overall results of the homeless counts, which can be compared 
across the four cities with the ratio of homelessness as it relates to the overall population of the 
city. This first comparison is problematic; each city used a slightly different methodology, a 
different definition of homelessness, and conducted the count at a different time during the 
year (meaning differences in weather between winter and spring counts, for example, will 
make results difficult to compare). These and other factors affect who is counted as homeless 
in the counts and therefore affects the overall comparability of the results (Smith 2015a).  
A better way of comparing the state of homelessness in the four big cities, and more 
relevant to this dissertation, is to compare the amount of chronic homelessness, defined as 
anyone who has been homeless for one year or more or who has experienced multiple short 
episodes of homelessness within a one year period. The Point-in-Time methodology has 
limits, such as its ability to measure hidden homelessness (including couch surfing and 
overcrowding), but it is recognized in Canada and around the world as providing an accurate 
estimation of chronic homelessness. The second set of numbers (Chronic and Ratio [chronic]) 
compare the extent of chronic homelessness in each city and show that the level of 
homelessness is very similar. It is clear that there is less chronic homelessness in Montréal 
than there is in other cities, but the ratio is overall highly comparable.  
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Table 1: Homelessness in Canadian Cities1 
 Total Ratio (total) Chronic Ratio 
(chronic) 
Vancouver2 
Pop:607,000 
(Mar 24 2015) 
1,746 1:345 784 (45%) 1:768 
Calgary3 
Pop:1,097,000 
(Oct 16, 2014) 
3,555 1:309 1,457 (41.2%) 1:752 
Toronto4 
Pop:2,615,000 
(Apr 17, 2013) 
5,253 1:497 2,941 (56%) 1:884 
Montreal5 
Pop:1,650,000 
(Mar 24, 2015) 
3,016 1:547 1,809 (60%) 1:912 
 
It is curious to see such similar rates of homelessness in these four cities; they are, after 
all, in very different provinces with very different social policies, notably those relating to 
housing and poverty. Québec and BC have built more affordable and social housing than other 
provinces, for example, and Québec has been very active in the area of poverty reduction since 
the early 2000s. Yet it is clear that, despite these social policy differences, there is a significant 
gap in the safety net in each of the provinces. The first two empirical chapters will explain 
why this is the case; I argue that chronic homelessness is a very specific and complex 
problem. Responding effectively to it requires a very targeted and specialized intervention; at 
time of writing, but especially in the early to mid-2000s, none of the provinces were doing this 
                                                
1 The date under the city population is the date on which the most recent homeless count was 
conducted 
2 (Thomson 2015) 
3 (Turner 2015) 
4 (City of Toronto 2013) 
5 (Latimer, Macgregor, Méthot, and Smith 2015) 
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well. Thus, despite significant differences in provincial welfare regimes, the level of chronic 
homelessness in each city was very similar in the mid-2000s and remains similar today. 
In Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal, local actors stepped up to fill the gap 
created by the provincial and federal governments, but the governance models are very 
different, notably in terms of the role of the local government and the degree of centralization 
or fragmentation of the models. Image 1 visually presents these differences. The details of 
each case are presented more comprehensively below. In some cities, there are regional plans 
on homelessness; these plans, though important, are not considered in the analysis that 
follows. The existence of a regional plan is largely the result of the regional structure of the 
metropolitan area; for example, there is no regional plan on homelessness in Calgary because 
there is no “region” of Calgary. For this reason, the regional plans are acknowledged below, 
but the analysis that follows considers only the local plans on homelessness, meaning those 
that are confined to the physical space of the municipality. 
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Image 1: Local governance models 
 
Vancouver 
The provincial government is very engaged in the area of housing and homelessness in 
Vancouver and throughout BC. At the local level in Vancouver, however, there are two 
important actors involved in the governance of homelessness: the City of Vancouver and the 
StreetoHome Foundation (STHF). Current Mayor of Vancouver Gregor Robertson pledged in 
2008 to end street homelessness by 20156 and to improve housing options all across the 
housing continuum, ranging from emergency shelters to home ownership (City of Vancouver 
2011). In addition to this specific homelessness promise, the City of Vancouver has a ten-year 
plan on housing and homelessness, which was introduced in 2012. Specifically, the plan aims 
to ensure that there is enough capacity to meet the needs of street homelessness by providing 
                                                
6 The March 2015 homeless count confirmed what many had long been suspecting; that the 
city did not attain this goal of ending street homelessness by 2015. 
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enough shelters and Single Resident Occupancy (SRO) units; to develop 2,900 units of 
supportive housing; 5,000 units of social housing; 5,000 units of purpose built rental housing; 
and 6,000 units of rented condos and suites and laneway houses. The most recent annual 
report card, which must be provided by city staff to city council every year, writes, “the targets 
were intended to be aggressive but at the same time achievable through focused and 
coordinated efforts between the City and our partners (senior government, private sector, and 
non-profits)” (Chief Housing Officer 2015, 6 emphasis added). 
In its first three years of implementation, the City invested significantly in the plan 
financially but also through lost revenues and in-kind contributions. For the housing and 
homelessness projects that were enabled in Vancouver between 2012-2014, the city 
contributed a total of $321 million. Of this funding, $208 million was in-kind contributions, 
which included affordable housing units acquired through density bonusing agreements or 
inclusionary zoning (see Chapter 5). The remaining $85 million was in land contributions, 
$9.6 million was in the form of exemptions or waivers of certain fees (to incentivize private 
investment in affordable housing), and $19 million was capital grant funding. The report card 
writes, “the City has contributed $321 million to leverage around $651 million of partner 
funding to deliver 3,455 units of social and supportive housing valued at around $973 million. 
This represents 33% of the total investment or around $93,000 per unit” (Chief Housing 
Officer 2015, 18).  
The city acknowledges that it cannot solve homelessness or the housing crisis in 
Vancouver without support from other sectors; “while significant, the City’s contribution 
alone cannot create the deeper affordability that is required to ensure our most vulnerable 
residents are sustainably housed” (ibid, 16). The plan and subsequent report cards highlight 
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the importance of partnerships with other governments and sectors. The STHF is, in a sense, 
an important partner for the city, but the STHF also has its own sources of funding and policy 
priorities; most notably, the STHF does not distinguish between street and sheltered 
homelessness unlike the City’s plan (StreetoHome Foundation 2010). The budget for the 
STHF plan is $26 million, much of which was fundraised from the private sector. Every year, 
the STH spends around $2-3 million. The goal of ending homelessness proposed by the STH 
is ambitious, but the financial contribution that the STHF makes to the fight against 
homelessness in Vancouver is not as significant as the City’s. For this reason, I argue that the 
City is a more important actor in the governance of homelessness than the STHF. 
A regional body, the Greater Vancouver Regional Steering Committee on 
Homelessness (RSCH) oversees approximately $8.9 million annually in funding for the entire 
Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) (Greater Vancouver Regional Steering 
Committee on Homelessness 2014a). The funding that the regional body oversees through its 
plan on homelessness comes from the federal government through its Homelessness 
Partnering Strategy (HPS) program. To guide its stewardship of this federal funding, the 
RSCH has a regional plan on homelessness. The RSCH plan distributes the federal funding to 
the entire GVRD, which has a population of approximately 2.5 million and is comprised of 23 
municipalities.  
In Vancouver, there are many cooks in the kitchen (or policy-makers around the table, 
as it were). The City of Vancouver, however, has demonstrated significant leadership in 
creatively using local tools to work towards the Council goal of ending street homelessness, 
and has invested substantially in the area as well, in terms of funding and in-kind 
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contributions. For this reason, the governance model is characterized by a strong degree of 
involvement of the local government, but is fragmented between the City and the STHF. 
Calgary 
 Unlike the City of Vancouver, the local government plays a very small role in the 
governance of homelessness in Calgary. The Calgary Homeless Foundation (CHF), a non-
profit organization with close ties to the oil and gas sector, has become the most powerful and 
influential actor in the governance of homelessness in the city. In the first few years following 
its creation in the 1990s, the CHF served mostly as a facilitator between different actors who 
were involved in responding to homelessness around Calgary. In 2008, however, it developed 
and implemented a 10-year plan to end homelessness, the first such plan in Canada (but 
common in the United States). Through its plan, the CHF sets priorities, issues contracts to 
local service providers, and is ultimately responsible for ending homelessness. 
 The CHF has rewritten its plan to end homelessness twice since 2008, meaning there 
are three versions of the plan. All plans aim to end homelessness, though the final version of 
the plan is overall more modest and more realistic about the costs associated with ending 
homelessness and about the investment that is needed from provincial and federal 
governments (Calgary Homeless Foundation 2015a). The first version of the plan was much 
more ambitious and even arrogant (Calgary Homeless Foundation 2008), but following a few 
years of implementation, the CHF realized that its targets were much too aggressive. Through 
this learning process, the CHF has remained the single most important body in the governance 
of homelessness and has maintained the legitimacy needed to continue implementing its ever-
evolving plan. 
 27 
 The CHF has an annual budget of $22-26 million; around $3 million is operating with 
the remaining money going to different homelessness projects (Calgary Homeless Foundation 
2010, 2013). The CHF funding is not, however, used for the construction of social or 
affordable housing, but rather is for operating budgets and Housing First programs. This 
funding comes from various sources; the CHF oversees federal HPS funding for Calgary, the 
majority of provincial funding for homelessness in Calgary, but it has also fundraised 
significantly from the private sector. There was some opposition to the plan in its early days 
(2008), notably from the largest homeless shelter in Calgary, the Drop-In Centre (see McLean 
2008). This opposition has gradually weakened, however, and there is currently no 
government or non-governmental plan that challenges or complements the CHF’s plan at the 
local level. Up until 2008, the province was completely uninterested in housing and 
homelessness, but this changed when introduced a ten-year plan to end homelessness. At the 
local level, however, the degree of involvement of the local government in the governance of 
homelessness is very weak, and the governance is highly centralized in the CHF. 
Toronto  
In Toronto, homelessness is fully governed by the local government; the city has full 
policy responsibility for housing and by extension homelessness. In the late 1990s, Mike 
Harris’s Progressive Conservative government embarked on an ideological project to reduce 
the size and scope of the provincial government. Part of this so-called “Common Sense 
Revolution” involved downloading the responsibility for social housing to the newly created 
mega-city of Toronto7. The trade of social housing and childcare to the municipal level in 
exchange for uploading education costs to the province was intended to be revenue neutral, 
                                                
7 The amalgamated city of Toronto is made up of 6 former municipalities; North York, East 
York, York, Toronto, Etobicoke, and Scarborough. 
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but in hindsight many actors argue that this gave the city much more than it could handle 
without other more significant structural and financial reforms (interview #54 and #46; Suttor 
2014). Doing what it could with limited resources, the City of Toronto has come to fully 
occupy the policy space regarding housing and homelessness, though its responses have, in 
recent years, come to a relative standstill. 
 The city’s main response to homelessness is the Streets To Homes Program, 
introduced in 1999, which was one of, if not the, first Housing First programs in Canada 
(Falvo 2009). David Miller’s local administration expanded the program in 2005. The City 
government also has a housing policy, Housing Opportunities Toronto (HOT), which spends 
approximately $700 million per year on housing and homelessness services (City of Toronto 
2009a). This funding is mostly operating funding for affordable and supportive housing, but it 
also includes the Streets to Homes program. 
 The City of Toronto is overall unchallenged as the main homelessness policy making 
body in the city, though at key moments in the city’s history, the private sector and the third 
sector have respectively exercised important influence. In the 1990s, a group of activists 
formed the Toronto Disaster Relief Committee (TDRC), which at the time was an active and 
powerful group that defended the rights of the homeless in Toronto. It never had a plan to end 
or reduce homelessness, but was a strong voice advocating for better standards in emergency 
shelters and more government investments in social and affordable housing. In 2012, the 
TDRC officially disbanded, though many of its former members, including Cathy Crowe, 
Michael Shapcott, and David Hulchanski, remain very active in the area of homelessness.  
Up until very recently, the advocate or activist void that was created when the TDRC 
disbanded was not filled; the City of Toronto had exclusive and unchallenged ownership of the 
 29 
issue of homelessness from a policy and political perspective. In 2014, however, the Toronto 
Alliance to End Homelessness (TAEH) was created as a body to represent the interests of 
community groups, researchers, and service providers. The TAEH has come to enjoy a 
productive relationship with the city, though in its early days it was very critical of and even 
hostile to city policy. The TAEH does not have a plan on homelessness, but rather, like the 
TDRC it is an advocacy body that aims to influence policy. It is included here therefore not as 
a group that challenges the City in the actual governance of homelessness, but as a potentially 
important voice in determining what the city decides to do.  
The province currently has a poverty reduction strategy, which includes a goal to end 
homelessness in ten years (Government of Ontario 2014). These developments are reviewed 
more fully in Chapter 5. Despite this re-engagement of the province, the City remains the 
single most important body that governs homelessness in Toronto. The local government is 
highly involved in the governance of homelessness in Toronto, and has strongly centralized 
that power. 
Montreal 
 The province of Quebec has historically exercised significant leadership in social 
policy, even when governed by right-of-centre governments (Noël 2013). Unsurprisingly, 
homelessness in Montréal has up until recently been largely governed by the province, and 
specifically by the Ministère de la Santé et des Services Sociaux (MSSS), which sets priorities 
and allocates funding throughout Québec through is agencies. The Province of Quebec 
introduced a comprehensive and multi-stakeholder policy on homelessness in 2014, one that 
was received well by many service providers and advocates in Montreal and throughout the 
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rest of the province (Montpetit 2014). This move by the provincial government underscored 
the continued provincial interest in the social policy landscape.  
 Despite this provincial plan, there are a number of groups at the local level who 
exercise significant influence in the governance of homelessness. The Réseau d’aide aux 
personnes seules et itinérantes de Montréal (RAPSIM) is a very influential advocacy body 
that represents over 100 organizations that provide services to the homeless population in 
Montréal. Not all service providers in Montréal are members of the RAPSIM (notably, the Old 
Brewery Mission, Montréal’s largest homeless shelter, has never been a member of the 
RAPSIM), but it is a powerful and effective voice when it comes to influencing government 
decisions around homelessness. It does not have a plan to end or reduce homelessness, but it 
has a preferred solution to homelessness – social housing with community support – for which 
it lobbies at all three levels of government. 
Recently, another group called Le mouvement pour mettre fin à l’itinérance de 
Montréal (MMFIM) has emerged at the local level in Montréal, which aims to respond to 
chronic homelessness. The MMFIM aims to respond to homelessness in a way that moves 
away from “managing” homelessness to “ending” it, language that is not unlike that heard in 
other cities in Canada and throughout the USA (Calgary Homeless Foundation 2015b; 
National Alliance to End Homelessness 2015). The MMFIM has developed a comprehensive 
plan to “end” homelessness in 10-years, which is based on lessons learned and best practices 
from Canada and Europe. The plan comes with a significant price tag; the MMFIM estimates 
that ending homelessness for the estimated 2000 chronically homeless people in the city will 
cost approximately $80 million; at time of writing, the plan remains unfunded.  
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Mayor Denis Coderre is also taking a great deal of interest and leadership in the area of 
homelessness, notably by announcing his own action plan on homelessness (CBC News 
2014b). Prior to introducing the plan, the City spent approximately $1 million per year on 
homeless services, mostly by supporting organizations or small projects throughout Montréal. 
With the new plan, the budget has more than doubled to a total of $2.2 million per year for 
three years. The City of Montréal’s action plan contains 4 priorities, 12 actions, and 44 
recommendations, including creating a local watchdog over issues relating to homelessness 
and the implementation of the Point-in-Time count of the homeless population. The 
introduction of this plan is a historic step by the City of Montréal; in the past, the city has had 
a plan or policy on homelessness, but it lined up point for point with provincial actions (see 
Ville de Montréal 2009). For the first time, the City of Montréal now has its own plan with its 
own priorities and actions, which do not line up with the provincial plan. In addition to the 
city’s plan, provincial plan, and MMFIM plan, there is also a regional plan on homelessness, 
which was introduced in October 2015. The plan was developed and is being implemented by 
the Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux (CIUSSS) from the South 
Centre of the island of Montréal. This plan comes with approximately $4 million of public 
funding per year for three years.  
There are a number of actors who are involved in the governance of homelessness in 
Montréal. The City is becoming more involved, but its plan does not have specific targets, and 
is not accompanied by much funding. For this reason, I argue that the degree of involvement 
of the City of Montréal is relatively weak in the governance of homelessness. Further, the 
MMFIM and the RAPSIM are also engaged in the area of homelessness. The governance of 
homelessness in Montréal is therefore, highly fragmented.  
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In this thesis, I seek to explain these different governance models of homelessness 
adopted in these four cities. This question of who does what in the provision of social 
protection is a classic one in the study of the Canadian welfare state, and in the study of 
Canadian politics more generally (Skogstad 2003). The literature on the Canadian welfare 
state, and specifically on who does what in the provision of social protection, has been 
strongly influenced by the study of federalism, meaning the focus has mostly been on the role 
of provincial and federal governments. Housing policy has not often been studied in the 
context of the Canadian welfare state, but when it is has, authors have also highlighted the 
importance of federalism. For example, Albert Rose, in his classic study of housing policy in 
Canada wrote, “the most important background fact in the Canadian housing experience is that 
Canada is a federal state” (Rose 1980, iii). Keith Banting, writing about social policy more 
broadly, has written “Canadians developed their version of the welfare state in the context of a 
vibrant federal state, with strong governments at both the federal and provincial level” 
(Banting 2005a, 89).  
To understand who decides and oversees policies in the Canadian welfare state, we 
must understand federalism and its unique dynamics in Canada. It remains an undeniably 
important factor in understanding what Jenson calls “the distribution of responsibility among 
the producers of welfare” (Jenson 2013, 46). The constitutional division of powers, and how 
intergovernmental relations have evolved over different periods of Canadian history, explain 
why the federal and provincial governments provide the social services that they do. Yet, this 
literature has been silent on the role of local governments; from the perspective of federalism, 
cities are not orders of government and have no constitutional protection or policy 
responsibility.  
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Changes to the welfare state in much of Canada through the 1980s and 1990s, 
however, compel us to take another look at this question of who does what in the welfare state, 
this time considering the local role as well. Through cuts, downloading, and retrenchment, 
many senior governments – both federal and provincial – have backed away from the 
provision of social services such as housing, and have reduced social assistance benefits. Rice 
and Prince write, “social safety nets are now badly frayed and closer to the ground” (2013, 
137). Noël has shown how Quebec took a different route by making different decisions 
throughout this period, expanding important parts of the welfare state while governments were 
retrenching in other provinces, but even Quebec has struggled with increasing poverty and 
homelessness, especially among single people (see Chapter 4).  
In short, changes to the welfare state in the 1980s and 1990s made local actors more 
powerful in the provision of social services. Of course, provincial governments play an 
important role in structuring what happens at the local level, both in terms of how their social 
policies shape the needs at the local level and through the powers that they grant to local 
governments. But to truly understand what explains the different governance models, we must 
dive right down to the local level. Though structured by the provinces, I argue that the 
different governance models are the result of unique local dynamics in each of the cities. 
Research Design 
This section outlines the research design of the project, including methods and 
theoretical contributions. This thesis is a small-N comparative study of the governance of 
homelessness in four large Canadian cities. Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal are the 
biggest and most important cities in Canada, and they are all at the forefront of the struggle 
with a growing homeless population. Through interviews, archival research and participant 
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observation, I test three hypotheses derived from the literature on the welfare state and urban 
governance (see Chapter 2). The first two hypotheses relate to the role of the local government 
in the governance of homelessness. Specifically, the first hypothesis is that cities have 
different housing related powers. The second hypothesis is that cities have degrees of different 
political commitment to the issue of homelessness. The third hypothesis is that the 
organization of local social forces determines whether the governance of homelessness is 
centralized in one body or fractured among various groups. 
These hypotheses were tested through a mixed-method, qualitative approach using 
interviews, participant observation, and archival research. Between January and October 2014, 
I conducted over 100 semi-structured interviews with actors involved in the governance of 
homelessness in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal. This included but was not 
limited to elected officials and bureaucrats at the municipal, provincial and federal levels; 
activists; service providers; the police; and private sector representatives. I identified the 
actors with whom I conducted interviews in part through primary document research. For 
example, in 2008 Mayor Gregor Robertson set up a task force on homelessness. Members of 
the task force were listed publicly, so I contacted them all for an interview request. I also 
asked interviewees to identify any other key actors with whom I should speak, a method called 
“snowballing” (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). In some cases, certain names came up again and 
again in interviews. When this was the case, I requested an interview with that person. The 
majority of people I contacted for interview requests agreed, though a limitation of this 
methodology is that some important actors did not consent to an interview. Often it was high 
profile individuals with busy schedules; where possible, I have sought out their public 
statements on homelessness.  
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The interview method is often described as “a conversation with a purpose” (Berg 
2011, 89). In the case of this thesis, the purpose of the interviews was to understand the 
development of the local homelessness governance networks and also to contribute to my 
analysis of the organization of local social forces. The questions and overall interview 
structure were designed in accordance with social science interviewing principles and 
guidelines so that they would yield systematic and comparable data, but they were flexible 
enough to be adapted to different people. Specifically, I conducted semi-structured (or semi-
standard) interviews. In this type of interview, a number of questions are systematically asked 
to all interviewees. However, this interview method allows for flexibility as well; “the 
interviewers are allowed freedom to digress; that is, the interviewed are permitted (in fact, 
expected) to probe far beyond the answers to their prepared standardized questions” (Berg 
2011, 95).  
When conducting semi-structure interviews, it is a common practice for researchers to 
develop a “topic guide” (Jelen 2013) or an “interview schedule” (Berg, 2011) for the 
interview. This allows for the in depth discussion of relatively broad, open-ended questions. 
My topic guide contained four questions, which were asked to all interviewees: 
1. Why did you become involved in the area of homelessness in your city? 
2. What is your role in the overall fight to end homelessness in your city? 
3. What causes homelessness? 
4. What is the solution to homelessness? 
 
I also asked many follow up questions to each interviewee and, in some cases I 
prepared specific questions for certain actors. Each interview was recorded (with the 
knowledge and permission of the interviewee), and was transcribed fully to allow for accurate, 
detailed analysis.  
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 An important weakness of the interview method is that memories of important events 
may fade, or alternatively, actors may consciously omit or change parts of the story. Further, 
when doing a limited number of interviews, there is always the possibility of selection bias, 
which can lead to a skewed representation of reality. This problem is often at the heart of 
social science research questions and qualitative research designs, especially those related to 
an intensely personal and complex question such as homelessness. One way of responding to 
this concern is to conduct interviews to the point of saturation (Denzin and Lincoln 2005; 
Jelen 2013). This is difficult to achieve in general in qualitative research, and in an area of 
public policy that is as broad and as poorly defined as homelessness. For these reasons, it is 
useful for qualitative researchers to triangulate. Triangulation involves testing facts against 
one another, which results in a more complete reflection of reality; “every method is a 
different line of sight directed toward the same point, observing social and symbolic reality. 
By combining several lines of sight, researchers obtain a better, more substantive picture of 
reality” (Berg 2011; 5). 
 Archival research was one of the ways I triangulated. By reviewing primary 
documents, such as annual reports, policies, plans and newspaper articles, I was able to put the 
interviews in a broader context and relate what one person said to another data source. I also 
used books and secondary sources to check facts. In addition to the formal interviews, in all 
four cities I also had a number of informal meetings with journalists, academics, and activists 
to test ideas and evidence that was presented during the interviews. 
 The final method I used to triangulate was participant observation, primarily in 
Montréal. Patton (2002) calls participant observation “an omnibus field strategy” (265) 
because it allows the researcher to gather information in various formal and informal ways. 
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Denzin (1978) specifies that participant observation “simultaneously combines document 
analysis, interviewing of respondents and informants, direct participation and observation, and 
introspection” (183). This method was only available to me in Montreal, where a new actor – 
the Mouvement pour mettre fin à l’itinérance de Montréal – began to form and gain influence 
as I started my fieldwork in 2013. Upon interviewing a number of members of the network, I 
was invited to their meetings to present my research. With the permission of the leadership of 
the new movement, I eventually began to observe most network meetings; I took notes during 
the meetings and breaks, I had informal conversations with members of the movement and 
asked questions regarding homelessness in Montreal. Further, as my role became more that of 
a participant, I was invited on calls with national leadership (including the Homeless Hub and 
the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness), and was involved in a number of email chains 
discussing the movement and its place within Montreal’s policy community. I also attended a 
number of meetings regarding homelessness with the City of Montreal, notably regarding the 
2015 Point-in-Time homeless count. This provided crucial insight not only into the actions of 
key public policy actors, but also into how they fit with respect to one another. 
 The risk of participant observation is that the researcher might, consciously or 
unconsciously, become biased in her analysis. Indeed, I was not able to observe the meetings 
or emails of the other main Montreal actor, the Réseau d’aide aux personnes seules et 
itinérantes de Montréal. To prevent such bias, I was able to conduct a number of interviews 
with actors aligned with this group, and I conducted significant archival and primary 
document research to fully understand the role of the RAPSIM in the governance of 
homelessness in Montreal. 
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Theoretical Contributions 
This dissertation makes four main theoretical contributions. First, it supports the 
growing literature, mostly on urban governance but also on federalism, that cities are 
becoming more powerful actors within the Canadian intergovernmental system. They are not 
just implementing provincial policies (taking policy), but are also developing their own 
(making policy). The paucity of powers, notably financial, has seriously limited the ability of 
cities to fully engage in the public policy process, and they are actively demanding more 
powers from the provinces. But municipal authorities are not sitting around and waiting for the 
provinces to comply, but rather are innovating and acting, often with insufficient and 
inappropriate tools, to develop public policy. Further, in taking a close look at their role in the 
governance of homelessness, it becomes very apparent that local governments are not all 
behaving the same; they are making political decisions and calculations, and in some cases are 
building and leading coalitions of other local actors in the fight against homelessness. In short, 
cities are acting very much like governments. This thesis is therefore a part of a larger story 
about the place of cities in the intergovernmental framework. 
Related to this first contribution regarding the intergovernmental framework, this 
research also sheds light on the place of the local level more broadly in the production of 
social protection. Rice and Prince have written that the welfare state is badly frayed and close 
to the ground. This is an important comment, especially when we compare the current welfare 
state with what existed following the Second World War when social policies were expanding 
rapidly. But as the federal and provincial governments failed to respond to the new social risk 
of homelessness, local actors began developing their own responses to fill the gaps created by 
the senior governments. They were and are doing so with wholly inadequate tools, but they 
have been having some success. The social safety net remains close to the ground, to be sure, 
 39 
but local actors – including governments, the private sector and the third sector – are doing 
their best to mend the nets, plug the holes, and fill the gaps that have been created by the two 
orders of government. To fully understand who is doing what with respect to homelessness 
and to grasp how the welfare state has evolved, we must look not just at provincial and federal 
levels, but at the local level as well.  
Thirdly, this thesis brings the study of housing and homelessness into Canadian studies 
on the welfare state. In Canada and abroad, housing has been studied more as an economic 
policy than a social policy (Bacher 1993; Torgersen 1987), even though it has been and 
continues to be an important part of the welfare state (Béland 2010). Yet the rise of chronic 
homelessness around the world as a new social risk that affects all kind of people has forced a 
re-think – of both policy and scholarship – of housing as an important part of the social safety 
net. Bringing the study of housing and homelessness directly into the literature on the welfare 
state will strengthen our understanding of social protection in Canada, and result in more 
complete theories of the welfare state and its evolution. Indeed, studying housing from this 
perspective both confirms and challenges existing theories of the evolution on the welfare 
state.  
On the one hand, it confirms how the evolution of the welfare state has mirrored the 
evolution of federalism, with federal and provincial governments asserting more leadership at 
different points in Canadian history, depending on the nature of federalism. It also confirms 
existing theories regarding what Banting (2005b) calls the new paradigm of social policy. This 
new paradigm invests more in human capital than in redistribution; “education and training are 
carrying too much weight in the new social discourse, and a successful strategy of investing in 
human capital cannot be divorced from issues of poverty and inequality” (Banting 2005b, 
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421). This new paradigm, Banting argues, does not include a redistributive complement to the 
investments in human capital; this is seen quite clearly with homelessness, where policies 
focus on investments in health and social supports, but do not include any meaningful income 
security complement. As the chapter on provincial social policies will demonstrate, the social 
assistance incomes offered to chronically homeless people in all provinces is 40-50% below 
the poverty line. Indeed, chronic homelessness and the policy responses to it is perhaps the 
most obvious evidence of this shift towards a new welfare state, which focuses on investments 
for the future and less on poverty alleviation for those who are presently poor. 
But studying housing policy within the context of the welfare state also challenges this 
literature, notably by highlighting the very important role that is being played by local level 
actors. Much of this literature, which focuses just on provincial and federal governments, 
misses a significant part of the picture. Whether it is municipal governments using by-laws 
and zoning powers to create more units of affordable housing, the private sector contributing 
capital funding to new developments, or community groups innovating in new forms of social 
supports, the local level is a vital player in the production of social protection for the other 1%. 
As more and more complex social problems are concentrated in Canada’s biggest cities 
(Bradford 2005), scholars should continue to look at what is happening not just at the 
provincial and federal levels, but they must also consider the local level as well. In other 
words, a multilevel perspective on new social risks and challenges will be increasingly 
relevant in today’s context where the local level is very active and important. 
There are also practical implications to this research. Looking at these different 
governance models, one might ask if it is “better” to be homeless in one city rather than 
another. The short answer is no. On the one hand, homelessness is experienced very 
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differently by different people; the experience of a woman on the street is different than the 
experience of a man, aboriginal people have different experiences than do non-aboriginal 
people, for example. Looking at the services that are offered and how they are organized, 
Vancouver is perhaps slightly “better” for an aboriginal person than Montreal is, but Montreal 
is perhaps better for women than Vancouver, though homelessness is of course a nearly 
universally negative, stressful, and undesirable situation. 
The discussion chapter will consider this question more fully, but ultimately concludes 
that each governance model has important flaws, which make it difficult for the most 
vulnerable people to find and keep housing. The governance models should not bear exclusive 
responsibility for the failure of local actors to “end” homelessness, however. As the pages that 
follow will make very clear, homelessness is a very complex and challenging area of public 
policy, one that no single level of government or no single sector of society can solve on its 
own. The fact that the federal government has been absent from discussions regarding housing 
and homelessness for over 20 years is perhaps enough to ensure that the successes of local 
fights against homelessness will be limited at best. This thesis ends on an optimistic note, 
however, as powerful actors at all levels of government now seem to recognize the importance 
of investments in housing and homelessness services; with the federal government back at the 
table and promising important investments in housing, local and provincial actors will have 
much needed support for their efforts and might expect to see greater successes in the coming 
years. 
Thesis Outline 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into seven chapters. In the following chapter, I 
review the literature on the welfare state and urban governance and present my theoretical 
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framework. I argue that existing theories of social protection in Canada tend to focus on the 
federal and provincial levels as the main producers of social protection. But by ignoring the 
local level, theories of the welfare state in Canada are incomplete. These existing theories fail 
to capture new actors in the welfare state, notably local governments and other non-state local 
actors, and the role they play in developing and implementing social policies. I therefore 
review the small literature on urban public policy to build a theoretical framework for the first 
part of this empirical puzzle regarding the different degree of involvement of local 
governments in the governance of homelessness. The theories of urban governance provide 
further insight into the governance of homelessness in these four cities and why it is 
fragmented in some cases but centralized in others. This second section of the literature review 
thus reviews different theories and models of urban governance in Canada and other 
developed countries and presents the second part of the theoretical framework, which relates 
to the centralization or fragmentation of the local governance model. 
The third chapter is primarily descriptive; it the history of homelessness in Canada and 
then reviews the historic role of the federal government in housing policy and more recently in 
homelessness policy. The next four chapters are the empirical heart of the dissertation. The 
first two empirical chapters present and compare the provincial social policy environments 
that structure the local responses to homelessness. The first of these chapters compares 
provincial housing policies. The second compares provincial efforts to reduce or alleviate 
poverty and consider poverty reduction strategies and social assistance benefit rates in the four 
provinces. These chapters conclude that while the provincial environment is an inevitably 
important factor that influences local responses to homelessness, there is clearly a gap in all 
four provincial safety nets, the most extreme manifestation of which is chronic homelessness.  
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The question of who fills this gap is a distinctly local question. Digging down to the 
local level, the third and fourth empirical chapters argue that local community groups and 
governments have mobilized in a way that is unique not to their respective provinces, but to 
their cities. The third empirical chapter compares the local housing related powers and 
political commitment to the issue of homelessness in the four cities; these factors explain the 
role of the local government in the governance of homelessness. The final empirical chapter 
argues that the governance model reflects the broader distribution of power at the urban level 
among local social forces. In other words, I conclude that the organization of these social 
forces determine the centralization or fragmentation of the governance of homelessness. 
The eighth chapter brings the conclusions of each empirical chapter together with the 
literature for the final analysis of the main research question. A comparison of these four cities 
demonstrates that local government and non-government actors are more important in the 
provision of social protection that the literature on the Canadian welfare state theorizes. This 
thesis does not counter in any way the central role of the two orders of government in the 
development and evolution of the welfare state, but argues that a great deal is missed if we do 
not also look at the local level. The implications of this increasing role of the local level is 
discussed in this concluding chapter, including what it means for how Canada is governed as 
well as the state of social protection in Canada.
Chapter 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 
This dissertation confronts an empirical puzzle in the Canadian welfare state. In the 
absence of federal and provincial interventions in the area of housing and homelessness during 
the 1990s and 2000s, visible and chronic homelessness began to rise rapidly in big Canadian 
cities. During that time, groups at the local level stepped up to fill the gap that created by 
federal and provincial governments in the welfare state. Yet despite facing the same problem 
at a similar scale, groups came together in very different ways to form very different 
governance models in Canada’s four biggest and most important cities.  
There are two main differences in the local governance models: the degree of 
involvement of the local government in the governance of homelessness, and the degree to 
which the model is fractured among different actors or centralized in one. In Vancouver, the 
city government is very involved in the governance of homelessness, but another group (the 
StreetoHome Foundation) has also developed, funded, and implemented its own plan on 
homelessness. In Calgary, the city government is not involved in the governance of 
homelessness; power is rather centralized in a non-governmental body, the Calgary Homeless 
Foundation. In Toronto, the city is very involved, having been given the responsibility for 
housing and homelessness from the provincial government in the 1990s. There is no other 
non-governmental body in Toronto that participates in a formalized way in the governance of 
homelessness. Finally, in Montreal, the city government is becoming more involved in the 
governance of homelessness, but there are two other groups that are also influential in this 
area, making its governance highly fragmented. I ask why there are such different models of 
local governance of homelessness in these four cities. In other words, why are there such 
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different producers of social security in these four cities, even though they are facing the same 
problem at a similar scale? 
This question of who does what is a classic one in the study of the Canadian welfare 
state. Because of the constitutional foundation of Canada and the multinational nature of the 
country, answers to this question have placed particular importance on federalism and on the 
federal and provincial governments as the main producers of social security. The 
constitutional division of powers and the evolving nature of federalism over the course of 
Canadian history have largely determined which level of government is responsible for which 
social policies. Provincial and federal governments are undeniably important actors in the 
welfare state, but in the 1980s and 1990s the federal and many provincial governments backed 
away from important areas of social policy, notably housing, and chronic homelessness 
increased quickly in urban centres across the country. In this context, the local level – 
including local governments, the private sector and the third sector – has become a more 
relevant and important producer of social protection than it has been in the past.  
Given these changes to the welfare state, we must again ask the classic question “who 
does what?” but this time paying particular attention to the local level. Specifically, why are 
there such different models of governance of homelessness in Canada’s four largest cities? In 
this literature review, I review the literature and justify the theoretical framework that I use to 
respond to this question. This chapter begins by briefly reviewing the literature regarding the 
Canadian welfare state, paying particular attention to the question of who does what and to the 
literature on federalism and the welfare state. This literature is an important backdrop to this 
thesis, but it falls short in that it does not adequately consider the role of the local level in the 
production of social protection in Canada. Finding that the literature on federalism and the 
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welfare state does not speak adequately to the role of the local level in the welfare state, I turn 
to the small literature on urban policy-making in Canada and build a theoretical framework to 
explain why the four local governments are involved to differing degrees in the governance of 
homelessness across Canada. I hypothesize that two factors determine the degree of 
involvement of the local government: the local housing related powers of the city government 
and the political commitment of the local government to the issue of homelessness.  
This literature stresses that local governments are important actors in urban 
governance, but often notes that municipalities do not have enough power or resources to 
govern on their own. They must therefore work with other local actors where possible, notably 
the private sector and the third sector, to govern more effectively. Staying at the local level, 
the final section of this chapter reviews the literature on urban governance more broadly, 
paying particular attention to the role of local social forces, including the private sector and the 
third sector, in the urban governance of these four cities. Based on this literature, I hypothesize 
that the centralization or fragmentation of the governance models is determined by the relative 
strength of these different local social forces in the overall governance of the city.  
Federalism and the Welfare State 
The question of who does what is a classic one in the study of the welfare state, and in 
Canadian politics more generally (Skogstad 2003). In Canada, studies of the governance of the 
welfare state have typically approached this question from the point of view of federalism. As 
federalism in Canada has evolved, so too has the division of responsibilities in the welfare 
state. Indeed, one reading of the history of the evolution of federalism could, in fact, identify 
the welfare state as the most important battleground between federal and provincial 
governments. As Banting argues; “provincial governments… fought to recapture tax room to 
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finance education, health, and social services on their own terms. In effect, the struggle was 
for control over the Canadian welfare state” (Banting 2012, 144; emphasis added).  
Authors such as Simeon, Robinson and Wallner (2014); Noël (2001, 2009), Banting 
(Banting 1987, 1990, 2005a), Rice and Prince (2000, 2013), Battle and Torjman (2002), 
Pelletier and Tremblay (2009), and Choudry et al (2006) to name a few, have considered how 
the changing nature of federalism has affected who produces social protection in Canada. To 
make things more interesting, the nature of federalism in Canada has been and continues to be 
contested both in the literature and in practice (Rocher 2009; Rocher and Fafard 2013). 
Studies of the federal welfare state are thus often accompanied by an explicit or implicit 
assumption regarding who should do what. Debates surrounding centralization versus 
decentralization (Battle and Torjman 2002; Gagnon 2009; Noël 1999; Rice and Prince 2013), 
the fiscal imbalance (Noël 2009), and the spending power (Choudhry, Sossin, and Gaudreault-
DesBiens 2006; Noël 2008) are often at the heart of this literature.  
Studies of federalism and the welfare state have been correct to highlight the important 
role played by provincial and federal governments in the development, expansion, and 
evolution of social protection in Canada. This literature remains relevant today, and scholars 
of the welfare state in Canada must continue to consider the many ways that federalism 
(including its contested and multinational nature in Canada) affects not just who does what in 
Canada, but also how effective policies are as well as how and why they change. However, it 
is not the intention of this literature review to settle these debates, nor even to review them 
fully. Rather, it is to highlight two important blind spots in this significant body of literature 
regarding who does what in the welfare state, which this thesis aims to fill. 
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 First, it is curious that housing policy is so often ignored in studies of the Canadian 
welfare state. Given the involvement of federal, provincial and municipal governments in 
housing policy, and the substantial changes in terms of policy leadership responsibility, this 
blindspot is troubling. Canadian welfare scholars have been more inclined to study income 
security (Banting 1987; Béland and Daigneault 2015; Boychuk 1998; Rice and Prince 2013), 
health policy (Boychuk 2008; Maioni 1997), education policy (Wallner 2010, 2014), and 
pensions (Myles 1989). Banting’s widely cited chapter “Social Housing in a Divided Federal 
State” in Housing the Homeless and the Poor (1990) represents one of the only attempts to 
analyze the history of housing policy within the context of the evolving Canadian welfare state 
(Suttor 2014).  
The theoretical silence on the place of housing within the welfare state is not unique to 
Canada; housing has long been called the “wobbly pillar of the welfare state” (Torgersen 
1987) in Europe as well. Torgerson writes, “I believe that housing always will occupy a 
special and awkward position in welfare thinking due to the special nature of the commodity 
in question” (ibid 116). He compares housing to other areas of the welfare state, such as 
pensions, education, and health; “each of these three domains are thus not just a type of human 
concern, but a fairly institutionalized complex, with well-defined borders, esprit de corps and a 
national director” (118). Torgerson notes that there important differences with housing, such 
as “no immediate action in the provision for help. This area also has less of a body of 
professionals” (ibid). For this reason, housing is the “odd-man out in the welfare company” 
(ibid).  
As is the case in Europe, Canadian studies of housing policy have often emphasized its 
economic orientation. Indeed, the housing system in Canada is overwhelmingly dependent on 
 49 
the private sector, more so than any other country in the OECD including the United States 
(Hulchanski 2002). One of the main books on the history of housing policy in Canada is called 
Keeping to the Marketplace, reflecting the economic theoretical and policy orientation housing 
policy. Indeed, when the federal government conducted a review of social services in the 
1990s, housing was not even considered (Prince 1998). 
Yet housing is and has always been an important component of the welfare state 
(Béland 2010) and is a known determinant of the success of other social policies (Carter and 
Polevychok 2004). Further, the rise of chronic homelessness around the world as a new social 
risk, and one that touches an increasingly broad and diverse group of people, has forced 
scholars and practitioners alike to rethink housing policy as not just an economic policy but as 
a social policy as well. Homelessness is not just about housing, but at the most basic level it is 
always about housing, and solutions to it often have the need for more affordable housing at 
their very centre. Not just an economic good, housing is increasingly seen as a tool for social 
policy as well. 
Bringing housing policy into the literature on the Canadian welfare state makes for an 
important contribution to the understanding of how federalism has evolved throughout history, 
and how its evolution has affected the governance of the welfare state. It also gives us a more 
complete understanding of how the welfare state protects the most vulnerable; in other words, 
if we look at housing and homelessness related interventions, is the safety net as frayed and as 
many scholars (see Rice and Prince 2013; Prince 1998) argue that it is? Given the involvement 
of different governments and the great changes that have taken place in terms of its leadership, 
the study of housing from the perspective of the welfare state will shed important light on the 
dynamics of federalism (notably its increasingly multilevel nature) and the evolution of social 
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protection for the most vulnerable Canadians who have become homeless. In short, bringing 
the study of housing and homelessness into the literature on the federal welfare state both 
confirms and challenges some of the main conclusions of this literature. 
 The second oversight in the literature on federalism and the welfare state is its silence 
on the role of local governments, and the local level more generally, as producers of social 
protection. This is, understandably perhaps, because local governments have no constitutional 
status in Canada and in law are nothing but creatures of the provinces with very few legal and 
financial powers. As Turgeon writes, “these omissions are nonetheless understandable given 
the limited economic and political resources available to municipal governments” (Turgeon 
2009, 358).  
This cursory treatment of the local level is, however, problematic. The changes to the 
welfare state that will be outlined in the following chapters illustrate how the federal 
government and many provincial governments backed away from important areas of social 
policy in the 1980s and 1990s, notably housing, and how this contributed to the rise of poverty 
and chronic homelessness across the country. The need for affordable housing and adequate 
social supports did not disappear however, and the tacit assumption that the private sector 
would create affordable housing ultimately did not prove true. Rice and Prince write that 
during the 1980s, “faith in the redistributive capacities of the welfare state decreased… It was 
argued that the state needed to expand the market’s role, not constrain it” (Rice and Prince 
2013, 114). They note that the result of these changes was the rise in the number of food 
banks, which started to appear in Canada in the 1980s, as well as increased reliance on soup 
kitchens and emergency shelters. Noël agrees, writing that “poverty and economic insecurity 
increased in Canada in the 1990s, and to a large extent this can be attributed to changes in 
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income security programs” (2001, 15). In other words, Rice and Prince argue, “social safety 
nets are now badly frayed and closer to the ground” (2013, 137).  
 Banting and Myles argue that conscious government decisions to cut social policy 
spending and programs contributed to the weakening of the social safety net, but so too did 
government inaction. They write, “taxes and transfers are no longer offsetting the growth in 
equality generated by the market, and Canadian society has become more unequal… policy 
drift has compounded the problem. Governments have failed to modernize the policy 
architecture in light of new social risks facing Canadians” (2013a, 412). Throughout the late 
1990s and early 2000s, both senior levels of government very clearly failed to respond to the 
new social risk of chronic homelessness. Where they did respond, it was in short-term and 
woefully underfunded programs, such as the federal National Homelessness Initiative (which 
has today become the Homelessness Partnering Strategy). Even federal government reviews of 
these programs conclude that they failed to meet the needs of the homeless population, largely 
because they were not designed to address the root of the problem: a lack of affordable 
housing and intensive social supports to help people remain housed (Canada, Human 
Resources and Skills Development Canada 2008, 2009). In other words, federal and provincial 
government failed to implement policies to help people exit homelessness, or that would 
prevent people from becoming homeless in the first place.  
 Looking at these changes and putting them in the context of changes to the welfare 
state around the world, Banting (2006) argues that, beginning in the 1980s, has been a 
paradigm shift in Canadian social policy. The postwar model was one of embedded liberalism, 
which “combined liberalization of the economy with the expansion of social security programs 
designed to provide economic security for the population as a whole” (Banting 2006, 417). In 
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contrast, the new model “places greater emphasis on providing citizens with the knowledge 
and skills required to prosper in a knowledge-based economy. Wherever possible, we are told, 
the primary goal of policy reform should be investing in human capital rather than 
redistributing income” (ibid). In practice, Banting concludes that Canadian governments have 
embraced the discourse of this new human investment paradigm, but have been more 
interested in cutting income transfers than in investing in education and training. He writes 
that this has important consequences; “it exposes the unskilled of today, especially older 
workers, to a harsher world with weakened protection systems” (ibid, 418). 
 There are important theoretical debates surrounding this new social investment welfare 
state, and this literature review cannot review them fully. But the point made by Banting is an 
important one to keep in mind; the post-war welfare state was one that aimed to protect 
everyone from new risks in an increasingly liberalized economy. The new approach to social 
policy sees social protection not as protection from change but rather as protection as the 
capacity to change, through education and training programs (Banting 2006, 420). This 
paradigm leaves certain people behind; Banting notes that older unskilled workers face a 
harsher world with fewer protections, but the same can be said for many other people who 
currently live in poverty. The welfare state does not protect low-income Canadians as much as 
it did in the post-war era; a small minority of this low-income population will become 
chronically homeless. The new social policy paradigm has little to offer this population, who 
have been left behind by efforts to invest in training and education at the expense of income 
security. 
 The story of retrenchment and policy drift did not play out exactly the same in each 
Canadian province, of course. The chapters on provincial social policies elaborate on efforts 
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by provincial governments to stem the rise of poverty. Some of these efforts, such as plans to 
fight poverty in the province of Quebec and its continuing investments in the construction of 
social and affordable housing, were in part successful. Importantly, the province’s efforts 
lifted many families and children out of poverty (Québec, Ministère de l’Emploi, de la 
Solidarité et de la Famille 2014). But even in the province of Quebec, where the social safety 
net expanded while it was retrenching in most other parts of the country and where 
considerable efforts and resources were deployed to fight poverty, inequality grew and chronic 
homelessness became an increasingly visible problem, especially in Montreal. 
The literature on the governance of the welfare state has in some cases argued that 
families, the private sector, or the third sector have filled the social policy gaps created by 
provincial and federal governments during and following this period of cuts and drift. Jenson 
(2013), for example, builds on the work of Esping-Andersen and colleagues (2002) regarding 
what they call the architecture of the welfare state. Esping-Andersen and colleagues argue that 
the responsibility for producing welfare is divided among three sectors: families, markets, and 
governments. Jenson instead proposes a four-sided image, a “welfare diamond”, which 
includes families, markets, governments, and the voluntary sector as the most important 
producers of social security. This is an important contribution to the evolving story of who is 
responsible for providing social protection in Canada, and the private sector and the third 
sector will play an important role in the story that is told in this thesis. Jenson’s welfare 
diamond does not, however, include local governments. This literature on the governance of 
the welfare state, even when it expands beyond a look just at provincial and federal 
governments, misses the very important role played by local actors in the production of social 
protection in Canada. 
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Scholars seeking to understand the evolution of the welfare state must continue to pay 
attention not just to the evolution of federalism, but also to the competing interpretations of 
federalism. But changes to the welfare state have made local actors more important producers 
of social protection. In other words, when faced with federal and provincial inaction in the 
area of chronic homelessness, the local level has become a more relevant and powerful actor 
in the social safety net in the 1990s and early 2000s, particularly for the most vulnerable 
citizens. Given these changes to the welfare state, it is clear that it is time to reconsider the 
question “who does what” in the Canadian welfare state, this time looking not just at senior 
orders of government, but also taking a close look at the local level as well.  
Urban Social Policy 
Urban scholars in Canada have long recognized the importance of the local level as a 
producer of social protection. Graham, Phillips and Maslove, for example, write, “economic 
restructuring and downloading of responsibilities from federal and provincial governments 
have a direct impact on urban governments. It is municipal governments that eventually must 
fill many of these program and financial gaps or bear the social costs of poverty” (1998, 1). 
Fallis and Murray write, “within Canada, the local level seems to be taking on a larger role in 
social housing policy, almost by default” (11). Writing specifically on the role of municipal 
governments in the area of social housing policy, Carter and McAfee (in their contribution to 
Fallis and Murray’s book) observe, “when community needs are not met, pressure is placed 
first on local government officials to respond… So municipalities do tackle housing problems, 
though often with inappropriate tools and inadequate funds” (1990, 227). This dissertation 
picks up where these and other urban scholars have left off, and brings this discussion into 
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direct conversation with what we already know about the welfare state and who produces 
social protection in Canada. 
To fully understand the role played by the local level in the production of social 
protection, we must therefore turn to the literature on urban governance and the growing 
literature on multilevel governance. Despite the trend of relegating the study of the local level 
to the margins of political science in the United States and Canada (Eidleman and Taylor 
2010; Judd 2005; Peterson 1981; Sellers and Lidström 2007), cities are drawing the attention 
of scholars for a number of reasons. For example, cities are increasingly important players on 
the international stage (Bradford and Bramwell 2014; Courchene 2007; FCM 2009; Good 
2009; Graham, Phillips, and Maslove 1998; Horak and Young 2012; Magnussen 2015). 
Thomas Courchene argues that global city regions such as Toronto, Montréal, Vancouver and 
Calgary, “are home to dense concentrations of knowledge and human capital networks” 
(Courchene 2007, 215), making cities particularly important players in the knowledge-based 
economy. And while he argues that democracy at the national level is in crisis around the 
world, Barber (2013) audaciously advances that Mayors are already starting to rule the 
increasingly interdependent world.  
Further, as this thesis argues, local actors are important producers of social protection 
in Canada. On the one hand, this is because some provinces have directly offloaded social 
policy responsibilities to municipalities (Graham et al. 1998). The province of Ontario, for 
example, formally gave the responsibility for social housing to municipal governments in 
exchange for the responsibility for education, a deal that many argue gave municipalities 
excessive responsibility without adequate resources (see for example Sancton and Young 
2009; Suttor 2014). On the other hand, however, provincial and federal governments have 
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placed tremendous stress on municipalities by cutting social programs. In many provinces, 
cuts to social housing and the introduction of more restrictive and less generous social 
assistance benefits in the late 1990s and early 2000s created considerable gaps in the safety 
net. Graham et al. call this the “dis-spending power” of provincial and federal governments, 
and argue that “virtually every Canadian city has been subject to downloading and shrinking 
provincial transfers” (181). To paraphrase Graham et al., the need for social services did not 
disappear when provincial and federal governments stopped funding them. Cities are left to fill 
the gap in programs and services.  
Good notes that there is a third way that senior governments can download 
responsibility to the local level, making local actors more important policy makers. She writes 
that this occurs when “upper levels of government fail to consider the place-specific 
consequences of their public-policy decisions” (Good 2009, 237-38). This is perhaps a type of 
policy drift, in that it fails to identify and therefore respond adequately to the different 
iterations of the same public policy problem in different regions or spaces across the country. 
Good notes that the role that is played by municipalities in multiculturalism policy is an 
example of this type of downloading; the same can be said for homelessness. Her comparative 
study of the construction of municipal multiculturalism policies is “one piece of a more 
fundamental story about the emerging importance of municipal governments in the Canadian 
intergovernmental system” (Good 2009, 13). My work builds on this important conclusion. 
Though they do not have formal Constitutional status as government, cities are 
increasingly ambitious and audacious in their place in the governance of Canadians. This, 
despite the fact that they continue to operate under remarkably constrained financial 
limitations, with their revenue sources largely limited to user fees and the limited and 
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regressive property tax (Graham, Phillips, and Maslove 1998; Sancton and Young 2009; Smith 
and Spicer Forthcoming) Despite stretched financial resources, recent changes in many 
provinces suggest that large cities are on their way to becoming more equal partners in 
intergovernmental relations as opposed to the “bit players” they have often been assumed to be 
(Graham, Phillips, and Maslove 1998, 1). While not all provinces have moved in the same 
direction and at similar speeds towards granting the local level greater local autonomy and 
therefore control over its affairs, Sancton and Young conclude, “the general picture… is one 
of significant change in the last few decades, change that has facilitated the emergence of 
Canadian municipal governments as a full partner in many new forms of intergovernmental 
collaboration” (18; see also Horak and Young 2012). This greater autonomy makes the lack of 
financial resources at the municipal level particularly challenging (Robertson and Nenshi 
2012). 
 The fact that scholars of urban politics are convinced that studying cities is important is 
obviously not surprising. They are not the only ones, however, to call for greater attention to 
cities; indeed, scholars of federalism and intergovernmental relations are also noting the 
importance of cities, especially large ones, in Canadian governance. For example, Rice and 
Prince (2010, 2013) appreciate the increasing role for cities, notably within the social policy 
domain. They argue that cutbacks in the area of social policy at the provincial and federal 
levels have “deeply fragmenting effects” (121), and they express concern about a potential 
situation in which cities offer drastically different social services, including privatized 
services. Whether one shares this specific concern or not, it is clear that what is happening at 
the municipal level is important to the structure and effectiveness of the social safety net. 
Cameron and Simeon’s (2002) article on the evolution of intergovernmental relations in 
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Canada is another example. They note that cities are not often considered important 
governments in the study of Canadian intergovernmental relations, but argue, “it will become 
increasingly necessary to look at the role of local, territorial, and Aboriginal governments and 
their interface with provincial, national, and international governments” (69).  
 Thus, while urban scholars are deeply convinced of the importance of cities and the 
local level more generally, scholars of federalism and the welfare state also recognize the role 
that cities, especially large ones, are coming to play in the development and implementation of 
the social safety net. Graham, Phillips and Maslove argue that to understand the role that 
urban governments are playing in the welfare state and Canadian governance more generally, 
we must look at urban governments as just that, governments and not mere service providers. 
Leading theorist of local governments Warren Magnussen agrees; “we need to get beyond an 
approach that identifies the municipality with the local community and treats all municipalities 
alike. It means taking space and time – geography and history – seriously” (Magnussen 2015, 
109). The theoretical framework that has been built does just that: treats local governments as 
governments, with interests, ideologies, and an ability to construct networks and coalitions to 
achieve their policy goals. To this end, the following section of the literature review focuses 
on the role of local governments in the public policy process in Canada, and builds a 
theoretical framework to answer the first question regarding the local governance models for 
homelessness: why do local governments play such different roles in the governance of 
homelessness? 
Helpfully, some authors of urban politics have written specifically on the role of local 
governments in the elaboration of social housing policy. While social housing policy and 
policies to fight homelessness are of course distinct things, the literature review and the 
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theoretical framework that it leads to draw mostly on studies of social housing policy. This is 
for two reasons. First, homelessness is a relatively new social problem, and there is little 
literature on its causes, solutions, and politics, let alone on the question of who does what to 
respond to homelessness. But secondly, for local governments to be involved in a long-term 
and sustainable way in the fight against homelessness, they need to have some way of 
controlling, or at least contributing to, social or affordable housing. In Vancouver, Calgary, 
Toronto and Montreal (though less in Montreal), affordable housing is in short supply. Finding 
adequate housing for homeless people is difficult in these crunched housing markets. 
Solutions to homelessness thus often rely on an increased production of affordable or social 
housing, which is then coupled with intense and highly personalized social supports to help 
the person remain housed. For this reason, the ability of a local government to be a long-term 
and influential actor in the fight against homelessness requires it to have some housing related 
powers. I therefore assume that the factors the explain the local government’s involvement in 
housing policy also explain in part the local government’s involvement (or lack thereof) in the 
fight against homelessness.  
In order to compare the housing related powers of local governments, we must build a 
framework that can be applied systematically to all four cities. The literature on the role of 
local governments in housing policy and public policy guides the construction of this 
framework. The main source for the theoretical framework, notably regarding the role of the 
local government, is the book Housing the Homeless and the Poor, an edited book by Fallis 
and Murray. It is somewhat dated (as noted above, Banting’s chapter only analyses housing 
policy and federalism up until 1990). Given the scarcity of literature in this area, however, it is 
a tremendously valuable and authoritative resource for this thesis and for other studies of 
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housing and homelessness policy (see also Suttor 2014). It is, however, complemented with 
more recent work on urban policy making. 
Not all cities are involved in social housing, of course. Carter and McAfee thus 
identify a number of determinants of local government involvement in this area; “the reasons 
cities have assumed different roles in the provision of social housing can be traced to varying 
degrees of affluence, different local development powers, levels of need, and political 
climates”(ibid, 233). The four cities under study here are very similar in terms of their degrees 
of affluence (see Smith and Spicer forthcoming). They also have very similar levels of need; 
the Context chapter presents in greater detail the scale of the problem of chronic 
homelessness, and shows that it is remarkably similar in all four cities. Affluence and level of 
need are perhaps more important when looking at why cities of different sizes and resources 
are involved to varying degrees in social housing development. For these four big cities, 
however, affluence and level of need are very similar. The main lessons to be drawn from this 
work are therefore regarding the importance of local housing development powers and local 
political climates.  
Based on this literature, I hypothesize that the role of the local government in the 
governance of homelessness is determined by the local housing development powers and by 
the local political climates, which I call political commitment to homelessness. While these 
hypotheses are drawn from the literature regarding the role of local governments in housing 
policy, they are nevertheless used in this dissertation regarding homelessness because of the 
very close link between housing and homelessness. It is important to clearly operationalize 
these two dimensions – housing related powers and political commitment to homelessness – in 
order to allow for a systematic and reliable comparison of the four cities. The small literature 
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on urban social policy provides some further insights into each of these factors, and this is 
what I use to build the remainder of the theoretical framework.  
For local housing development powers, I consider four variables: the policy 
responsibility for social housing, local autonomy, density bonusing, and inclusionary zoning. 
The first variable is perhaps the most obvious: jurisdiction over housing policy. Horak writes, 
“whether or not a particular policy field or initiative is within local government jurisdiction 
clearly matters, since having primary jurisdiction over a policy field (such as local 
infrastructure development) allows local officials to be involved de jure in the policy 
development process” (2012a, 364). In so far as one variable is the most important in the 
determination of the role of the local government in the governance of homelessness, it is this 
one. 
Next, I compare the local autonomy of the four cities. Sellers and Lidström have 
shown that there is “a close relation between decentralization to local government and the 
character of the welfare state itself” (2007, 610). In other words, the welfare state in cities that 
have greater local autonomy is more generous than it is in cities with less autonomy. For the 
purpose of this thesis, and also for the index used by Sellers and Lidström for that matter, it is 
problematic to directly compare Canadian and European cities; the latter have a great deal 
more power, including a much more substantial financial resource base, than their Canadian 
counterparts. But there are still important lessons to be drawn regarding local autonomy and 
involvement in the welfare state. For this reason, I compare the extent to which local 
governments are able to freely enact local policies, free of provincial constraints, using the 
results of an index created specifically to measure local autonomy in the Canadian context 
(Smith and Spicer forthcoming).  
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The final two variables are specific local housing development powers. Carter and 
McAfee highlight the importance of two powers that allow local governments to require or 
encourage the private sector to create affordable or social housing units, which in turn allows 
local governments more control over the housing market: density bonusing and inclusionary 
zoning. These two powers are also referenced throughout the literature as important in 
determining the local government’s role in social housing (City of Toronto 2015; Clayton and 
Schwartz 2015; Drdla 2014; Fillmore 2012; Mah 2009; Moore 2013; Tsenkova and Witwer 
2011; Wake Carroll 2002). Wake Carroll, for example, writes, “the main, and very important, 
role played by municipalities with regard to housing is in planning where housing is to be 
developed and in regulating occupancy standards” (2002, 71). Density bonusing and 
inclusionary zoning are two important tools that allow municipalities do this; inclusionary 
zoning allows municipalities to determine where social and affordable housing will be located, 
while density bonusing is a tool to directly regulate occupancy standards.  
The second hypothesis is that the local political context, or political commitment to the 
issue of homelessness, also determines the local government’s role in the fight against 
homelessness. As was the case with the first factor, there are 4 elements that I use to determine 
the political context and overall political commitment to homelessness, which have also been 
drawn from the literature on urban governance and social policy. The first factor is whether 
the regional structure of governance is fragmented or consolidated; in other words, is the 
region one, large municipality or is it comprised of a number of small municipalities. The 
debate between those promoting one of the two governance models has been an important one 
for urban scholars, and the theoretical exchanges between the two sides have been energetic 
(King 2004; Tiebout 1956). This literature review does not advocate one particular model over 
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another, but rather recognizes that it is a factor that will structure the local government’s 
response to homelessness.  
Dennis and Fish explain the relevance of this variable: “the larger the geographical 
area covered by a single agency (planning board or regional government), the more diluted the 
voice of special groups. Diluting a group’s voice can result in ignoring the problems created 
by its special needs and lack of development of or participation in programs suited to those 
needs. This is true of a variety of services for minority groups in general, and particularly true 
of services and programs directed toward the low income group, including housing” (Dennis 
and Fish 1972, 166). This is particularly the case with homelessness; studies of homelessness 
in Canada, and around the world, have shown that homelessness is concentrated in downtown, 
urban cores (Busch-Geertsema, Benjaminsen, Hrast, and Pleace 2014; City of Toronto 2013; 
Greater Vancouver Regional Steering Committee on Homelessness 2014b; Latimer, 
Macgregor, Méthot, and Smith 2015). Fragmented structures will therefore provide more 
incentives for local government involvement than consolidated ones. 
The local electoral system is the second factor we consider. Graham, Phillips and 
Maslove underscore the importance of this; “the biases inherent in an electoral system may 
well serve to privilege certain groups or classes over others” (1998, 97). Most municipalities 
in Canada use ward systems, where councilors run for election in a small part of the city. 
Municipalities in BC (including Vancouver), however, use an at-large system. In this electoral 
system, all city councilors run for election in the entire city.  
In evaluating the effects of ward systems, for example, Graham et al. write, “the main 
case against a ward system is that it increases parochialism. Councillors focus on local issues 
they know will sit well with their own constituents rather than legislate with the bigger, city-
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wide picture in mind” (ibid, 98). Though ward systems are seen as less complex for voters and 
provide a direct link between citizen and democratic representative, Graham, Phillips and 
Maslove also note, “log-rolling – whereby a councilor gives support to another councilor on 
one issue in exchange for support of his or her pet concerns – is easier in a ward system, and 
this results in one neighbourhood’s issues being traded off against others” (98). The concern 
with a ward system, therefore, is that it can lead to NIMBYism, with councilors opposing 
shelters or other services for the homeless in their wards. This NIMBYism might even be 
strong enough to prevent homelessness from being a priority of City Council. Carter and 
McAfee observe that this does indeed happen often; “nearly every major city in Canada can 
document several incidents where projects have been stopped or placed in less than adequate 
surroundings because of the reaction of resident groups” (1990, 243). Ward systems will 
therefore provide fewer incentives for the local government to be involved in the fight against 
homelessness than at-large systems. 
The third factor is the local party system. As Sancton writes, “whether or not there are 
parties in municipal councils is a key question in the governance of our major cities” (Sancton 
2010, 179). Some have argued that city councils without political parties are more effective 
because council members work together more cooperatively (Siegel 1987). But the lack of 
political parties can also make city council a weak actor in urban politics and can create 
barriers for those who wish to make the issue of homelessness a political priority. Graham et 
al. write that it is easier for local elected officials to commit to issues such as homelessness 
when there is a party structure encouraging and supporting them to do so; “parties are more 
likely to accomplish the things they set out to do because they can count on the votes of their 
members in council” (1998, 113). In other words, if the governing party has decided that 
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homelessness is a priority, the Mayor and her or his party is able to control council to pass 
changes relating to housing or homelessness. Therefore, the existence of local political parties 
is an incentive for local commitment to the fight against homelessness. 
The final factor is the broader political goals of the local councilors (including, 
importantly, the mayor). Carter and McAfee write, “a political commitment [is] the one 
ingredient required to make any role successful” (260). Hulchanski (2005) agrees that politics 
is perhaps more important than legal or constitutional constraints when it comes to 
understanding the engagement of the local level in the area of social housing. If homelessness 
fits with the broader goals of the local government, then there will be a stronger incentive for 
city council to play an important role in the fight against it.  
To summarize, I hypothesize that two factors determine the role of the local 
government in the governance of homelessness: local housing related powers and political 
commitment to homelessness. Each of these factors is operationalized through four variables, 
all of which have been drawn from the literature. For local housing related powers, I compare 
the jurisdiction for housing policy, local autonomy, density bonusing powers and inclusionary 
zoning powers. Four more factors – regional structure, local electoral system, local party 
system, and broader political goals – are used to measure the political commitment of the local 
government in the fight against homelessness. 
Urban Governance 
 The question of who does what, or who governs, is not quite as present in the literature 
on urban politics. One of the most distinguished scholars of Canadian urban politics, 
Christopher Leo, writes, “much has been written about a rich variety of issue areas, from 
poverty and gender-related questions through land use, housing and immigration, to municipal 
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finance. But the actual process of decision-making, involving such questions as who governs, 
how is power organized and wielded, who gains and who loses, has receive much less 
attention” (Leo 2003, 344). This is perhaps changing recently, with scholars paying more 
attention to the questions or urban governance and multilevel governance, and specifically to 
how different sectors (public, private, and non-profit) work together (or in isolation from one 
another) to achieve policy goals (see Sancton and Young 2009; Horak and Young 2012; 
Bradford and Bramwell 2015). 
This section of the literature review confronts the second dimension of difference 
between the local models of governance of homelessness: the centralization or fragmentation 
of the model. In Calgary and Toronto, the governance of homelessness is centralized within 
one main body, whereas it is highly fragmented among a number of different groups of actors 
in Vancouver and Montreal. Turning to the literature on urban governance and multilevel 
governance, and specifically to the role of social actors (including the private and nonprofit 
sectors) in policy-making, I build the second part of the theoretical framework. Like this 
literature on urban and multilevel governance, this thesis acknowledges that local governments 
are not the only actors who develop policy at the local level, but that they often work with (or 
are sometimes replaced by) other sectors. As Bherer and Hamel write, “cities’ problems are 
rarely solved by municipalities alone… the study municipal politics requires examination not 
just of the initiatives and programs municipalities develop, but also those developed by other 
economic and social actors at work both in and on the city” (2012, 104). Building on this 
literature, the third hypothesis is that the centralization or fragmentation of the local 
governance model is determined by the organization of these local social forces.  
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The debate about who governs at the local level in Canada has been heavily influenced 
by American theories, notably by those advanced in City Limits by Paul Peterson (1981) and 
Regime Politics by Clarence Stone (1989). Canadian studies often engage with this literature, 
but highlight the ways in which local governance is different in Canada (see Good 2009). In 
other words, the influence of these theories does not mean that they have become the dominant 
approach to urban governance in Canada. Rather, a heated and on-going debate has considered 
whether these theories are even relevant in the Canadian context.  
In his influential book City Limits, Paul Peterson argues that, as the title suggest, cities 
are limited in terms of the policies they are able to develop and implement. He argues that 
local governments are only able to pursue a narrow range of economically-determined 
interests, which do not include redistributive programs or policies. He writes, “I find the 
primary interest of cities to be the maintenance and enhancement of their economic 
productivity” (Peterson 1981, 15). Elaborating on what these interests are, he writes, “policies 
and programs can be said to be in the interest of cities whenever the policies maintain or 
enhance the economic position, social prestige, or political power of the city, taken as whole” 
(20). In his assessment of local governance, local politics is of very little importance in urban 
governance; rather, economic considerations limit and determine what cities are able to do. 
 City governments in the USA and Canada are indeed limited in their ability to govern; 
this dissertation does not dispute that. In Canada, the most important limitation on cities is the 
severely restrictive financial framework under which they operate, which determines how they 
can raise and spend money. Smith and Spicer (forthcoming) have demonstrated that big cities 
in Canada all have remarkably similar, and low, levels of financial autonomy, even though 
there are interesting differences in terms of their legal and political autonomy. This lack of 
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financial freedom limits the ability of cities to exercise autonomy in terms of policies and 
programs.  
In fact, much of the literature on urban governance, or the role of local governments in 
social housing even more specifically, agrees with Peterson’s central assertion regarding the 
substantial limitations on the ability of cities to act autonomously. Carter and McAfee, for 
example, write, “municipalities do tackle housing problems, though often with inappropriate 
tools and inadequate funds” (1990, 227, emphasis added). Graham, Phillips and Maslove 
agree; “the resources and policy levers available to urban governments in Canada are often 
inadequate for grappling with the issues that they face” (1998, 2). Specifically regarding 
affordable housing in Ontario, Clayton and Schwartz write, “it is generally recognized that the 
provision of affordable housing to meet the needs of lower income households is an income 
redistribution program most appropriately funded by the senior levels of government… 
Municipalities are being forced to search for less satisfactory, locally based approaches due to 
a marked shortfall in funding” (2015, i). 
Thirty-five years after the publication of City Limits, therefore, Peterson’s conclusions 
are still relevant for the Canadian and American context; it is important to stress the weakness 
of cities to govern themselves on their own. Peterson has been challenged, however, in his 
assumption that this means cities only pursue economic-oriented, or “growth”, policies. The 
trend in the literature towards local and urban governance, as opposed to just governments, 
highlights the importance of other local level actors who engage with cities in the process of 
urban governance.  
Peterson concludes that politics is of secondary importance to economic factors in 
urban governance. In his agenda setting work on urban governance in Atlanta, Clarence Stone 
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(1989) forcefully disagrees with Peterson, and instead postulates that politics plays a central 
role in urban governance. Responding directly to Peterson in his influential book Regime 
Politics, Stone writes, “Peterson constructed an interpretation of city politics in which, within 
each policy arena, the type of policy… molds the form of political participation and the 
character of politics… The regime analysis I am employing offers a different dynamic. Politics 
in the form of the governing coalition shapes policy, and policy also shapes the regime” 
(1989, 164). In other words, local politics shapes local governance, which can result in 
different outcomes and not just pro-growth, economically oriented outcomes as Peterson 
theorizes.  
Stone accepts to a large extent Peterson’s assumption about the limited nature of cities. 
He finds, however, that local governments are still able to make themselves effective actors in 
local governance through coalition building and long-term partnerships, specifically with the 
private sector. He writes, “[p]ainting the picture of governance in Atlanta requires a broad 
canvas. Depiction of government structure is not enough” (ix). He calls the coalition that 
results of the relationship between city hall and the private sector an urban regime, “an 
informal yet relatively stable group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have 
a sustained role in making governing decisions” (4). Stone concludes that this informal but 
stable partnership, which in Atlanta is between downtown business elites and the black middle 
class, is the driving force behind urban governance in Atlanta and is what “makes governance 
in Atlanta effective” (3). 
Stone calls this the social production model to the study of urban governance. He 
writes, “governance requires the power to combine necessary elements for a publicly 
significant result… the capacity to assemble and use needed resources for a policy initiative is 
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what I call the social production model” (227). The idea that local actors work together to 
achieve common goals and ultimately to govern is not controversial. Yet Stone’s theory of 
urban regimes has provoked a long-lasting debate among scholars of urban governance outside 
of the American context.  
Savitch and Kantor (2004) have argued that the theory is not useful in the European 
context, where the local level is much less influenced by the private sector than it is in the 
United States. Also writing from the European perspective, Pierre agrees that regime theory is 
not applicable; “the European experience paints a rather different picture. Political 
mobilization is higher in Europe, local authorities are comparatively speaking more 
resourceful and the political discourse is shaped by ideology to a much higher degree than in 
the United States” (2011, 4). 
Within the Canadian context, scholars tend to agree to a certain extent with Stone 
regarding coalition building, and the fact that it leads to a stable governing relationship. But 
there are also criticisms from Canadian scholars. On the one hand, a regime as Stone 
conceptualized is a strictly local entity. Part of the critique of Stone’s framework stems from 
the fact that in Canada, provinces and in many instances the federal government are very 
involved in municipal affairs (Leo 2003; Sancton 2011; Spicer 2010). It is difficult to 
disentangle provincial influence from what happens at the local level, making many scholars 
skeptical of the idea that they will find a regime of purely local actors in Canadian cities.  
But, as is the case in Europe, there have also been debates regarding the influence of 
the private sector in Canadian municipalities. In studying urban politics, Young writes that it is 
important to consider “the involvement of non-governmental actors in the policy process, 
which is a long standing phenomenon” (Young 2012, 6). Graham et al. agree with Young’s 
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view on the importance of non-governmental actors in urban governance, but they go farther 
by noting that third sector actors are also involved in urban governance; “municipal 
governments are integrally entangled in a variety of co-production and partnership agreements 
with a wide variety of voluntary associations and business organizations”(1998, 2). Through 
building coalitions with these other actors, local governments are able to develop policies that 
they would not be able to on their own. A regime in Stone’s original work was a partnership 
between local elected officials and the private sector; many Canadian scholars would argue 
that third sector actors are also important partners in urban governance, which leads them to 
reject the applicability of regime theory in Canada. 
Leo (1995) was the first Canadian urban scholar to apply regime theory to a Canadian 
city. His study of the policy-making process in Edmonton found evidence of a corporate 
regime in the city. Looking at Leo’s study and his evidence, however, Sancton disagrees with 
Leo’s conclusion. He does not see evidence of a stable and sustained regime relationship 
between the Edmonton city council and local business associations. Pointing to the stated 
instability and unpredictability of the relationship between the business sector and city hall, 
Sancton writes, “from Leo’s own description and analysis, it appears that there simply was no 
regime in place in Edmonton during the period he was studying”  (2011, 233). 
Another influential attempt to apply regime theory to the Canadian context was 
Timothy Cobban’s 2003 article, in which he analyzed three instances of local economic 
development in London, Ontario. He finds that Stone’s theory is of limited use in 
understanding decision-making in London, concluding that the relationship between private 
sector interests and the London city council did not result in a stable governing regime. He 
suggests that there are simply too many differences between urban politics in Canada and the 
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United States for Canadian scholars to be able to import regime theory: “the absence of an 
urban regime in London is at least partially explained by structural features of urban politics 
that make local governments in Canada less susceptible to the influence of business elites than 
their American counterparts” (Cobban 2003a, 243). American cities are dependent on loans 
from the private sector whereas this is not the case in Canada, for example, making the private 
sector a more powerful force in urban governance. Cobban suggests that these structural 
differences between Canadian and American cities make regime theory ill suited to Canadian 
studies. 
Leo, who has become one of the most vocal Canadian defenders of regime theory, 
responded to Cobban’s article. Leo criticized Cobban’s findings and objected to his suggestion 
that regime theory is invalid in the Canadian context. Leo contends that Cobban’s evidence is 
insufficient to draw such a conclusion, writing, “a finding that, in any particular city, there is 
no stable regime with long-term staying power does not invalidate regime theory as an 
approach to the analysis of how development or other local government decisions are made, 
because, despite its name, regime theory is not, in the first instance, about regimes” (Leo 2003, 
344). Rather, he states that regime theory is fundamentally about coalitions. He writes, “a 
meaningful refutation of regime theory on its own terms would be a finding that there is no 
coalition-building taking place, that there are no prime movers in achieving particular policy 
objectives or that the prime movers do not negotiate, strike compromises, and offer incentives 
to get others on board” (ibid, 347). He specifies that the question of whether such a coalition is 
in fact a regime is one of evidence, but also of judgment. “The story remains untold,” Leo 
concludes implying that if Cobban had looked dug a little deeper, he likely would have found 
evidence of a regime in London, Ontario.  
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Cobban issued a response to Leo’s critique; the debate between the two has 
appropriately become known as the Leo-Cobban debate to scholars of Canadian urban politics. 
Cobban concludes that the disagreement between him and Leo is a profound one; “ultimately, 
our methodological disputes are probably symptomatic of a more fundamental disagreement 
about what exactly constitutes a urban regime analysis” (Cobban 2003b, 351). This question 
of what is a regime, and what is regime analysis, has remained at the heart of future disputes 
regarding the theory’s applicability in the Canadian context. To some scholars, such as 
Cobban, a regime is a very specific concept; to others, such as Leo, it is more elastic and 
simply refers to coalitions. The truth is likely somewhere between; Stone has himself 
acknowledged that it is a mistake to remain overly faithful to his 1989 definition, writing that 
the participation of the business sector is not essential in a regime (see Stone 2005). The 
challenge with taking too many liberties with the theory, however, is that it looses its ability to 
hold water. As Sancton correctly notes, “the more loosely the term ‘regime’ is used, the less 
useful it is likely to be” (2011, 236). Urban regime theory has more recently been used in 
Canadian studies, notably by Kristin Good (2009) in her important study of municipal 
multiculturalism policies in eight Canadian municipalities. She finds evidence in many 
Canadian cities of urban regimes. 
The debate about whether urban regimes exist in Canada is not one that we aim to 
settle here. The idea that the business sector is an important partner in urban governance 
remains relevant today (Young 2012), as does Peterson’s insistence on city limitations and the 
importance this places on economic development. It is important, therefore, for Canadian 
scholars to engage with this literature, without necessarily assuming that regimes are 
impossible (or omnipresent, for that matter), in Canadian cities. Regime theory is not, 
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however, the dominant framework used in this dissertation, primarily because of the strong 
involvement of provincial governments in the area of housing and homelessness.  
Recent work by Pierre (2011) recognizes that the economic emphasis in urban 
governance theories is indeed the reality in many North American and European cities, but he 
argues that there are other influences on urban governance and therefore multiple forms of 
urban governance as well. To promote the comparative study of urban governance that takes 
these differences into consideration, Pierre developed a four-part typology of urban 
governance. The pro-growth model he identifies is most clearly linked to the past traditions in 
theories of urban governance reviewed above. In this model of governance, the private sector 
is the most important local partner in urban governance and decisions are made with an 
objective of encouraging economic growth. Unlike Stone, however, Pierre stresses that this is 
not the only model of urban governance. He also identifies a managerial form of governance, 
which has been influenced by the New Public Management reforms. In this model of urban 
governance, the emphasis is usually on efficiency; public services are frequently contracted 
out or privatized in this model of urban governance, and managers and bureaucrats are given 
significant autonomy and discretion.  
 The corporatist model of urban governance is common in Western European 
democracies, Pierre argues, where the “third sector” including non-profit organizations and 
non-governmental organizations are given an important role in the decision-making and policy 
process. Finally, there is a welfare model of governance, which is commonly found in 
declining industrial cities; Pierre lists Detroit as an example of this type of urban governance, 
but notes that this model can also be found in European cities as well. In the welfare model of 
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urban governance, the city depends heavily on support from senior governments, and there are 
strong local sentiments for “local socialism” (27).  
Pierre admits that his typology is best suited for cities in developed countries, and he 
acknowledges that the models of urban governance that he develops in his book are ideal 
types. In reality, he insists, “we should expect most cities to display some features of several, 
if not all, of the models” (26), as different sectors of local government can characterized by a 
particular model of governance (distributive sectors tend to be more corporatist, for example). 
Pierre’s framework is useful for the study of comparative urban politics for a number 
of reasons. First, it avoids a historically common pitfall in the study of local politics and urban 
governance: normativity. Pierre does not suggest that one model is better or worse than 
another, but rather gives researchers much needed tools to study and compare urban 
governance. It also builds on important and still relevant theories of urban governance, such as 
growth machine theories. While growth theory advanced by Peterson does not apply to all 
cities in Canada or the United States, and perhaps even less so to European ones, it is clear that 
the theory is far from obsolete. Cities continue to operate in very restrictive legal and financial 
frameworks, and thus must often pursue directions that will enhance their economic 
prosperity. But Pierre recognizes that different cities will have different traditions and cultures 
of policymaking, even for cities within the same country. In other words, his theory responds 
to critiques of past theories while not simultaneously throwing away their theoretical 
strengths.  
 In order to determine which governance model best characterizes a city, Pierre 
developed a framework involving nearly 20 variables. A full analysis of the local governance 
models in each of the four cities under study here using this framework proposed by Pierre is, 
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unfortunately, beyond the scope of this dissertation. Rather, I compare the four very different 
governance models in one particular sector – homelessness. But the overall governance 
structure of each big city, while not studied using Pierre’s framework, has nevertheless been 
subject to consideration lately by Canadian scholars. This literature on urban governance 
considers how the local government, the private sector, and the third sector work together (or 
fail to work together) in urban governance dynamics, and is especially useful for this 
comparative study of the governance of homelessness. Fallis and Murray write, “because of 
the weakened welfare consensus and because people are increasingly skeptical about the 
ability of senior governments to solve the housing problem, there has developed a recognition 
that other parts of society must play a greater role… It is likely that the private sector, third 
sector, and municipalities will play an even more important role” (9). It is therefore this 
literature on urban and multilevel governance that guides the final chapter, which explains the 
centralization or fragmentation of the governance of homelessness. 
Studies of urban governance in Canada, reviewed above, do not focus exclusively on 
local governments, but also on how they interact and work with other sectors and governance. 
Horak and Young explain, “governance implies that governments are acting within networks 
of social forces – organized interests of many different kinds, active at different levels” (2012, 
6). The private sector has, of course, long been considered an important actor in urban 
governance. But recent Canadian studies of urban governance recognize that the private sector 
is not the only important actor at the local level (an assumption made by both Stone and 
Peterson), but that the third sector is also important in urban governance networks (Leo 1995; 
Cobban 2003; Graham et al, 1998; Good 2009; Horak and Young 2012; Bradford 2005). 
Third-sector groups have long been involved in the provision of social services in Canada; 
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“…religious and charitable agencies, such as church missions and the Salvation Army… are 
the oldest welfare agencies in Canada and pre-date by far any governmental programs of 
social welfare” (Wolfe and Jay 1990, 197). They are of central importance in understanding 
who governs, and who holds power at the local level not only in terms of the governance of 
homelessness but also the overall governance of the urban space.  
Because of the complicated nature of many of the problems that are faced by cities, 
including homelessness but also immigration, inequality, infrastructure and many other policy 
areas, urban scholars have also been interested in understanding and comparing how local 
level actors work with other levels of government as well. Bramwell and Wolfe write, “the 
dual challenges of maintaining economic competitiveness and addressing the emerging social 
inequalities resulting from these changes place new demands on local governments that are 
often too complex for them to meet on their own. In response, novel relations are emerging 
between various levels of government, and among public, private, and community actors at the 
local level” (2014, 58). Studies of multilevel governance look at how these three local sectors 
work (or do not work) with other orders of government to achieve their policy goals. This 
literature is most useful, as it considers the relative power of the three sectors in the overall 
governance of urban spaces that are most relevant in the governance of homelessness.  
 This literature is used to respond to the second question regarding the fragmentation or 
centralization of the local governance models. Recent studies of urban governance and 
multilevel governance have done extensive work to document the relative power of local 
social forces in big cities in Canada, and to evaluate how they work with other levels of 
government (Sancton and Young 2009; Horak and Young 2012; Bradford and Bramwell 
2014). These studies conclude with a demonstration of the relative power of different local 
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social forces in urban governance in Canada’s ten largest cities. The conclusions of these 
studies regarding the relative strength of different sectors at the local level explain why the 
local governance models are either centralized or fragmented. In Chapter 7 on the role of local 
social forces, these studies are used to first establish how the overall urban governance models 
in each city can be characterized. The third hypothesis, drawn from this urban and multilevel 
governance literature, is that the overall urban governance model explains the centralization or 
fragmentation of the governance of homelessness.  
Conclusion 
 The theories reviewed above conclude that structural, institutional, and political factors 
are important determinants of who has power, and who governs, at the local level in the area 
of homelessness. Together, the literature reviewed provides insights into what explains the 
differences between the four governance models. The theories that emphasize the importance 
of federalism in the development of Canadian social policy are important contributions to our 
understanding of the welfare state in Canada. However, their primary weakness is the 
exclusion of the local level as a producer of social protection. Changes to the welfare state, 
including cuts to social spending and an emerging human capital perspective, have however 
made these local actors more important actors in the welfare state.  
To fully understand why such different governance models have emerged around the 
same question of homelessness, we need to dive down to the local level. The literature on 
urban governance is therefore used to build a theoretical framework that explains why 
homelessness is governed so differently in the four cities. The literature regarding the local 
role in social policy has led to two hypotheses. The role of the local government in the 
governing coalition is determined by two things: the housing related powers of the local 
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government and the political commitment to homelessness. The literature on urban and 
multilevel governance has led to the third hypothesis, that the centralization or fragmentation 
of the governance model is determined by the organization of local social forces in each city.
Chapter 3: Context8 
 
“We therefore need to be careful when we use the words homeless and homelessness. While it 
is true that all societies through history tend to have some people who are homeless – without 
a home – we have not always had the set of social problems we associate with the word 
homelessness” 
 
Hulchanski, 2009. 
 
 This chapter presents some history and context to allow for a better understanding of 
the local level responses to homelessness across Canada. To this end, I begin by providing a 
broad history of homelessness in Canada. Future chapters will look closely at provincial and 
local responses to homelessness, but it would be a mistake to omit federal actions. I therefore 
also trace the history of federal responses to homelessness, looking at housing and also 
homelessness policies that have existed at the national level since the end of the Second World 
War. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to fully present the origins of homelessness, 
including its many causes and how it has changed throughout Canadian history; this chapter 
instead provides a big picture look at homelessness in Canada, including some of its most 
obvious and clear causes.  
History of Homelessness in Canada 
As outlined in the Introduction, the local level has recently come to play an important 
policy-making and implementing role in the area of homelessness. The local level began to 
play this role because it became clear with the rising homelessness in the 1980s and 
continuing until the early 2000s that there was a significant gap in the social safety net, the 
most extreme and visible manifestation of which was homelessness. This gap was created by 
                                                
8 A portion of this chapter has been published by the CCPA and the Harper Decade 
(Doberstein and Smith 2015a, 2015b). 
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federal and provincial government cuts to social spending, including housing, and through the 
failure of these senior governments to respond to the new social risk of homelessness (policy 
drift).  
It is estimated that 95% of Canadians get their housing from the private market, and 
they are comparatively well housed (Carter and McAfee 1990; Layton 2008; Hulchanski 
2009). The Canadian housing system is the most dependent on the private sector of any 
housing system in the developed world, including the United States (Hulchanski 2002). There 
was and continues to be, however, a minority of people whose housing needs are not met 
through the private market system. Housing markets became increasingly crunched as Canada 
became a more and more urbanized country, rents and home ownership costs rose faster than 
incomes, and stable housing was increasingly out of reach for these Canadians. By 2014, an 
estimated 235,000 Canadians would experience homelessness over the course of the year 
(Gaetz et al 2015). This other 1% lost their housing somewhere along the way and, for a short 
or long period of time, had nowhere to go. This problem was in large part the result of 
decisions made by the federal government to cut housing. 
There have always been people who have been unhoused, but some scholars and 
activists argued that the problem had transformed into a new issue by the 1980s and 1990s. To 
illustrate the new-ness of this problem, housing expert J David Hulchanski presented the 
history of the word homelessness in Canada during his keynote address to the Growing Home 
conference on housing and homelessness in Calgary in 2009. He noted that over the course of 
Canada’s history, there have long been people who were poor and did not have housing of 
their own. But he argues that there is an important conceptual distinction between people who 
were homeless in the sense that they were un-housed, and what we today call homelessness;  
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By the early 1980s we needed a new term for a widespread mass phenomenon, a new 
social problem found in many wealthy, developed nations. The response was to add yet 
another suffix to further qualify the word homeless, to give us that odd-job word, 
homeless-ness. Adding the suffix –ness makes the simple and clear word into an 
abstract concept. As such, it allows users, readers, and listeners to imagine whatever 
they want. It tosses all sorts of problems into one handy term. (Hulchanski 2009). 
 
Other scholars agree that Canada has not always had a homelessness problem. Fallis 
and Murray ask rhetorically whether this increasingly visible homeless population was really 
different from the poverty that existed in Canada through the 1980s and 1990s; “a cynic – or a 
person with a strong historical sense – might well ask if homelessness is just the 1980’s word 
for poverty” (Fallis and Murray 1990, 12). Answering their own question, they write, “the 
general consensus seems to answer no. Things are not the same; things are qualitatively 
different”(ibid). Indeed, they specify, “we had always had hoboes and panhandlers, but 
something had changed… there were young people and young families without housing” 
(Fallis and Murray 1990, 5). Gaetz further identifies this change, writing that during the post-
war era until the 1990s, “there is no denying that many people were living in poverty in 
Canada, low incomes coupled with individual stressors (loss of jobs, evictions, health 
problems etc) did not inevitably mean that individuals and families had to face to prospect of 
long term homelessness. For the most part, an adequate supply of affordable housing existed” 
(2010, 21–22). Not only were more people experiencing homelessness beginning in the late 
1980s and 1990s, but it was touching a more diverse, heterogeneous group of people including 
families and young people. Gaetz writes,  
With less safe, affordable rental housing on the market, a declining and underfunded 
social housing stock and no government commitment to ensure housing for all, people 
with low incomes experiencing personal crises have become more and more vulnerable 
to homelessness. During this time, the number of people who wound up living on the 
streets and in parks in communities across Canada (including families, women and 
youth) began to grow quite dramatically, putting pressures on the homelessness 
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infrastructure that was largely set up to serve single adult men. The homelessness 
service infrastructure was not sufficient to respond to this rapid growth in numbers, nor 
designed to effectively respond to the needs of specific sub-populations such as youth, 
women and ethno-racial minorities (particularly aboriginal persons). (2010, 23). 
 
Hulchanski specifies what these changes meant for people living in poverty; “starting 
in the 1980s, it was clear that homelessness referred to a poverty that includes being unhoused. 
It is a poverty that means being without required social supports. And it is a poverty so deep 
that even poor-quality housing is not affordable. Canada has always had many people living in 
poverty. In the 1908s, more ad more people were not only poor, but they also found 
themselves unhoused” (2009, 5).  
Following these changes, scholars, activists, and even elected officials began saying 
that the lack of affordable housing and state of homelessness in Canada had become a “crisis” 
in the 1990s. Then MPs Paul Martin and Joe Fontana co-chaired a Liberal Task Force on 
Housing. In 1990, they wrote, “the housing crisis is growing at an alarming rate.” They 
continue, “poverty and homelessness are symptoms of the broader crisis in the supply of 
affordable housing” (Martin and Fontana 1990; emphasis added). The language around the 
issues of housing and homelessness continued to build and gain momentum throughout the 
1990s, culminating in 1998 when the Toronto Disaster Relief Committee (TDRC) successfully 
lobbied for local governments across Canada to declare homelessness an unnatural disaster. 
They wrote in their declaration, “when many people are unhoused we have a community-wide 
crisis. When the numbers are allowed to grow, and when all reasonable analyses point to even 
more homeless people every day, we have a disaster” (Toronto Disaster Relief Committee 
1998; emphasis added).  
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Continuing into the 2000s, experts and activists continued to use this type of language. 
Jack Layton, a former City of Toronto councilor who was, during this period, one of the only 
politicians in the country paying attention to homelessness, wrote a partisan but informative 
book on the history of homelessness in Canada entitled Homelessness: How to End the 
National Crisis. The first chapter in the book uses similar language: “Chapter 1: The Making 
of a Crisis” (Layton 2008). A 2010 editorial by Canadian homelessness expert Stephen Gaetz 
is called “The Struggle to End Homelessness in Canada: How We Created the Crisis, and How 
We Can End it (Gaetz 2010, emphasis added). The latest State of Homelessness in Canada 
reports from 2013 and 2014 continue to use the word crisis, noting “homelessness emerged as 
a significant problem – in fact, as a crisis – in the 1990s” (Gaetz, Gulliver, and Richter 2015, 
3). It was not just activists and politicians who began to use the label crisis. The Toronto 
Board of Trade wrote an influential report in 2000 entitled “Building Solutions to 
Homelessness: A Business Perspective on Homelessness and Toronto’s Housing Crisis” (The 
Toronto Board of Trade 2000). For over two decades, activists, scholars and even elected 
officials from various levels of government and the private sector have been saying that there 
is a crisis of homelessness. 
It is difficult to know exactly how much homelessness, or how many unhoused people 
there were, before the 1990s compared to what it had become by the mid-2000s. But there are 
several indications that homelessness was indeed rising rapidly through the 1980s and into the 
mid-2000s. Though not representative of the entire country, the Church of the Holy Trinity in 
downtown Toronto has been keeping a memorial with the names of all those who have died 
“as a result of homelessness” since 1985. According to their tabulations, in most years 
throughout the 1980s and into the mid-1990s, fewer than 10 people died as a result of 
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homelessness per year. Ten deaths per year is already far too many in a country as rich as 
Canada, yet incredibly, the number of deaths per year increased well beyond this during the 
1990s and mid-2000s. In 1998, the year in which homelessness was declared an unnatural 
disaster thanks in large part to activist work by Toronto’s TDRC, 19 people died as a result of 
homelessness in Toronto, but it would continue to increase rapidly. The number of deaths per 
year peaked in 2005, when 72 people died as a result of homelessness. 
The efforts by the TDRC and the Church of the Holy Trinity were perhaps the earliest 
attempts in Canada to quantify how homelessness was changing and growing over the years in 
Canada. Recent efforts in large cities across Canada track homelessness through regular Point-
in-Time counts of the homeless population, but these counts began fairly recently. The federal 
government has also started to collect data regarding the number of people who use the 
emergency shelter system, but this misses people who do not use emergency shelters (a small 
but important proportion of the homeless population). Looking at the results of the existing 
homeless counts in Canada, it is clear that homelessness has increased from the late 1990s to 
mid to late 2000s. In Calgary, for example, the city’s first homeless count in 1994 found 461 
people experiencing homelessness; by 2008, that number had increased nearly tenfold to 4060 
(Calgary Homeless Foundation 2009). In Vancouver, the first homeless count, conducted in 
2002, found 628 people; by 2008, the number had nearly tripled to 1,576 (City of Vancouver 
2011).  
Data for Montreal are more difficult to compare. There have only been two attempts to 
enumerate the homeless population, which used very different methodologies. The most recent 
count, conducted in 2015, used the more common Point-in-Time count methodology and 
found 3,016 people experiencing homelessness on the night of the count (Latimer et al. 2015). 
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The other count was conducted in the late 1990s; its goal was much broader than the 2015 
count, in that it sought to determine how many people had experienced homelessness over the 
course of a given year. The authors concluded that during the 1996-1997 year, 12,666 people 
experienced homelessness at least once (Fournier and Chevalier 1998). I have argued 
elsewhere that these two counts can, in fact, be compared with a bit of care (Smith 2015b), and 
that homelessness has clearly increased in Montréal between 1998 and 2015.  
Toronto began conducting homeless counts in 2006; since then, the number of 
homeless people in Toronto has remained relatively stable (City of Toronto 2006, 2009b, 
2013). This is likely because, by the mid-2000s, homelessness in Toronto had already peaked 
(as it had in other big Canadian cities like Vancouver and Calgary). While the information 
gathered by the Church of the Holy Trinity regarding homeless deaths is not perfect, it also 
suggests that the mid-2000s was the peak of the growth in homelessness. So while it is 
difficult to say with precision that homelessness increased by a specific amount, beginning in 
the 1980s, trends in Canadian cities and substantial evidence lead us to conclude that 
homelessness had unmistakably increased during this period. 
There is more homelessness today than there was in the past, and it is a more complex 
phenomenon than it was previously, taking many forms and having multiple causes. In 
addition to this quantitative rise in the number of people experiencing homelessness, there is a 
general consensus that a more diverse group of people experience homelessness today. Gaetz, 
in the quotation above, notes that by the 1990s, women, youth, and aboriginal people began 
using the homeless system, which had been set up mostly for homeless men. Today, there are 
services for all kinds of people experiencing homelessness, including pregnant women, 
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aboriginal women, seniors, and people with disabilities (see Nichols and Doberstein 2016). 
This is new. 
While there is no formally accepted definition of homelessness in Canada, the 
Canadian Homelessness Research Network (CHRN) has proposed a Canadian definition and 
typology of homelessness that is increasingly used in homelessness research, counts, and 
policies (Nichols and Doberstein 2016; Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 
2015a; Turner 2015). The definition highlights that not only are there different types of 
homelessness (hidden homelessness, street homelessness, sheltered homelessness for 
example), but that there are also differing degrees of chronicity. Canadian research based on 
data regarding people who use emergency shelter has shown that the overwhelming majority 
of people who experience homelessness manage to find and keep housing of their own quite 
quickly. For these people, homelessness is a one-time event; this type of homelessness is 
called transitional or situational. A small minority of the homeless population is episodically 
homeless, meaning that over the course of a few months or years, they experience a number of 
short episodes of homelessness between periods of being housed. 
The most visible and perhaps troubling form of homelessness is chronic homelessness. 
This is what we usually think of when we hear the word homelessness; it is a very visible and 
troubling form of homelessness. The people who are chronically homeless have experienced 
homelessness for over one year, and they tend to have a number of barriers to housing, 
including mental health problems or addictions. This population is overwhelmingly white and 
male; that is not to say that women, youth, and people of colour do not experience extreme 
forms of poverty and marginalization; the conventional wisdom among service providers and 
the academic literature is that chronic homelessness for this population is too dangerous. 
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These people will often hide their homelessness; they will stay in violent relationships, 
exchange sex for shelter, or live in situations of extreme overcrowding or inadequate housing. 
The chronically homeless individuals who we see on the streets and in shelters, however, tend 
to be middle-aged men. 
The rise in homelessness noted above is primarily related to chronic homelessness, 
which is the easiest to measure using the Point-in-Time methodology. There are a number of 
factors that contributed to its rise throughout the 1990s and 2000s, but as Hulchanski argues, 
“the one thing that the diverse group of people we call homeless have in common is that they 
are unhoused. Otherwise, they are a heterogeneous group of destitute Canadians” (2005, 5). In 
this sense, the primary cause of the new problem we today call homelessness is linked clearly 
to government decisions related to the welfare state, and specifically to decisions related to 
housing. As the following section demonstrates, the federal government made the decision to 
cut funding to new social housing developments in the 1990s. Following further federal cuts to 
social transfer payments to the provinces, most provinces also stopped funding new social 
housing (with the notable exceptions of BC and Québec). Gaetz writes, “beginning in the 
1980s and accelerating through the 1990s, a transformation began to take place. Global and 
domestic changes in the economy (trade liberalization, deindustrialization), coupled with 
profound changes in government social and housing policies had a direct impact on the growth 
of poverty” (2010).  
Federal Role in Housing Policy 
Up until the 1990s, the federal government partnered with provincial governments to 
contribute significantly to the social housing stock across the country, building up to 25,000 
units of social housing per year (Shapcott 2007). Beginning in the late 1980s the federal 
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government began to cut housing expenditures, and in 1993, the government announced that it 
would no longer fund new social housing developments. This decision, along with others to 
cut transfer to the provinces and reduce social assistance benefits, had important consequences 
on the most vulnerable and marginal Canadians and contributed to the rise in homelessness 
throughout the 1990s and 2000s, as the previous section argued. This section reviews the 
evolution of the federal government’s involvement in housing, including its limited in 
engagement in the area of homelessness in the late 1990s. 
 A number of scholars of housing policy, notably Banting (1990), Carroll and Jones 
(2000) and Hulchanski (2005) have broken the federal government’s post-Second World War 
involvement in housing policy into different periods or eras. Prior to Second World War, the 
federal role in social housing was, as was the case in other areas of social protection, “limited 
and often grudging” (Banting, 1990). Though not a significant priority prior to the Second 
World War, there were nevertheless some small early federal housing policy interventions. For 
example, the Dominion Housing Act was passed in 1935 and was followed by the introduction 
of the National Housing Act (NHA) in 1938 (Library of Parliament, 1999). But this did not 
yield much in the way of social housing; “from the 1940s-1963, the government had a 
minuscule social housing program that produced about 850 units a year throughout the 
country” (Hulchanski 2002; iii). Overall, approximately 12,000 units of social housing were 
built between 1949-1963 (ibid). For Hulchanski, Banting and Carroll and Jones, this period 
from the late 1940s to early 1960s was the first era of housing policy, a very unproductive 
period that saw little commitment from the federal government. The federal government’s 
approach to social housing during this time was largely laissez-faire. Hulchanski puts this 
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bluntly, calling the 1940s-1960s the period of “leave it to the market and hope for the best” 
(2002, 9).  
 The authors also all agree that the 1960s marked the beginning of a new period of 
social housing, one where provinces became more engaged and the federal government 
invested more substantially and intentionally in social housing. Provincial governments began 
to fight back against federal dominance in area of social policy in the 1960s; control over 
social housing policy was no exception. As Rose notes, social housing became “an important 
battle ground” (1980; 16) in constitutional fights between the provinces and the federal 
government. Beginning with Ontario and Quebec, provincial governments began to establish 
their own housing corporations, which would eventually become powerful actors and experts 
in their own right in the area of social housing policy.  
In contrast to the previous period, the social aspect of housing policy become more 
important in determining social housing policy beginning in the 1960s. Hulchanski 
characterizes the period from 1964-1984 as: “build an inclusive housing system by addressing 
the social need for housing” (2002; 9). The minister responsible for urban affairs, Ron 
Basford, is quoted as saying, “when we talk… about the subject of housing, we are talking 
about an elemental need – the need for shelter, for physical and emotional comfort in that 
shelter” (quoted in Hulchanski 2002). This philosophy regarding the importance of housing 
translated into significant social housing developments; during this 20-year period, there were 
nearly 200,000 units of social housing built across the country (Rose 1980). For Carroll and 
Jones, this expansionist, social development period lasted only one decade and ended in 1978. 
Their reading of history is overly pessimistic. Hulchanski and Banting argue that the period of 
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building and expansion continued into the 1980s. Indeed, the first of the federal cuts to 
housing programs (specifically to the co-op program) did not occur until the mid-1980s.  
Looking at the history of housing policy through a federal lens, Banting writes that the 
1970s was a time of competitive unilateralism, as provinces began to develop their own 
housing programs. For example, there was an intergovernmental meeting to disentangle the 
different levels of government in the area of social housing in 1978. For Banting, this was the 
beginning of a long period of accommodation in which the federal government agreed to 
abandon its unilateral approach to social housing and make way for a more decentralized 
model, allowing room for provincial action as well. In the late 1970s, therefore, the federal 
government began to work more cooperatively with the provinces. Written in 1990, this period 
marks the end of Banting’s analysis of the different periods of housing policy, but he does 
caution at the end of his chapter that this period of accommodation is certain to not last 
forever. 
The 1980s, following a period in which provincial and federal governments were both 
heavily involved in the area of housing, was the peak in the creation of new units of social 
housing. In 1983, 25,000 new units were built (Hulchanski, 2002), and the average throughout 
the 1980s was 20,000 units per year. Up until the early 1980s, there was a political 
commitment at the national level to ensure there was adequate housing for everyone. Despite 
this expansion of the social housing stock throughout this decade, Carroll and Jones and 
Hulchanski emphasize the increasing disinterest in housing on the part of the federal 
government. Carroll and Jones argue that the 1980s marked a new period in social housing, 
which was characterized by a federal government that aimed to reduce its involvement in 
 92 
housing policy. Hulchanski calls the decade between 1983-1994 “From a small federal role to 
no role at all.”  
Not just for housing but also for the whole welfare state, the 1980s was a period of 
transition towards a less generous welfare state. There was an increasing demand for “a new 
politics of social policy” in Canada, one that saw a more limited role for governments 
(Banting and Myles 2013b). This is generally believed to have coincided with the election of 
Brian Mulroney’s Progressive Conservative government. Immediately following his election, 
Mulroney put in place a task force to review all government spending (Hulchanski 2002). 
Housing was identified as a key area needing further review, and in 1985, the government task 
force insisted, “the record of current programs in meeting social housing needs is dismal. 
Because expensive, long-term supply programs have been used and programs have not been 
directed solely at this in need, there has been a minimal impact on resolving the housing 
problems of low income Canadians” (Canada, Task Force on Program Review 1985, 39). 
Following the recommendations of this task force, Mulroney announced that his government 
would introduce a new housing policy that made housing programs much more targeted. Co-
operative housing, generally used by low-income families and individuals, was the first 
program to be cut. While it was seen as an effective system (Wolfe 1998), it was also seen 
overly expensive and inefficient.  
 The 1993 election was a landside loss for Mulroney, and the newly elected Liberal 
party did what Mulroney was not able to do himself, and enacted his promised cuts to future 
social housing developments. The changes that were made to the financing and administration 
of social housing policy happened quickly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The cuts that 
came in the 1990s were rapid fire: the federal co-op program, first cut in the 1980s was 
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completely eliminated in 1992; the National Housing Program was cut in 1993; federal 
support for housing was also withdrawn in 1993; and the CAP was eliminated and replaced 
with the much less generous Canada Health and Social Transfer. Provinces were left to make 
up the difference in social policy, including in social housing. The reactions across the country 
varied. Quebec and BC continued to fund and build social housing, but they struggled to keep 
up with demand after the federal partner disappeared. Assessing the impacts of these cuts in a 
broad sense, Wolfe writes, “it was never imagined that a system that had taken 50 years to 
build-up could be dismantled so rapidly” (1998, 131). 
In 1996, the federal government completely removed itself from the area of housing by 
transferring the responsibility for administration of social housing units to the provinces. In no 
other area of social policy has the federal government actively withdrawn itself in this way. 
The federal disinterest in the growing housing crunch and rising homelessness in Canadian 
cities did not go unnoticed by advocates across the country. One of these groups, the Toronto 
Disaster Relief Committee (TDRC), led a largely successful campaign to get homelessness 
and housing back on the public agenda. Former Toronto city councillor Jack Layton was a 
strong leader in the group, serving as a bridge between passionate Toronto-based advocates 
and disinterested political leaders. In part in response to increasing pressures coming from 
advocates in Toronto and throughout the rest of Canada, including the mayors of big cities and 
the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), the federal government appointed a 
Minister responsible for homelessness, Claudette Bradshaw in the late 1990s.  
After a half-decade of federal inaction facing what many were calling a crisis or 
unnatural disaster of homelessness, Minister Bradshaw toured Canada to learn more about the 
issue. In 1999, the federal government took a baby step into the domain of homelessness by 
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introducing the National Homelessness Initiative (NHI). Never intended to be a permanent 
program, the NHI originally allocated $765 million for three-years to fight homelessness. 
More specifically, the federal government wanted this program to build partnerships between 
the local level, including governments, aboriginal groups, and the private sector (Doberstein 
and Smith 2015b). Establishing a direct federal-local link, the program effectively bypassed 
provinces. For this reason, the NHI was not implemented until 2001 in Quebec, following two 
years of negotiations regarding the transfer of federal funds to the provincial government, 
which then allocates the funding throughout Quebec.  
Significant decision-making authority was given to the local level to decide what their 
needs were in addressing homelessness, though a recurring complaint about the NHI and its 
subsequent iterations as the HPS was that it did not provide enough funding to build housing 
that was desperately needed, particularly in large cities (Canada, Human Resources and Skills 
Development Canada 2008, 2009). Funding from the first three-year allotment of the NHI was 
used for initiatives such as pilot projects, to open shelters, or to renovate existing housing. 
Shortly after introducing the NHI, the federal government also crept back into the area of 
affordable housing with its Affordable Housing Initiative (AHI), which began in 2001 and 
continued until 2011. Through the AHI framework, the federal government entered into 
bilateral agreements with all ten Canadian provinces to build affordable housing in partnership 
with provincial governments. Yet AHI was also a modest program, with $124 million in 
annual federal funding; provincial governments matched this money.   
Due in no small part to the advocacy efforts of groups and individuals across Canada, 
the National Homelessness Initiative funding was repeatedly renewed for 1-3 year periods at 
approximately $135 million per year until 2006, when the Liberals were defeated. In that year, 
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the newly elected minority conservative government introduced the Homelessness Partnering 
Initiative (HPS). The HPS was little more than a name change from the previous NHI 
(Doberstein and Smith 2015b). An advocate who fought for the renewal of the NHI under 
Harper agreed; “The original homelessness program was called NHI, which morphed into 
HPS. Because when Harper came in he had to re-name everything” (interview #50). The 
original HPS was a two-year program, but as was the case with its predecessor the NHI, the 
HPS was extended repeatedly for 2-3 year periods. In 2013, the HPS was extended for 5 years, 
the longest period in the program’s history. Funding levels have remained similar ever since 
the program’s beginning in 1999 (though recent funding has gone down due to inflation). A 
federal bureaucrat who works closely with the program notes that this is significant: 
“L’enveloppe n’a jamais augmenté mais en même temps n’a jamais diminué… compte tenu du 
fait de la crise économique… On a quand même pu protéger cette enveloppe-là… et on est très 
fiers” (Interview #69).  
The 5-year renewal of the HPS funding in 2013 also contained a significant policy 
shift. As of 2013, the majority of funding for big cities must now be used for Housing First 
projects; previously, under the NHI and HPS, local community groups had a great deal of 
freedom to decide what they wanted to use the federal funding for. Programs included drop-in 
centres, bus services to pick up people and bring them to shelters, and other emergency 
resources. Community groups now have much less freedom in deciding how to use their 
federal funding. 
In contrast to Housing First, other approaches to homelessness are sometimes called 
“treatment first” (Falvo 2009) or “the staircase model” (Hannele and Frederiksson 2009). 
These programs require that homeless individuals be considered “ready” for housing by first 
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addressing any addictions or mental health issues they might be living with. Housing, in this 
approach, is abstinence based; treatment for any addictions must first be successfully 
completed. Housing First, in contrast, puts housing at the beginning rather than at the end of 
an individual’s transition out of homelessness. Individuals are housed “first”; intensive wrap-
around services are then provided with the aim of helping the previously homeless person 
become more stabilized and secure, and ultimately recovering from any previous challenges 
such as addictions or mental illness (see Falvo, 2009; Gaetz et al, 2013).  
Part of the wrap-around services that are offered is a commitment to keeping the 
person housed. If a person is evicted or causes damages to the apartment, a housing worker 
negotiates with private landlords on the person’s behalf and finds new housing for the person 
so he or she does not end up on the streets or in an emergency shelter. The costs of any 
damages to the unit are covered by the Housing First program. Because of this, the housing 
that is used comes largely from private as opposed to public providers. This is one of the most 
controversial elements of Housing First. 
It is often said that this approach was first developed in New York City through the 
Pathways to Housing program. But many advocates and long-time anti-homelessness workers 
in Canada argue that the idea of putting housing at the centre of the solution to homelessness 
is not, in fact, a new idea. The FOHM, for example, has argued and published reports 
regarding the success of this approach since the 1990s, and advocates in Toronto ran pilot 
projects that guaranteed housing to homeless individuals, no matter their barriers such as 
addictions or mental illness, since the 1980s (interview #67). What is new, however, is the 
dependence on rent supplements that make private market housing more affordable to people 
who otherwise would not be able to afford it. 
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This idea that public money goes to private landlords in housing first programs has 
resulted in significant opposition in a number of Canadian cities, but there is also significant 
support for Housing First approaches to ending homelessness because it is seen as an effective 
and cost-efficient intervention. And the federal government has powerful evidence that 
Housing First is an effective antidote to chronic homelessness. In 2007, in response to a 
powerful Senate report regarding mental health9, the federal government established the 
Mental Health Commission of Canada (MHCC). Twelve provincial and territorial 
governments endorsed the creation of the MHCC. The Québec government refused to endorse 
the idea because it was seen as an incursion on provincial jurisdiction over social policy. 
Nevertheless, the federal government tasked the MHCC with an ambitious pilot project to 
study the effectiveness of Housing First. 
The MHCC was allotted a budget of $150 million, the majority ($110 million) of 
which would go to a cross-country study of Housing First, which was called the At 
Home/Chez Soi pilot study (AHCS). AHCS tested the Housing First approach through a 
randomized control pilot study in five Canadian cities; Vancouver, Winnipeg, Toronto, 
Montréal, and Moncton. 2000 participants were recruited across the country from shelters and 
from the streets to participate. There were eligibility requirements, such as age and citizenship, 
but participants also needed to have been diagnosed with a serious mental illness in order to 
participate in the study. Just over half of the 2000 participants received the “treatment”, which 
was Housing First. Depending on their needs, study participants in the treatment group were 
given varying degrees of social supports through the Housing First framework; those who 
were classified as having “high needs”, including but not limited to serious mental illness and 
                                                
9 Out of the Shadows at Last, 2006 (also called “The Kirby Report”) 
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addictions, were supported through an Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) approach. An 
ACT team is a multidisciplinary team that includes a number of experts who offer personal 
support to previously homeless individuals. Those who had “moderate” needs were supported 
through the Intensive Case Management (ICM) approach. In this approach, each previously 
homeless individual was given a case manager with whom they met regularly and who 
supported them with their needs. 
For the researchers to fully test the effectiveness of Housing First as a response to 
homelessness, the remaining participants in AHCS were in the control group, or “treatment as 
usual”. For these individuals, nothing changed; they still had access to all the services and 
supports that were available in their home community, such as shelters, detox, and 
counselling, but they were left to navigate the system and try to find housing on their own. 
They were also classified according to their needs, being either high or moderate so that they 
could be later compared with the treatment groups. The progress of the two groups was 
tracked closely with thorough interviews every three months. 
The results of the study show that Housing First is an effective intervention for people 
experiencing homelessness, not just in terms of helping them maintain housing stability and 
other quality of life indicators, but also in terms of the cost-benefit analysis associated with the 
program. For high needs people in the Housing First group, there was a net savings of $9.60 
for every $10 of public spending. These savings came from a number of sources, including 
correctional facilities and emergency medical services. For the moderate needs individuals, the 
savings were $3.42 for every $10 of public spending. The AHCS report further notes that 10% 
of the participants were particularly high service users; for that population, the savings 
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associated with housing first was $21.72 for every $10 of public spending (Currie, 
Monirussaman, Patterson, and Somers 2014). 
These findings directly informed the 2013 policy shift towards Housing First in the 
HPS, which will likely continue until 2018. The ten biggest cities supported by HPS funding 
(including all four studied here) must now dedicate at least 65 per cent of their HPS funding 
dollars to Housing First programs. Many big cities, such as Toronto and Calgary, had long 
been doing Housing First and are thus not overly affected by the change.  
The Affordable Housing Initiative, introduced under the Liberal government in 2001, 
was also continued by the Conservative government, though it was renamed the Investment in 
Affordable Housing (IAH) program in 2011. Like the HPS, this was mostly a name change, 
though the investments in housing more than doubled to $250 million annually in 2011, which 
will continue until 2019. Though a substantial increase from previous Liberal government 
commitments to affordable housing, this remains significantly less than what the federal 
government used to contribute and what is needed to resolve the housing crunch in big cities 
across Canada. For example, the entire Province of BC received $30M annually from the 
Harper government to invest in affordable housing through the IAH. To put this in context, the 
provincial government’s contribution alone to affordable housing in BC in 2013 was $421M, 
meaning the federal government commits less than 7 per cent of the total expenditures related 
to housing (BC Housing 2014a). Experts and advocates argue that the expanded IAH under 
Harper is not even half of what is required of the federal government to adequately address 
Canada’s vast affordability deficit (Shapcott 2014). 
The newly elected federal Liberal government has promised to come back to the table 
as a full partner in the fight against homelessness and in the area of housing more generally. 
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Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has promised $20 billion in spending over ten years on what he 
calls “social infrastructure” (CBC News 2015b), including housing. The mandate letter from 
the Prime Minster to Amarjeet Sohi, Minister of infrastructure and communities, instructs the 
minister to  “work with the Minister of Families, Children and Social Development to create a 
housing strategy to re-establish the federal government’s role in supporting affordable 
housing” (Trudeau 2015). This would include $125 million per year in incentives to 
developers to renovate existing rental units, and to build new ones. It has also promised to 
renew expiring operating agreements with social housing operators, and to make federal HPS 
funding long-term and predictable. The details of the promises are not yet released. 
Conclusion 
The previous section has presented a broad overview of the history of homelessness in 
Canada, and has presented the history of the federal government’s involvement in the area of 
social housing and, beginning in the late 1990s, in homelessness. The period from 1973-1993 
was the high water mark in the construction of social housing in Canada, due to a national 
housing program that saw the construction of nearly 20,000 units of housing per year. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there was a great deal of social policy change, including cuts 
to the funding and administration of social housing. During this time, the emergency shelter 
system expanded and became populated with a more diverse crowd, including young people, 
women, and children. The late 1990s and early 2000s saw a slight re-engagement on the part 
of the federal government, first through the establishment of the NHI and then HPS, and 
second through the AHI, which began the IAH. But during this period, from the 1990s-2000s, 
there was a gap in the safety net and increasing numbers of people experiencing homelessness 
in large cities throughout Canada. At some point during this period, groups at the local level 
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decided to step up and fill the gap created by federal and provincial governments. The 
following section presents the different governance models that emerged at the local level to 
respond to homelessness in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montréal. 
 Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, there was a clear gap in the safety net that was 
resulting in an increasingly apparent homelessness problem throughout Canada. In Canada’s 
biggest cities, actors and groups of people at the local level stepped up and began to develop 
their own responses to homelessness. Four very different models of governance of 
homelessness emerged in these four cities. In Vancouver, the city is a strong actor, but there 
are a number of other actors who are also involved, making the governance fragmented. In 
Calgary, the city is not involved at all; rather, there is one powerful actor, the Calgary 
Homeless Foundation, which is primarily responsible for governing homelessness. In Toronto, 
the city is the strongest and most important actor; the governance of homelessness is therefore 
highly centralized. Finally, in Montréal, the city is a relatively weak actor, and there are a 
number of other actors who are also involved in the area of homelessness, making the 
governance highly fragmented. The remainder of this dissertation explains why such different 
governance models emerged in these four cities. 
Chapter 4: Provincial Housing Policy 
 
 When the federal government stopped funding social housing in the mid-1990s, 
provincial governments were faced with a decision: continue funding social housing out of 
their own coffers, which were increasingly crunched due to decreasing social transfers from 
the federal government; stop building housing (with the implicit assumption that the private 
sector would meet the housing needs of Canadians); or offload the responsibility to another 
sector or government. BC and Quebec chose to continue funding housing, Alberta stopped 
funding housing altogether, and Ontario went with the latter and downloaded the 
responsibility to municipalities. 
 This chapter gives a broad comparative overview of the provincial role in the area of 
housing policy. I begin with a brief scan back to the post-war era, when the welfare state and 
social housing stock were expanding rapidly. Particular attention, however, is paid to the 
period beginning in the 1990s and continuing to the end of 2015. The 1990s was, of course, 
the decade when the production of social housing slowed considerably, and chronic 
homelessness began to rise across the country. 
Though the four provinces vary considerably in their commitment to housing, with BC 
and Quebec being much more engaged than Ontario and Alberta, the amount of chronic 
homelessness in the four largest cities in these provinces in very similar. This is for two 
housing related reasons. First, investments in housing, where they existed, did not keep up 
with the increasing demands for more affordable housing in Canada’s urban centres; this was 
especially the case in BC, where the housing market in Vancouver faces significant challenges 
due to the geographically limited nature of the city. But secondly, the housing that was built 
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was targeted not just at homeless people, but at other groups as well, such as seniors, people 
with disabilities, or low-income families. To be clear, housing for these populations is 
important, and there is an inadequate supply of housing for them. But housing the chronically 
homeless is a difficult task, and requires a particular type of housing, notably housing with 
intense supports. Even the governments that were engaged in the area of housing were not 
responding adequately to the specific housing needs of that population. For that reason, 
despite different provincial interventions in the area of housing, chronic homelessness is 
remarkably similar in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal. 
History of Social Housing in BC 
Compared to other provinces, and even compared with its own social policy track 
record, the province of BC has been particularly engaged in the area of housing and to a lesser 
extent homelessness for the most part of its recent history, with a few important exceptions. Its 
engagement has often been cautious and not always explicitly related to homelessness10, but 
the province has nevertheless taken an active role in the housing sector. 
The main provincial body that implements social housing policies is BC Housing, an 
arm’s length public corporation that has existed since the 1960s. BC Housing has long been 
interventionist and active in the field of housing. For example, there has been an inclusionary 
housing policy in place since 1975; indeed, BC was the first province in Canada to introduce 
measures to promote mixed-income social housing. BC Housing’s 1980 annual report explains 
this policy; “[t]oday, to ensure a mix of income levels in each family housing development, 
and to maintain a balance between working and income assisted residents, the Commission 
                                                
10 BC’s 10-year plan to reduce the number of people who suffer from mental health and 
addictions across the province, for example, addresses homelessness as a consequence of 
addiction and mental health. 
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strives to offer 65% of its units to families earning $13,000 or less, and the remaining 35% to 
families earning between $13,000 and $20,000… This policy helps to keep developments 
from becoming ghettos of the poor and disadvantaged and ensures that residents live in 
neighbourhoods that reflect community patterns” (BC Housing 1980).  
Since 1975 the province has also depended greatly on rent supplements, which help 
low-income people access stable and adequate housing that they could otherwise not afford. 
Rent supplements are used not just for co-operative or non-profit housing, but also for private 
market housing as well. This particular instrument has become an increasingly important 
component of BC Housing’s housing strategy for low-income residents. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, BC Housing, along with significant financial support 
from the federal government, produced an average of 1,000-1,500 new units of social housing 
across the province per year (Klein and Copas 2010). This significant push in the construction 
of social housing, specifically for “those with low incomes” (BC Housing 1986), was the 
result of the federal-provincial operating agreement, signed in 1986. The agreement resulted in 
the creation of 11,046 units of social housing for low-income people between 1986 and 1991 
(BC Housing 1991). Future housing developments by BC Housing have become increasingly 
targeted, specifically towards homeless people. This period was the high point in social 
housing developments, when approximately 1,800 new units per year of social housing were 
built for families, seniors, single people, and people with disabilities (Stern 2007, 20). 
The production of new units of social housing across BC slowed significantly when the 
federal government withdrew as a financial partner in 1993. In 1994, NDP premier Mike 
Harcourt introduced BC’s new provincial social housing program, Homes BC. The Minister 
responsible for housing during this time, Joan Smallwood, was highly partisan in the 
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introduction to Homes BC; “This year marks the first time since the Second World War that 
the federal government will not be funding new social housing developments for Canadians. 
This short-sighted approach has been rejected by our government. Unlike the federal 
government, BC recognizes the importance of continuing to support housing programs that 
increase the permanent supply of affordable housing for British Columbians” (BC Housing 
1994). On its own, the province continued to contribute an average of 600 units of social 
housing per year throughout the 1990s (Klein 2013).  
 In its 2001 budget, the NDP government promised another 3,400 units of social 
housing over the following three years. Following the introduction of this budget, the province 
went into a provincial election. After 10 years of NDP provincial governance, British 
Columbians elected the Liberal Party of BC to power. Facing debts and aiming to balance the 
budget, Liberal Premier Gordon Campbell announced the Core Services Review (CSR) in 
August 2001. The CSR resulted in significant cuts across most government departments 
including social housing and social assistance (interview #19). Homes BC was immediately 
cancelled, and in the early years of Liberal governance, from 2001-2004, there were no 
commitments to build new social housing made in the province (Irwin 2004; Klein and Copas 
2010). Previous housing commitments were honoured, however, including the 3,400 units of 
new social housing promised in the 2001 NDP budget. The Liberals would later claim credit 
for these new units (see BC Housing 2014), but they only reluctantly agreed to build them in 
the first place in 2002. 
In 2001, BC signed an agreement with the federal government through the Affordable 
Housing Agreement Framework. The federal government would transfer $89 million in capital 
dollars between 2002-2007, which was matched by the government of BC, and was to be used 
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for affordable or social housing. Analyses of this funding indicate that it was not put towards 
the development of new units of housing. Rather, the funding was “channelled by the province 
into the health care system. The funds are being used for assisted living units for the elderly 
and those with physical and mental disabilities” (Irwin 2004; 4). A senior provincial official 
during this time confirms that seniors, not affordable housing for the broader low-income 
population, were the priority during this period; “the province was not as active, especially on 
the homelessness file, though we did a lot of seniors housing from 2001-2006” (interview #16; 
see also The Caledon Institute 2002). Critics argue that the money should have been used for 
the construction of new units targeted at low-income British Columbians. Reports estimate 
that if the nearly $180 million in combined provincial and federal funds had been used to build 
housing, the funding could have resulted in the addition of up to 2,500 new affordable units 
across the province between 2002-2007 (Irwin 2004).  
Homelessness was becoming an increasingly visible and political issue in BC by the 
mid-2000s, and there was a perception among provincial officials that homeless people were 
often living with serious mental health and substance abuse issues. In response to this, 
provincial officials and senior members of Gordon Campbell’s administration slowly began to 
re-engage in the area of housing in 2004. The province was also in a stronger financial 
position; a highly placed official in the Liberal government noted, “I think there was a 
recognition that there was a real problem and a real need. And the government had turned a 
corner a little on its fiscal situation, so it was in a situation where it could choose priorities, 
and act on them” (interview #8).  
In 2004, Gordon Campbell began a province wide task force on homelessness, mental 
health and addiction. Getting the province to dedicate time and money to the issue of 
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homelessness took a bit of convincing by sympathetic insiders, however; “a number of people 
got the province engaged and committed, I worked to get the Premier committed and on 
board. [Minister of Housing] Rich Coleman had some kind of come to Jesus moment when he 
realized that [homelessness] was a real problem. It’s not just that you stop drinking and doing 
drugs and turn your life around… he began to be very creative about how to create the capital 
to make it possible to make a significant contribution to new social housing” (interview #8).  
The mayor of a mid-sized BC town who was a member of the task force recalled the 
meetings between the mayors and the premier, “So [Campbell] called 7 mayors together… He 
called us to a meeting and he said, well he never said it, but I saw it as political damage 
control meeting… Remember, [Campbell] had a problem to solve that he had created, this 
was an outcropping of the Core Services Review, and he said, ‘Whoops!!’” The Mayor 
continued, “The whole idea was that we would come up with a strategy to deal with the 
problem that had been created, without him sort of saying ‘I created a problem, I am now 
solving it’” (interview #19).  
Following the task force’s work and research, the province began to reinvest 
significant capital spending in the construction of new units of social or affordable housing. 
The former mayor on the task force explained how this worked; “So [Campbell] said ‘the 
funds are there… communities that can provide shovel ready housing projects for the drug 
addicted mentally ill whatever will get the money’”. He continued, “But [Campbell] warned 
us, he said ‘if you don’t come to the party shovel ready’ -- meaning we had to prove that we 
are doing something fast -- we would miss out” (interview #19). Through the partnerships 
with mayors throughout BC, the province constructed a number of supportive housing units in 
7 BC cities, providing capital dollars for construction and operational funding for services if 
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the municipalities could provide properly zoned and shovel ready land. In this way, the 
province had begun to re-engage in the area of housing in 2004. Provincial interventions had 
become increasingly targeted, as the supportive housing that was built was targeted at 
homeless people with mental health problems and/or addictions.  
Following the task force, the Department of Housing, and specifically BC Housing, 
emerged as the lead ministry for future responses to homelessness. Housing was seen as the 
department that was best equipped to handle provincial efforts on homelessness; “With the 
addition of shelters to BC Housing you can begin to knit the continuum together so people can 
move from outreach to shelters to SROs to other forms of housing” (interview #16). The 
province also amended the Municipal Act and gave municipalities more tools to promote 
affordable housing, such as the important density bonusing power (see Chapter 6). 
The province introduced a housing policy entitled Housing Matters in 2006, the first 
housing policy in the province since Homes BC was cancelled in the early-2000s. While not an 
explicit response to homelessness, the policy addressed the housing spectrum and spoke to the 
full range of housing needs from emergency shelters to homeownership, notably through the 
Provincial Homeless Initiative (BC Housing 2006). Within the framework of this policy, the 
province has contributed to and protected the low-income housing stock across BC, and in 
Vancouver in particular, since 2006.  
For example, the province bought 20 Single Resident Occupancy (SRO) hotels in the 
DTES in 2007. These hotels were built over 100 years ago and were originally intended to be 
temporary housing for seasonal or forestry workers (interview #5; see also Campbell et al 
2009). Though these housing units are not quality housing by any means, they are at risk of 
being bought up by developers and being converted into lucrative condos (interviews #4 and 
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#5; see also Campbell, Boyd, and Culbert 2009). In buying these buildings, the province has 
protected that affordable housing stock and has committed to repairing and upgrading the units 
(slowly). 
 Housing Matters marks a significant departure from the province’s previous social 
housing commitments under Homes BC. The introduction to Housing Matters emphasizes that 
the province would take a new approach to housing; “it’s clear that the challenges of 
addressing housing need in BC are much different than they were a decade ago. It’s equally 
clear that we need to take a new direction” (BC Housing, 2006). With this policy, the province 
moved fully away from building housing for low-income British Columbians, but instead 
targeted its housing investments at the homeless. Indeed, insofar as the needs of low-income 
people are mentioned, Housing Matters notes that the province will facilitate access for that 
population to rental market housing. 
Housing Matters was updated in 2014. In the introduction, Minister Coleman boasts 
about the recent track record of BC Housing; “Launched in 2006, Housing Matters BC 
remains the most progressive housing strategy in Canada” (BC Housing 2014b). While 
acknowledging that the context has changed, the updated policy “maintains our commitment 
to supporting those in greatest need” (ibid). Homelessness remains an important priority of the 
plan, and low-income housing needs will continue to be met through facilitated access to 
private market rental units. The plan is not, of course, a comprehensive plan on homelessness; 
it does not involve other Ministries, for example, and does not speak to the many causes of 
homelessness. It does, however, prioritize the reduction of homelessness throughout the 
province. 
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Minister Coleman was named Deputy Premier of the province in 2014. Through 
various cabinet shuffles over his 13 years in public office, he has always kept the housing file. 
His long tenure as housing minister gives him credibility among many housing advocates as 
well as provincial and city officials. A senior provincial official emphasized the importance of 
Coleman’s long tenure: “It is very odd to see a housing minister who has maintained a 
portfolio for so long. You rarely get that level of continuity with a senior cabinet minister on 
any single file… When you get someone who understands the file that well, is committed to it 
and is as strong a cabinet player as he is, it keeps the issue front and centre” (interview #16).  
In conclusion, BC has been involved in the area of social housing, with one notable 
exception (2001-2006), from the 1990s to the present. The nature of this involvement has 
changed, however, as government housing has become increasingly targeted at people with 
barriers, such as homeless people or people with mental health barriers, as opposed to being 
for low-income British Columbians as it was in the 1970s and 1980s. The province has 
increasingly come to rely on rent supplements as a means of facilitating the access of low-
income people to rental housing. Despite these interventions in the area of housing, the level 
of chronic homelessness in Vancouver is similar to what is seen in cities where the province 
has been much less involved in housing. The province has not been able to keep up with the 
needs of the homeless population, and the unique nature of Vancouver, where land is limited 
and expensive, has worked against provincial efforts to create housing for those who need it 
the most. The lack of affordable housing in general in Vancouver puts more people at risk of 
homelessness, making provincial interventions extremely important but ultimately inadequate 
to meet the needs of the homeless population. 
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Housing policy in Alberta 
Prior to the federal withdrawal from the housing sector, the province of Alberta, like 
other provinces, built social housing in partnership with the federal government. Annual 
reports from the Alberta Housing Corporation (AHC) indicate that the province slowly but 
steadily added to its housing supply through the 1970s and 1980s. The priority throughout this 
period was housing for seniors. The 1981-82 annual report explains; “More than half of the 
corporation’s unit commitments, 2070, were to the Senior Citizens Self-contained Program; a 
further indication of the priority which the government places on affordable housing for 
Alberta’s many pioneers” (Alberta Housing Corporation 1982, 3 emphasis added). In addition 
to the construction of social housing, the province also purchased housing units, which have 
become a part of the social housing stock.  
The province also had a transitional housing program, but it was different from what 
we understand transitional housing to be today. In modern language, transitional housing is 
intended for people who are exiting homelessness, either leaving a shelter or another form of 
street involved life, or people fleeing violence. This housing is temporary (though it lasts up to 
three years in many cities), and is intended to help a person become more stable before 
entering his or her own permanent housing. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the transitional 
housing in Alberta, however, was housing that was built or purchased in Northern “growth” 
centres, such as Slave Lake or Fort McMurray, for people leaving northern aboriginal 
reserves; “Assisting our indigenous people in bridging the differences between theirs and an 
urban society is not a simple undertaking… AHC’s part in all of this is to find or construct 
homes for the family in its new community… The housing is supplied with rent geared to 
income and after two years of integration into the new community the family has the 
opportunity to purchase their home from the corporation… the program’s success is generally 
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defined as self-sufficiency through gainful employment” (Alberta Housing Corporation 1980, 
16). 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, therefore, Alberta’s housing stock was small and was 
largely targeted at seniors (the province’s pioneers), with some smaller programs like the 
transitional housing for aboriginal people and a program that offered housing to public 
servants. Provincial documents indicate that by 1992, the provincial stock was comprised of 
just under 40,000 units of housing, including municipal non-profit housing that was 
provincially subsidized (Alberta Ministry of Municipal Affairs 1992). The majority of this 
stock, 21,906 units, was for seniors. By prioritizing the province’s “pioneers”, Alberta’s early 
housing policy, like its present social assistance policy, was geared more towards the 
deserving than the undeserving . Indeed, because of this emphasis on housing for seniors, low-
income Albertans did not benefit as much as they might have from housing construction 
during this period.  
As was the case in other provinces, notably Ontario, reporting on housing statistics 
became very patchy and incomplete throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. During this time 
(coinciding with federal cuts to social housing) the province of Alberta stopped funding new 
social housing developments, though it did continue operating the units that were already in its 
possession.  
Combined with a growing population in Alberta, a federal freeze on new social 
housing developments, provincial disinterest in the sector and overall cuts to social services, 
the homeless population began to increase rapidly throughout Alberta in the 1990s and 2000s 
(Gaetz, Gulliver, and Richter 2014). The plight of this population was initially met with 
indifference or worse by provincial public officials. A colourful and admittedly flawed leader, 
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former Premier Ralph Klein had a series of high profile and embarrassing encounters with the 
homeless population in his province. One of the most famous incidents was in 2001, when the 
premier was attending an event in Edmonton. Following the event, where he had had a lot to 
drink (CBC News 2013a), Klein asked his driver to take him to the Herb Jamieson homeless 
shelter. When he arrived, he got out of his car and reportedly berated a group of homeless 
men, yelling at them to get jobs before throwing money at them. His office briefly attempted 
to spin the event, suggesting that the premier was simply inquiring how many of the men at 
the shelter had jobs (Dabbs 2006). Klein eventually held an emotional press conference, in 
which he apologized for this behaviour and admitted that he struggled with alcoholism.  
The provincial government slowly reengaged in housing in the mid-2000s through the 
Affordable Housing Initiative (AHI) a bilateral cost-sharing agreement with the federal 
government. Between 2001-2011, the government of Alberta claimed (and matched) $122.58 
million in federal funding, which produced 4,308 units of housing over the course of ten years 
(CMHC 2011). Much of this housing was built specifically for seniors, again keeping with 
Alberta’s past tradition of prioritizing the province’s “pioneers”.  
By 2007, it was impossible for the province to ignore the fact that the growing housing 
needs across Alberta were rapidly outpacing its investments. Seven of the province’s biggest 
cities, including Calgary and Edmonton, were implementing plans to end homelessness and 
were constantly referencing the astonishing growth in the numbers of homeless people on their 
streets. The Calgary Homeless Foundation (CHF) estimated that if nothing was done about 
homelessness, by 2017 there would be some 15,000 homeless people in the city (Gaetz, 
Gulliver, and Richter 2014). The numbers are likely exaggerated and sensationalist; the 
authors extrapolated from the worst economic period in recent Canadian history, the 2008 
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downturn, and assumed that rates of homelessness would continue to grow at a similar rate in 
the future. These numbers were successful, however, in getting attention, and in 2007, 
Progressive Conservative Premier Ed Stelmach announced the creation of a Secretariat that 
would propose a path to ending homelessness across the province. “It’s an ambitious goal,” 
the premier is quoted as saying in a CBC news article, “but one that I believe we must pursue 
to help those most in need” (CBC News 2007). 
There was also a sense in the mid-2000s that homelessness in Alberta was quite simply 
a housing shortage problem. The source of this perception was an influential study by the 
Drop-In Shelter (the DI), Canada’s largest homeless shelter, with more than 1000 people using 
its shelter or transitional housing services every night. The study found that more than half the 
population in the homeless shelter worked the equivalent of a full-time job and could even 
afford to pay between $400-800/month in rent (Calgary Drop-In 2007). Looking at these 
results, many influential provincial and local actors saw homelessness as a casualty of their 
incredible success in building prosperity in Calgary, and felt a responsibility to do something 
about it (Scott 2012; interviews #24 and #37). Accepting the results of the study at face value 
was problematic, however. Indeed, the study was based on a self-selecting convenience 
sample of 27% of the population at the Drop-In Centre. This type of sample has implications 
for the findings; the most chronically homeless people at the shelter, for example, likely did 
not complete the survey. As a result, the study probably overestimated the number of people 
who were able to work, and discounted those who had serious barriers to housing and 
employment and needed more than a place of their own to live. 
In October 2008, the province introduced a 10-year plan to end homelessness in 
Alberta. Interestingly, this plan was adopted after the seven biggest cities in Alberta adopted 
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their own local 10-year plans to end homelessness. The province’s plan was greatly influenced 
by what took place at the local level, as well as the federal At Home/Chez Soi project, and 
there is indeed a strong similarity between the provincial plan and the local 10-year plans. 
Like the local plans, the provincial plan emphasizes the Housing First approach to ending 
homelessness and follows three key pillars: “rapid re-housing of homeless Albertans… 
providing client-centred supports to re-housed clients… and preventing homelessness” 
(Alberta Secretariat for Action On Homelessness 2008; 2).  
Like the CHF plan, the provincial plan emphasizes “self-reliance” (ibid) and stresses 
that ending homelessness yields significant cost savings when compared to managing 
homelessness. The upfront investment planned by the plan is $3.316 billion over ten years 
(Alberta Secretariat for Action On Homelessness 2008, 11). But based on an estimated growth 
in homelessness of 7% per year (a very liberal estimation, as indicated above), the provincial 
plan claims that ending homelessness will save $7.1 billion by 2019. This is another important 
similarity with the provincial and local homelessness plans; they all emphasize early and often 
that eliminating chronic homelessness will save money. The plan also emphasizes the need to 
collect data about homelessness, and has worked with local governments in Alberta to develop 
common data collection and reporting standards.  
Though the ten-year plan to end homelessness was generally well received and 
exceeded even some of its early targets (notably to house 11,000 formerly homeless people), 
there were noticeable gaps in the policy. According to a senior member of the Secretariat, 
“There are gaps, such as specialized populations that are not being served within the current 
model of Housing First. So there are groups such as people with disabilities, seniors, 
aboriginal people – and don’t get me wrong, there are people with disabilities and aboriginal 
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people who are being served, but there are specialized groups that require a unique housing 
response” (interview #39). In 2013, the province created an Interagency Council on 
Homelessness (modeled after American Interagency Councils), which was tasked with 
addressing these gaps in the ten-year plan. Following the recommendation of the Interagency 
Council, the province of Alberta became the first in Canada to introduce a plan to prevent and 
reduce youth homelessness in 2014.  
The provincial plan on homelessness is not a housing policy, but it does indicate that a 
priority would be constructing new units of affordable housing. Specifically, the plan 
promised to house 11,000 homeless Albertans within ten-years, and estimated that it would 
need to construct some 8,000 new units of affordable housing to do so. In addition to federal 
funding that was used to construct affordable housing, the province of Alberta has also 
contributed to the construction of new affordable housing; “the Government of Alberta has 
provided funding to help develop over 10,790 affordable housing units” (Alberta Ministry of 
Housing and Urban Affairs 2011). In 2011, 2,600 units were completed, with an anticipated 
2,400 units to be completed by 2012 and the remaining 5,800 by 2015. Looking more closely 
at the numbers, however, shows that these units are again often aimed at seniors or at low-
income families. Indeed, by 2011, out of 10,970 affordable housing units, only 581 were units 
committed under the province’s plan to end homelessness, specifically for the homeless 
(Alberta Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs 2011). This is far from the 8,000 units of 
affordable housing for the homeless that were promised in the plan. 
A similar trend can be seen with the federal-provincial housing funding. The 
Affordable Housing Initiative was renamed the Investment in Affordable Housing (IAH) 
program in 2011 by the Conservative government. Not only was the program renamed, but its 
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funding was also doubled between 2011-2019. By 2015, the government of Alberta had 
claimed $80.76 million in federal funding, which was used to support 1,324 units of affordable 
housing (CMHC 2015). The province has continued to prioritize seniors with this funding, but 
it has not benefited as much as other provinces from the federal cost-sharing programs, and 
housing production has remained very slow (CMHC 2015). From 2011-2013, for example, the 
province built only 644 units of affordable housing using the AHI funding; of these units, 334, 
or more than half, were for seniors (Government of Alberta 2013b). Forty of the 644 units 
were for people with special needs and 32 for people with disabilities. The remaining 238 
units built between 2011-2013 were for families and individuals, of which 110 were units for 
the homeless (the majority in Calgary), and 51 for homeownership (through Habitat for 
Humanity).  
By the end of 2015, it has become apparent that while the provincial plan had been 
successful at helping some people leave homelessness through relying on existing housing, it 
was equally clear that it had not kept its promise to build affordable and supportive housing. A 
review of the first five years of implementation of the plan found, “there are risks to the Plan’s 
success” (Alberta Interagency Council on Homelessness 2014). The report by the Interagency 
Council notes, “the plan is working, but more affordable housing is needed across Alberta.” It 
continues to emphasize that the construction of new affordable housing is not meeting the 
needs of the growing homeless population, and writes, “at the very centre of the Council’s 
advice is that ending homelessness and having an adequate supply of affordable housing are 
inseparable tasks” (ibid).  
The lack of provincial engagement in the area of affordable housing, including for the 
homeless population, has led some media reports to predict that the provincial plan will not 
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succeed at ending homelessness by 2019; “six years into an ambitious plan to end 
homelessness, it now appears the goal will have to be moved back” (CBC News 2015a). The 
article notes that the NDP government hopes to get the plan back on track to succeed by 2019, 
but by the end of 2015 no official housing related provincial plans had been announced. 
The province has thus reengaged somewhat in the area of housing and particularly with 
respect to homelessness through a Housing First approach. The lack of commitment to 
affordable housing, however, meant the overall success of the ambitious plan to end 
homelessness in the province is extremely limited. The provincial NDP government has 
indicated a willingness to invest more substantially in housing, and federal Liberal 
government is willing to partner in this endeavor, so this situation might change. But there is 
so much pent up housing need throughout the province that this will require substantial 
political will and investment.  
Housing Policy in Ontario 
The early post-war years of housing construction in Ontario were similar to what they 
were in other provinces; the federal government dominated the post-war period with respect to 
housing policy up until the 1970s in Ontario. Ontario was the first province to challenge the 
federal government’s dominance by taking an active interest in the area of housing policy. The 
Ontario Housing Corporation (OHC) was created in 1964; as Suttor explains, “[then Ontario 
Premier] Robarts’ Ontario saw itself as a subnational government somewhat parallel to the 
federal government, expanding its capacity and expertise, and ‘province-building’ was a real 
theme” (Suttor 2014, 118; see also Banting 1990).  
In the 1970s, the other large provinces also began to take an interest in the area of 
housing. In the face of this provincial challenge, Prime Minister Trudeau to some extent gave 
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them more space to exercise their powers through, for example, the creation of the Established 
Programs Financing Act (EPF). Created in the 1960s, the EPF replaced previous cost-sharing 
programs with a block fund transfer to provinces, giving them more control of their social 
policies (though the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), a more conditional cost sharing program, 
remained in place). Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, having taken more control over the 
area of housing policy, Ontario had a diverse housing policy, which included social housing 
and subsidies for private rental production, among other programs (Suttor 2014, 155).  
In Ontario and the rest of the country, social housing had not been tainted with the 
same stigma that characterized it in the United States. Rather, housing was an effective tool 
for promoting mixed neighbourhoods and broader urban development. The type of mixity that 
was promoted through housing policy in the 1960s and 70s was different from what is today 
understood to be its main goal; “ideas on mixed-density, nodal suburban development were 
not focused, as they are today, on urbanity of urban form, environmental objectives, or transit-
supportive density; they were explicitly about a mix of prices, tenures, social classes, and 
stages of the life cycle” (Suttor 2013, 111-12).  
When the OHC was created in 1964, there were a mere 6,179 units of social housing in 
the province (Ontario Ministry of Housing 1977). By 1975, 84,145 units of social housing had 
been built in the province (Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association 2011), a massive increase 
in housing production in Ontario.  These units were developed through federal leadership in 
terms of policy direction and funding, though the OHC was involved on the program delivery 
side. Beginning in the 1980s, the Canadian economy took a turn for the worse and this decade 
marked a departure from the previous goals of promoting mixity and instead moved to a more 
targeted approach. There was still great production of social housing in the 1980s, but as 
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housing became more targeted and oriented towards a smaller and smaller segment of society, 
the general public increasingly came to see housing as benefitting the few, as opposed to the 
many. As many authors have noted (Hulchanski 2004; Rose 1980; Suttor 2014), these changes 
would make future cuts and downloading much easier. Between the mid-1970s and 1985, 
some 52,189 units of housing were created (Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association 2011).  
While the political consensus was coming to criticize the diverse housing policy of the 
past and was moving to make it more targeted, intense housing and homelessness related 
advocacy was taking place in Ontario, and notably in Toronto. This advocacy, a number of 
authors have insisted, was influential not just in terms of Ontario policy, but also in terms of 
national policy as well (Leo 2006; Crowe 2007; Layton 2008; Suttor 2014). In a sense, 
however, this advocacy supported the new, targeted orientation of the housing system by 
highlighting the severe needs of a small group of homeless or special needs people, mostly 
concentrated in Toronto. Elected in 1990, the Ontario NDP was influenced by this advocacy 
and proved itself committed to the housing policy agenda, keeping it on the political radar by 
coupling it with the government’s stimulus program.  
Between 1986-1995, the province alone funded 37,884 units of housing, and worked in 
partnership with the federal government to produce another 30,998 units between 1986-1992 
(Ontario Non-Profit Housing Association 2011). By 1995, there were approximately 205,000 
units of social housing in Ontario (Office of the Auditor General of Ontario 2009). Housing 
production would come to slow remarkably during the 1990s, and today, the majority of social 
housing that exists throughout Ontario was built between 1960-1990. 
In 1995, just days after Progressive Conservative Mike Harris was elected premier of 
Ontario, provincial housing programs were cancelled in what some activists call an 
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“ideological fit” (Shapcott 2001). Running on a “Common Sense Revolution” promise to cut 
government spending and social programs, Harris had successfully branded the province’s 
history with social housing as a “boondoggle”. Not only did Harris cut new planned 
developments, but he also cancelled some 17,000 units of housing that were under 
construction at the time, with the exception of those projects that would have been more 
expensive to cancel than to finish (Suttor 2014). There were no new social housing 
commitments in Ontario between 1995-2001. 
In addition to slashed funding at the federal and provincial levels, the government of 
Ontario downloaded the responsibility for social housing to municipalities in the late 1990s. 
This decision has had a long-lasting and devastating effect on the housing market in Ontario, 
notably in Toronto. The Local Services Realignment (LSR) resulted from the Who Does What 
panel implemented by Mike Harris, an important part of the effort to minimize government 
size and expenditures. Numerous accounts highlight Harris was seeking to cut education costs 
through an overall realignment of responsibilities, and that housing was in many ways an 
“afterthought” (Suttor 2014; Toronto Social Housing Services Corporation 2007; personal 
interviews #46, #51 and #52). This further serves to reinforce the fact that this decision was 
made with little thought to the lasting impact of giving municipalities the responsibility for the 
one of the most expensive areas of social policy and infrastructure, without affording them 
additional revenue tools to fully exercise those powers.  
Through provincial-municipal negotiations, municipalities were given the 
responsibility for managing social housing and a number of other social policy areas. In 
exchange, the province uploaded the previous municipal share of education funding. Since the 
late 1990s, the City of Toronto has had significant control over the public housing sector, and 
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has written comprehensive housing and homelessness policies such as Housing Opportunities 
Toronto 2010-2020 (HOT). This realignment of service provision between the provincial and 
municipal governments in the 1990s was intended to be revenue neutral, but municipalities 
protested from the very beginning that they were being given far more than their fair share 
(interviews #43, #46, #53 and #54). Indeed, the first proposal from the province was met with 
“intense municipal reaction” (Suttor 2014, p 195), and led to another round of negotiations. 
Municipalities had little choice but to accept the second deal; “there was further controversy, 
but the municipal sector reluctantly accepted the May 1997 proposal as the best deal they 
could get” (ibid). 
A former mayor of another big Canadian city said of the LSR, “I would have never 
accepted that deal if I had been mayor of Toronto” (interview #24), but this is, of course, much 
easier said than done. A senior member of the Toronto bureaucracy highlighted that there was 
intense dissatisfaction with the LSR and especially with the devolution of housing at the city 
level; “there was a lot of resistance, because it also came with the cost to fund it… So the 
mayor was pretty angry about it, and contemplated a constitutional challenge.” The actor 
noted that a constitutional challenge would most likely have failed, but he still thinks it should 
have been done; “I think we should have constitutionally challenged it just to highlight the 
opposition. And it has turned out not to be too terrific, because cities do not have the tax base 
to deal with [housing]” (interview #44).  
The City of Toronto was perhaps the biggest loser of the realignment; not only was 
there an increasing need for new affordable housing in Toronto, but there was also a high 
concentration of existing social housing in the city. Built between the 1960s-1990s, this 
housing was and continues to be in severe need of expensive repairs. Writing in 2012, 
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Shapcott notes, “the Ontario government downloaded a capital repair liability to municipalities 
that was estimated at a billion dollars several years ago, and has grown since then” (Shapcott 
2012). Suttor’s numbers are slightly different, but serve to reinforce the point made by 
Shapcott, that Toronto was given a huge repair bill with no way, other than the limited and 
regressive property tax, to fund it; “the extra annual cost to Metro [Toronto] was $1,470 in the 
[rejected] January 1997 proposal; $665 million in the accepted May 1997 proposal” (2014, 
201). That funding is only related to the repairs backlog; the cost of building new affordable 
housing to meet the needs of low-income Ontarians bring the bill much, much higher. 
By 2001, after a half-decade of federal and provincial disinterest in housing in Ontario, 
the CMHC estimated that there was a need for around 80,000 units of affordable rental 
housing in Ontario (Shapcott 2001). Had Harris had not cancelled funding for housing in 1995 
but rather kept going at the pace of previous governments and commitments, it is estimated 
that an additional 55,000 units would have been created (ibid). This would not have fully met 
the need for affordable housing across the province, but it would have gone a long way. 
The Affordable Housing Agreement between Ontario and the government of Canada 
was introduced in 2001. A cost-sharing program between the federal and provincial 
governments, new affordable housing developments would receive a subsidy of $50,000 per 
unit of affordable housing. $25,000 of this funding was federal, and in most provinces the 
other $25,000 was to come from the provincial government. But by the time the federal 
government had introduced the AHA, the provincial government had dissolved itself of any 
responsibility with respect to housing, and Harris would only commit a paltry $2,000 per new 
unit. The municipality and community groups were left to make up the balance of $23,000 per 
unit. Between 2001-2011, nearly $453 million in CMHC funding was claimed (and matched) 
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in Ontario, leading to the construction of nearly 22,000 new units of affordable housing 
(CMHC 2011). 
In 2010, McGuinty’s Liberal government introduced an Ontario-wide Long-term 
Affordable Housing Strategy (LTAHS). The document urged the federal government to play a 
more important role in the long-term funding of affordable housing, while promising that the 
province would build the housing system from the bottom up with municipal and other local 
partners The document harshly criticizes Harris’s to download housing to the municipal level; 
“In the 1990s, previous governments decreased funding for housing by transferring 
responsibility to municipal governments. That approach was short-sighted” (Ontario Ministry 
of Municipal Affairs and Housing 2010, 4). The LTAHS notes that the province has, since 
Harris’s departure, invested significantly in affordable housing since 2001, though this was of 
course funding that was required by the federal government in order to access the Affordable 
Housing Program funding. This criticism is thus curious, as McGuinty had been in 
government for nearly a decade but the LTAHS was the first obvious move by his government 
to correct this past mistake.  
The LTAHS would mark the beginning of a renewed interest on the part of the 
province in the area of housing. The province did not provide new funding for housing, but 
rather the LTAHS required local governments to develop ten-year affordable housing and 
homelessness plans. Though the Strategy announces that the province is contributing to 
affordable housing, the funding mentioned in the document is funding that had already been 
allocated to affordable housing through the framework of the IAH cost-sharing program with 
the federal government. 
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Repeated calls to upload the funding responsibility for social housing to the province 
went unheeded (Schuk 2009; Shapcott 2001), the province was nevertheless becoming 
increasingly engaged in the particular area of homelessness in 2010. Through the LTAHS, five 
provincial programs were created to provide local service providers with more flexibility and 
control over their homelessness programs. In 2013, these five programs were consolidated into 
the Community Homelessness Partnership Initiative (CHPI), a “100% provincially funded 
investment that allows municipalities to use flexible program funding to develop homelessness 
programs tailored to community needs” (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 
2015b). This consolidation was intended to provide municipalities with even more flexibility 
by becoming a block transfer payment. But as is often the case when funding becomes 
consolidated into a block transfer, the province transferred less money to the municipalities for 
homelessness services than it did under the previous system (personal interview 2014). 
By 2013, three years into the LTAHS, the provincial wait list for affordable housing 
had reached 158,445 (72,700 of which were in Toronto) and the Toronto Housing Corporation 
was reporting a backlog for repairs bill of $862 million (Monsebraaten 2013). Municipalities 
were and remain left to shoulder this bill on their own. Provincial CHPI funding cannot be 
used to fund the construction of buildings nor to convert buildings.  Rather, it focuses on 
projects related to supports, emergency responses, and prevention of homelessness; 
municipalities were left to deal with their waitlists and repair bills on their own. 
The province announced in 2015 that it would update the LTAHS; “we want to ensure 
that we continue to make progress in meeting the housing needs of Ontarians, and that housing 
policies are relevant to current realities, reflect new research and best practices, and support 
the Province’s goal to end homelessness” (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 
 126 
2015b). Noting that there had been significant accomplishments since the original LTAHS of 
2010, the province nevertheless announced consultations to inform an updated plan that 
“brings together government with the private and non-profit sectors” (ibid 5). While insisting 
that housing is an important priority of the provincial government, the discussion guide directs 
participants to highlight ways that the private sector or federal government can do more.  
In response to this call for submissions, the Association of Municipalities of Ontario 
(AMO) stated, “when the costs of social housing were downloaded by the Province to 
municipal governments, this was done so [sic] without the transfer of adequate financial 
reserves to address capital needs. It is not manageable for municipal governments to address 
this situation on their own off the property tax base. More provincial help is required” 
(Association of Municipalities of Ontario 2015, 4). The AMO insists that the province must 
not just tell others what to do, but must also invest in housing; “the need for more resources 
into the system cannot be understated [sic]. The housing system has been underfunded by the 
provincial and federal governments for years and the downloading to municipal governments 
has taken its toll” (ibid 15). These and other submissions will be considered by the province 
for when its updated LTAHS is announced. 
Homelessness has become a part of the province’s poverty fighting plan. As will be 
outlined in the following chapter on provincial poverty policy, the province of Ontario began 
implementing its first Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) in 2008. The first plan was timid and 
unambitious, seeking only to decrease child poverty by 25% in five years. In part due to the 
economic downturn in 2008, the province was unable to accomplish even this very modest 
goal by 2013. To its credit, the province came back in that same year with a more ambitious 
PRS, one that admitted the shortcomings of the previous plan while setting more aggressive 
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targets. Notably, the 2013 PRS set the goal of ending homelessness throughout the province. 
To this end, the province set up an expert advisory panel on homelessness to provide advice 
on the timeline as well as path forward to this goal. The panel released its report in late 2015, 
which included its recommendation that the province adopt a definition of homelessness, 
conduct regular and coordinated homeless counts, and adopt a Housing First approach to 
homelessness (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing 2015a).  
At the 2015 Conference to End Homelessness in Canada, Ontario Deputy Premier and 
Minister responsible for the PRS was invited to deliver the keynote address. Matthews was 
open about her government’s failure to deliver on the first PRS; she was, however, also 
insistent on the fact that the conservative federal government should have played a larger role 
in the fight against poverty. She was unreservedly optimistic and pleased with the new liberal 
government, and insisted that the promises in the second PRS, including ending homelessness, 
were within reach with the new federal partner.  
The province of Ontario went from an early and engaged actor in the area of housing to 
one that absolved itself of any responsibility for housing. That has changed somewhat 
recently, with the province stating in various reports, plans and policies that housing and 
homelessness are important priorities. The province has invested in the construction and repair 
of affordable housing, but this is money that it must spend in order to receive federal housing 
dollars; this investment has not come at the province’s initiative, and the province has not 
gone beyond what it has needed to do to access federal funding. The decision in the 1990s to 
download the responsibility for social housing to municipalities, without giving municipalities 
any financial tools to fund this massive and expensive policy area, has had a lasting effect on 
poverty and homelessness in Ontario cities. Unless they are given more financial powers or 
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tools to deal with housing repairs and waitlists, municipalities will continue to fall behind in 
the fight against homelessness. 
Housing policy in Quebec 
Like BC, the government of Quebec, through the Société d’habitation du Québec 
(SHQ), continued to fund new social housing following the federal cuts in the 1990s. Quebec 
has continued building and buying housing ever since the 1990s, making it the only Canadian 
province to have funded social housing non-stop since the federal disengagement in the 1990s. 
The early development of the Quebec welfare state, including housing policy, was 
distinct from what happened in the other Canadian provinces. The provincial welfare state 
developed later in Quebec than it did in other provinces, but it also developed differently; the 
province tends to intervene more, programs tend to be less targeted and more universal, and 
civil society participates more in policy development. The differences should not be 
overstated; as the following Chapter will illustrate, the levels of social assistance offered by 
Quebec are somewhat more generous than what is offered in other provinces, but Quebec is 
not the most generous province in the federation. There are, however, important differences in 
social policy in Quebec, not just in the content of the policies, but also in terms of how they 
were developed. This is also the case for the province’s housing policy. 
While housing policy has been understudied in the Quebec (Vaillancourt and 
Ducharme 2001), its story quite closely follows what happened in other areas of social policy 
development in the province. Vaillancourt et al. (2001) argue that there were three main 
periods of social housing development in Quebec. The first immediately followed the Second 
World War, from 1945-1968, when Quebec “used the public housing format favoured by the 
federal government and CMHC less frequently than other provinces” (2001; 11). For this 
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reason, government-led housing developments were slower than what they were in other 
provinces during this period, and there were other non-public bodies that provided welfare for 
those in need, notably the Catholic Church. 
The SHQ was created in 1968, which marked the beginning of the second period of 
housing, which would last until 1980. Housing developments got off to a quick start following 
the Quiet Revolution and the creation of the welfare state, and would amount to 35,435 units 
by 1980 (Vaillancourt, Ducharme, Aubry, and Grenier 2016). There were two main ways of 
contributing to the social housing stock throughout the 1970s and 1980s: building housing and 
buying housing. While other provinces contributed to social housing significantly through 
construction, Quebec more often purchased existing buildings and renovated them to make 
them suitable for housing. This is a practice that continues today in the province; the effort to 
convert old hospitals, for example, into mixed-housing communities is an important priority of 
community groups (interviews #65, #67 and #71).  
In the 1960s, 70s and 80s, the construction and purchase of housing for low-income 
people and families was done largely through cost-shared programs between the federal and 
provincial governments, with the federal government contributing approximately 60% of the 
costs to construction and purchase of housing through the Canadian Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation (see, for example, Table 9 on page 58 of Société d’habitation du Québec 1982). 
The Province of Québec covered the remaining 40% of the costs through the SHQ. The 
majority of this housing still exists today, and amounts to just under 74,000 units.  
Beginning in 1978, the SHQ also began offering rent supplements to low-income 
families or individuals. The rent supplement program “fournit également aux citoyens 
défavorisés, locataires d’un édifice appartenant à une coopérative d’habitation locative ou à 
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un organisme sans but lucratif, une allocation financière leur permettant d’absorber l’écart 
entre le loyer normalement exigible et leur capacité de payer” (Société d’habitation du 
Québec 1978). As the previous quotation notes, rent supplements were originally only 
available to citizens living in co-op or non-profit housing. This would change in 1987 when 
there was a high level of vacancy in the private housing market. The SHQ announced in that 
year that it would take advantage of the high vacancy rate by extending the rent supplement 
program, on an experimental basis, to certain private market units. The 1987 SHQ annual 
report explains this change;  
Tirant parti d’un taux de vacance élevé sur le marché locatif privé, la SHQ a pu mettre 
en place un nouveau volet du programme de supplément au loyer. Cette mesure a 
permis à 922 familles, inscrites sur les listes d’attente des offices municipaux 
d’habitation de 23 municipalités du QC de pouvoir disposer rapidement d’un logement 
convenable pour lequel elles paieront un loyer comparable à ce qu’elles auraient 
déboursé dans un HLM du secteur public (Société d’habitation du Québec 1987, 42). 
 
Following this change, there was a significant jump in the number of rent supplements offered 
by the SHQ; by 2013, there are nearly 25,000 rent supplements (Société d’habitation du 
Québec 2013). Thus, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, we can see a significant and consistent 
growth in the public housing stock in Quebec, as well as in terms of the number of private 
market units that were supported by the provincial government’s housing policy; this was the 
case in most other provinces. 
The third period of housing development in Quebec identified by Vaillancourt et al. 
began in 1980 (writing in 2001, the authors end their analysis in the year 2000). Throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, the role of the third sector grew, both in terms of developing and 
implementing housing policy. The development of housing units in Quebec gradually began to 
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slow in the 1980s, notably because federal cost-sharing programs were being cut and were 
ultimately eliminated in the mid-1990s. 
Further, with the diversification of the rent supplement program to include private 
housing units, housing policy became more targeted in the 1980s when federal and provincial 
budgetary constraints forced the SHQ to reorient and re-prioritize. The 1988 SHQ annual 
report notes, “cette souplesse d’adaptation au contexte socioéconomique s’est concrétisée 
cette année par la poursuite de la diversification amorcée en 1987 et surtout par 
l’augmentation du nombre des unités affectées au Programme de supplément au loyer sur le 
marché locatif privé” (Société d’habitation du Québec 1988). Rent supplements became more 
oriented to low-income populations, and began taking up a larger share of the SHQ’s annual 
budget.  
 Homelessness slowly came on the political agenda of provincial elected officials in the 
1980s. The Minister responsible for Housing was the government of Quebec’s coordinator for 
the UN’s International Year of Shelter for the Homeless (IYSH) in 1987. Following IYSH, the 
government of Quebec provided a small amount of funding, $2.5 million, for community 
organizations; “l’objectif visé était de permettre à ces organismes de se doter d’ameublement 
et d’équipement pour lesquels il n’existait aucune disponibilité financière dans e cadre 
d’autres programmes d’aide gouvernementale” (Société d’habitation du Québec 1987; p33). 
The SHQ also noted the importance of educating the public about the problems related to 
homelessness. The SHQ made $310,498.10 available to community groups for this purpose; 
this money was used for research, videos, colloquiums, and other forms of public education 
regarding homelessness (Société d’habitation du Québec 1987).  
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The federal government made its decision to download and cut social housing in the 
mid-1990s, which was a difficult period in Quebec history (Vaillancourt, Ducharme, Aubry, 
and Grenier 2016). The province had been through a narrowly defeated referendum on 
sovereignty, and the province’s finances were undergoing tough times. Vaillancourt et al 
(2016) write that this timing made it both likely and unlikely that the province would step up 
and continue to fund social housing on its own, in the absence of the federal government; 
“Sous la direction de Parizeau (94-95) et Bouchard (96-2000), le gouvernement du PQ s’est 
fait connaître, en matière de développement économique et social, par un ensemble de 
nouvelles politiques publiques dont certaines paraissent plus conservatrices, voire 
néolibérales, et d’autres, plus novatrices et progressistes” (23). In this difficult period of its 
history, the government of Québec nevertheless reacted to the federal cuts to new social 
housing developments by creating its own housing policy, which has continued uninterrupted 
to this day and depends exclusively on provincial funding11. 
Led by the left-of-centre and sovereigntist Parti Quebecois (PQ), the government of 
Quebec came to clearly acknowledge the importance of social housing, making significant 
political and financial commitments to housing developments. This commitment followed two 
important Quebec-wide Summits on the economy and employment. Bouchard, a right-of-
centre leader of the PQ, committed to couple his commitment to zero deficit with a 
commitment to not increase poverty in the province (appauvrissement zero) (see Noël 2013). 
This commitment came after extensive pressure from civil society groups, who actively 
participated in the summits. Housing was kept on the agenda during this time by energetic and 
respected groups like the Front d’action populaire en réaménagement urbain (FRAPRU). 
                                                
11 For a more complete version of this history, see Vaillancourt and Ducharme 2001, 
Vaillancourt et al 2016 and FRAPRU 2016. 
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The QC government was significantly influenced by civil society groups (Vaillancourt, 
Ducharme, Aubry, and Grenier 2016; Vaillancourt and Ducharme 2001) in its new housing 
policy. The policy was entitled the AccèsLogis program (ACL program), which allows the 
provincial government to work with community partners to build new social housing, as well 
as to renovate the older housing stock. The 1997 Housing Action Plan announced that “le 
gouvernement du Québec lançait le Programme AccèsLogis, issu du Fonds québécois 
d’habitation communautaire, doté d’un budget global de 43 millions de dollars par année, 
pendant cinq ans, provenant de l’engagement gouvernemental” (Société d’habitation du 
Québec 1997). The social housing component of the plan consisted of 1,820 units of housing; 
1,200 were for low-income households, 500 for the elderly losing their autonomy, and 120 for 
people with special needs (including women fleeing violence, homeless people, and people 
with disabilities) (Société d’habitation du Québec 1997; 22). 1,820 units/year was nowhere 
near the 8,000 per year demanded by the FRAPRU, but it was nevertheless an important 
political commitment in a time when the majority of the Canadian provinces ignored the area 
of housing.  
The Liberal Party of Quebec (LPQ), upon being elected to power on 2003, fully 
supported and sometimes even increased the funding for the ACL program. But Arsenault 
argues that had the LPQ been in power back in the mid-1990s when the federal cuts to housing 
were made, it likely would not have taken the initial action of funding social housing at the 
provincial level (2016). Civil society and advocacy groups like the FRAPRU were key in 
getting housing on the political agenda, and these groups are much closer to the PQ than they 
are to the LPQ (Arsenault 2016; Vaillancourt et al 2016; Noël 2013). Further, Arsenault notes 
that the LPQ and its then leader Daniel Johnson were particularly critical of housing and 
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strongly opposed social housing. The original development and implementation of a housing 
policy was very much contingent on the left-right power dynamics in the province in the 
1990s, which at the time leaned towards the left. Arsenault argues that the ACL program has 
lasted continuously since the 1990s, however, because of a fragile and ambiguous left-right 
coalition around the issue of housing. Indeed, right-of-centre LPQ leader Jean Charest nearly 
doubled the number of units committed under the ACL program to 3000/year in 2007 
(FRAPRU, 2015).  
There is indeed a strong and lasting consensus among left and right actors, even in 
times of severe budget constraints and austerity. Indeed, the ACL was born in, and has 
survived, difficult times. Vaillancourt et al (2016) are deeply critical of the new LPQ 
government (and its leader Phillipe Couillard), saying that this current Liberal government is 
obsessed with austerity and is searching for any reason to cut ACL. Yet Couillard, even during 
the current period of severe budget constraint and austerity in the province of Quebec, has 
continued funding the ACL program, though the number of funded units of housing was cut in 
half, from 3000 to 1500. But two points are worth emphasizing. First, many community 
groups had anticipated with Couillard would cut the program altogether; the fact that it has 
survived such difficult financial times is significant and speaks to a continuing political 
commitment to housing. Second, Couillard has increased the amount of rent supplements 
(PSLs) for the following five years by 1,100 per year. Community groups often criticize rent 
supplements as temporary measures, but the government of Quebec has relied on this 
instrument since the 1970s; it is and has been an important part of Quebec’s housing policy.  
The ACL program was initially a 5 year program, but it has been renewed non-stop 
since 1997;  “la différence toutefois entre les politiques d’habitation québécoises et celles de 
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certaines autres provinces, comme la C-B et le MB, réside dans le fait qu’au QC des 
politiques d’habitations ont été capables, de 1994-2015, de perdurer sur une période de plus 
de 20 ans, en dépit de plusieurs changements de gouvernements survenus au QC et du retrait 
du cofinancement fédéral” (Vaillancourt et al 2016; 51). It is not entirely true that Quebec is 
the only province to have seen housing policy survive through different governments of 
competing political stripes; as the section on housing in BC outlined, the BC Liberal Party cut 
housing but subsequently reengaged in the policy area a few years later. With that nuance, it 
is, of course, true that Quebec is the only province to have funded housing policy non-stop 
since the federal government stopped funding it in the mid-1990s. By the end of 2015, the 
ACL program has resulted in the development of 25,330 units of social housing. Including the 
promised and developing units of housing under the ACL program, the total number of 
housing units built or purchased under the ACL program is substantial: 37,296 units (Société 
d’habitation du Québec 2014). 
The government of Quebec has also been engaged in the area of homelessness in an 
active way since the mid-2000s. Long-existing community groups, such as the Réseau d’aide 
aux personnes seules et itinérantes de Montréal (RAPSIM) and the Réseau SOLIDARITÉ 
itinérance au Québec (RSIQ) have been active in the area of homelessness since the 1970s, 
but their demands became much more vocal and ambitious in the mid-2000s. As is the case 
with many areas of social policy in Quebec, the province’s homelessness policy has been very 
much influenced by these and other important civil society groups (though that is not to say, of 
course, that the province has always heeded their advice and given them what they wanted). 
In 2006, the RAPSIM and the RSIQ began pushing the province to adopt a 
homelessness policy (une politique en itinérance) (RAPSIM 2012). Comparing homelessness 
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to other social problems, such as domestic violence, these groups argued that a policy must 
precede a plan so that the issue is properly identified and defined, to specify the government’s 
role in a global sense (ie to involve multiple departments in the solutions) and to make the 
problem into an issue of concern for the broader public (un enjeu de société). Notwithstanding 
this demand from community groups, the government of Quebec, led by Liberal Premier Jean 
Charest, insisted that a plan on homelessness, not a policy, was the most appropriate response 
at the time. 
The 2010-2013 plan on homelessness followed a province-wide consultation on the 
issue. The consultation was guided by a 2008 framework developed by the province, which 
received nearly 150 submissions and heard directly from 104 people (Québec, Ministère de 
l’Emploi et de la Solidarité sociale 2014). Unveiled in 2009, the plan invested $14 million in 
homelessness over three years, involved 10 government ministries and contained five 
priorities and a dozen objectives. The plan was immediately criticized by community groups, 
notably the RAPSIM and the RSIQ for not investing enough resources in housing and poverty 
reduction, and for not presenting a global approach to the problem. The RAPSIM again 
explained the importance of a homelessness policy; “la volonté contenue dans la Politique est 
d’avoir une cohérence dans les actions menées par le gouvernement. Bref, que la main droite 
fasse la même chose que la main gauche, ce qui n’est pas le cas actuellement. Le meilleur 
exemple concerne l’espace public : de la main gauche, l’État finance des organismes 
d’aide…; de la main droite, il criminalise et judiciarise des personnes itinérantes” (RAPSIM 
2009). 
In the lead up to the 2012 provincial election, PQ leader Pauline Marois campaigned in 
part on a promise to develop a homelessness policy. Upon winning the election with a 
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minority government, the Minister responsible for homelessness Véronique Hivon indicated 
that the government would develop a policy; “il faut faire vite et il faut faire bien” (RAPSIM 
2013). Using its close ties to community groups, Hivon held a two-day forum on homelessness 
and conducted extensive community consultations, which led to the unveiling of the 
homelessness policy in 2014. Shortly thereafter, a provincial election was announced. The 
policy was important but community groups worried that if the government changed, the 
policy would be shelved and would not lead to the next step, and action plan. The RAPSIM, 
among others, noted a concerning “radio silence” on the part of the LPQ with respect to 
homelessness (2014). 
Upon being elected with a majority government in 2014, the LPQ did in fact develop a 
homelessness plan, which was praised by the RAPSIM for its coherence and continuity with 
the PQ’s homelessness policy. The plan was nevertheless criticized for not investing sufficient 
funding, particularly in the areas of social assistance and social housing. Some aspects of the 
plan were celebrated, notably the training portion for community support workers, but overall 
there were concerns that the plan’s weaknesses would counteract any reductions in 
homelessness that the plan might achieve. In 2016, the leaders of the RAPSIM wrote that the 
two year anniversary of the homelessness policy would be a sad one (Bonnefont and Gaudreau 
2016). Noting that the title of the homelessness policy is Ensemble pour eviter et quitter la rue 
(Together to avoid and leave the street), the authors said that austerity measures and cuts to 
housing indicate that the priority of Couillard and his government is rather Ensemble pour 
faire que davantage de personnes se retrouvent à la rue (Together so that more people end up 
on the street) (ibid). 
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Despite these important efforts in the area of housing and homelessness, the number of 
chronically homeless people in Montreal is very similar to what is seen in cities with much 
less active provincial governments. One reason for this is that the ACL program Volet 3, 
which is specifically oriented to homeless people, has had a difficult time keeping up with the 
specific needs of the chronically homeless, which require highly trained and funded service 
providers; “la majorité des projets résultent d’un ensemble, souvent fragile, d’ententes 
formelles ou informelle, d’engagements bénévoles, de contribution financière des locataires, 
etc… les conditions de travail de ces « nouveaux employés » se caractérisent par des bas 
salaires et une faible protection sociale…” (Vaillancourt et al 2016; 40).  
In addition to being overwhelmed with the needs of this population, only a small 
number of the ACL units are intended for people with special needs, including homeless 
people. The majority of the units are for low-income people and families. This is important, 
and as the context chapter outlined, has likely resulted in the fact that fewer people experience 
homelessness in Montreal due just to poverty. The majority of people in homeless shelters, for 
example, are chronically homeless, whereas in other cities the majority is transitional, a type 
of homelessness that is much more likely to be caused by poverty or a lack of affordable 
housing. So while the profile of the broader homeless population in Montreal is somewhat 
different than what it is in other cities, the extent and profile of chronic homelessness is very 
similar. Provincial interventions have been successful at preventing some people from 
experiencing homelessness, but they have been less so when it comes to helping those who are 
currently chronically homeless to exit homelessness and find housing of their own. 
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Conclusion 
 As the above has demonstrated, the four largest provinces in Canada responded very 
differently to the federal decision to stop funding and then give the responsibility for social 
housing to the provinces. BC and Quebec continued to fund housing out of their provincial 
budgets, though BC stopped funding housing between 2001-2006 whereas Quebec has 
continuously funded housing ever since the mid-1990s. The government of Alberta stopped 
funding housing altogether, only reengaging slightly in 2001 to benefit from the federal cost-
sharing program in housing. Ontario stopped funding housing and downloaded the 
responsibility for housing to municipalities, without giving municipalities any financial 
powers to generate the revenues needed to fund such an expensive area of infrastructure and 
social policy.  
Despite these very different provincial roles in the area of housing, the amount of 
chronic homelessness in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal is remarkably similar. 
This is because even in cases where the province was engaged (BC and Quebec), the housing 
interventions were not sufficient and were not specialized enough to meet the increasingly 
complex needs of the chronically homeless. Where there were efforts to develop housing 
specifically for this population, designed with supports for people living with mental health 
challenges or drug addictions for example, the investments were simply not enough to keep up 
with the demand. Housing is a very expensive infrastructure, and even once the housing is 
built, supportive housing for this population requires a substantial operating budget to keep 
people safely and permanently housed. Provincial efforts to contribute a few hundred units for 
the homeless in BC and Quebec simply have not met the needs of the growing homeless 
population. 
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An interesting difference when analysing the effect of different provincial roles, 
however, is with respect to the breakdown of the homeless population in the four cities. As 
noted above and in the Context chapter, a large percentage of the homeless on a given night in 
Montreal (according to the recent homeless count) is chronically homeless. In Montreal, 
approximately 60% of those who experience homelessness are chronically homeless, whereas 
in the other cities, it is closer to 40% (City of Toronto 2013; Latimer, Macgregor, Méthot, and 
Smith 2015; Thomson 2015; Turner 2015). This is a significant difference, and indicates that 
people are less likely to experience homelessness transitionally or episodically in Montreal 
than they are in other cities. Transitional or episodic homelessness tends to be caused by a lack 
of affordable housing or poverty.  
This is likely because only 10% of the new housing built through the ACL program 
has been for the homeless; the rest has been for low-income individuals or families. In BC 
(and in Alberta, where the province began investing slightly more in affordable housing), new 
housing is intended almost exclusively for the homeless. It is, of course, important to prioritize 
this population. But it also means that people who are low-income or poor have little 
government support for housing and are at greater risk of becoming homeless themselves. In 
Quebec, low-income individuals and families benefit from greater affordable housing options. 
Housing is, of course, much less expensive in Montreal than it is in the other three cities. This 
simple fact of the housing market undoubtedly also helps low-income families find suitable 
housing. But as the following chapter on poverty will demonstrate, people living on social 
assistance in Quebec receive well below the poverty line according to the market basket 
measure, making even Montreal’s comparatively affordable housing market out of reach for 
them. 
 141 
It is difficult to know exactly how the situation would have been different in 
Vancouver and Montreal had BC and Quebec not been engaged in housing. Had Quebec 
devolved responsibility for housing to the local level without also transferring important 
revenue tools, or had been completely abandoned the responsibility for housing, it is likely 
that the numbers of homeless people would be higher in Vancouver and Montreal. But given 
the gaps in provincial housing policies, which already relate specifically the chronically 
homeless population, it is unlikely that the number of chronically homeless people would have 
been much higher without the provincial interventions. Rather, we would likely see even 
greater numbers of people experiencing homelessness briefly due to poverty in these cities. 
In conclusion, this chapter has argued that chronic homelessness is a very complex and 
multi-faceted problem, and solving it effectively requires targeted, expensive, specialized 
interventions. Even the provinces that invested in housing – Quebec and BC – have not been 
successful at meeting the needs of the chronically homeless population. There are interesting 
differences in the overall makeup of the homeless population. But when it comes to chronic 
homelessness, the different housing interventions in the four provinces have not resulted in 
significantly different results. 
 
Chapter 5: Provincial Poverty Reduction Policies12 
 
“Moi, je suis toujours tombée entre les craques”  
Homeless woman in Montréal, 2015 
 
This third empirical chapter of this dissertation is a comparison of provincial poverty 
interventions offered in BC, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec, which I define as social assistance 
(primarily to single employable people) and deliberate provincial efforts to reduce poverty. 
This chapter does not seek to explain the differences between the provincial actions. Rather, as 
was the case in the previous chapter on housing, the argument is that chronic homelessness is 
a very specific, complex social issue, which requires a highly targeted, expensive and 
specialized intervention. Up until very recently, none of the provinces have responded 
effectively or adequately to chronic homelessness. Though poverty interventions have been 
different, the scale and profile of chronic homelessness is remarkably similar. This chapter 
argues that different provincial poverty interventions, where they have existed, have not led to 
different outcomes in terms of the scale of chronic homelessness in Vancouver, Calgary, 
Toronto and Montreal. 
Before moving on to the provincial comparisons, a quick note on the measures and 
data. For the purpose of cross-provincial comparison of poverty, this paper uses the Market 
Basket Measure (MBM); this is a measure of the cost of a certain “basket” of goods, including 
food, clothing, shelter, and transportation, that a person needs in order to meet his or her basic 
needs (Centre d’étude sur la pauvreté et l’exclusion 2009). In taking into consideration the 
cost of living in different provinces, the MBM is a more realistic measure of poverty than 
other measures, such as the Low Income Measure (LIM), which establishes the low-income 
                                                
12 A portion of this chapter, translated into French, has been published as a blog 
 143 
threshold at 50% of the Canadian median income. It is also, for this same reason, more useful 
in terms of comparing poverty in different cities or provinces, where the cost of living varies. 
Quebec has used the MBM to evaluate its poverty reduction strategy since 2009, but Ontario 
uses a version of the LIM. Further, when comparing social assistance offered in the provinces, 
this paper mostly considers rates for Single Employable Persons (SEP). While there are 
families and couples who experience homelessness, it is generally very difficult for couples to 
be homeless together and, for child protection purposes, it is very rare for homeless 
individuals to have custody of their children. Indeed, the majority of the chronically homeless 
population is made up of single men (City of Toronto 2013; Gaetz, Gulliver, and Richter 
2014; Greater Vancouver Regional Steering Committee on Homelessness 2014b; Turner 
2015). For this reason, Table 2 includes the social assistance rates only for single employable 
people. 
British Columbia 
There were two recent reforms to the provincial social assistance policy in BC: a 
moderate NDP reform in 1995 and a more aggressive and punitive Liberal reform in 2002. 
Welfare rates, benefits and restrictions have fluctuated considerably throughout the 1990s and 
2000s as a result of these reforms. BC is one of the most restrictive and least generous 
provinces in the country and has the highest level of overall poverty (Gouvernement du 
Québec 2014: 32), child poverty (CBC News 2013b) and wealth inequality (The Broadbent 
Institute 2014) in the country. Further, the province has never adopted a Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PRS); indeed, BC has the dubious distinction of being the only Canadian province to 
have never even considered implementing one.  
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Social assistance reforms 
Elected in 1991, the NDP made important cuts to social assistance in 1996 with the 
implementation of BC Benefits: Renewing our Social Safety Net, replacing the Guaranteed 
Available Income for Need Act (GAIN), which had been in place since 1972. With BC 
Benefits, the province lowered assistance rates. Single employable people were particularly 
affected by the cuts, but benefit levels for most other recipient categories also began a slow 
and steady decline starting in 1996 (see Tweddle, Battle, and Torjman 2014: 37-39). Rates 
began to pick up again around 2005-2007, but they have never returned to what they were in 
the 1990s. 
The introduction to the BC Benefits notes that GAIN, which was originally 
implemented in the 1960s, was increasingly inadequate for BC. Repeatedly throughout the BC 
Benefits policy, the government argues that the social assistance caseload had become too 
high, and explicitly set out to reduce the number of people on welfare. In the face of this rising 
caseload, NDP Premier Mike Harcourt framed the policy as a renewal; “Some people would 
respond by severely weakening our safety net, or forcing people to do menial, dead-end work 
to get a handout… Instead, my government has chosen to renew our social safety net” (British 
Columbia Ministry of Social Development and Economic Security 1995). The province also 
aimed to help people to move into the labour market. In a press release announcing the new 
policy, the government explained, “The B.C. government today announced a major renewal of 
the province’s social safety net to help people move from welfare to work, and provide 
ongoing income support for people who need it, including seniors, the disabled, and others 
unable to work. The province is also, for the first time, extending new benefits to all lower 
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income working families to make work a better deal than welfare” (Government of British 
Columbia 1995).  
The plan cut social assistance rates for all recipient categories except for seniors, 
people with disabilities, and those who are temporarily unable to work13; the government of 
BC estimated that these cuts to social assistance benefits would result in a savings of nearly 
$50 million/year. The policy also introduced a 3-month residency requirement before allowing 
people to access benefits, believing that this would reduce the welfare caseload in two ways; 
“first, a certain number of people who would otherwise receive benefits are no longer eligible 
to receive them. Second, it is expected that this change will result in fewer people moving to 
BC without adequate resources” (Government of British Columbia, 1995a: p 19). Another 
reform was to the welfare appeal system, which made the new system “legally and 
procedurally complex and inaccessible to income assistance recipients without assistance from 
a lawyer or a trained advocate” (Legal Services Society 1996). Through these measures, the 
NDP provincial government sent a clear message that social assistance was to be the option of 
last resort for those in need; in other words, social assistance would be made accessible only 
once family and private market options were exhausted.  
A three-year review of BC Benefits noted an important decrease in the number of 
people living on social assistance, which the province repeatedly and proudly claimed credit 
for; “The results speak for themselves. The level of welfare dependence in B.C. dropped from 
10 per cent in 1995 to less than seven per cent in mid-1999” (British Columbia Ministry of 
Social Development and Economic Security 1999b, 5). This decrease, however, has been 
                                                
13 The policy does not, however, index the benefits, which results in a de facto cut 
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persuasively linked to changing unemployment rates, which largely mirror social assistance 
rates (Boychuk 2015).  
In 2002, the NDP lost the provincial election and Gordon Campbell’s newly elected 
Liberal government would quickly introduce even deeper reaching reforms to social 
assistance. The province made its changes through two pieces of legislation, the Employment 
and Assistance Act and the Employment and Assistance Act for Persons with Disabilities Act. 
In so doing, assistance and shelter benefit levels dropped for all recipient categories (including 
families) and significant eligibility restrictions and rules were imposed on recipients. Notably, 
BC became the first province in Canada to introduce a maximum period of assistance; in any 
five year time period, a person could only receive support for two (non-consecutive or 
consecutive) years. Following two non-cumulative years of assistance within a 5-year period, 
a person was cut off of assistance, a rule that Pulkingham calls “highly punitive and 
unprecedented (in Canada)” (2015, 207). This rule was ultimately repealed before it was ever 
implemented. 
Another measure that was introduced was a dollar for dollar claw back on income 
earned while on social assistance, constituting a 100 per cent tax on earned income. 
Previously, social assistance recipients could supplement their income by up to $200 every 
month without penalty. This elimination of earning exemptions was another remarkably harsh 
reform that even conservative voices criticized. The Fraser Institute, in its Report Card of 
Welfare Reform in BC gave the province an overall “B” for its welfare reforms that would 
make welfare into a work-focused system (Schafer and Clemens 2002; 6), but gave the system 
an “F” on the area of “making work pay”, specifically because of the elimination of earning 
exemptions (ibid). Earning exemptions were reinstituted in 2004 following loud and severe 
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criticism of the measure as overly harsh and anti-work. In an analysis of these reforms, the 
Caledon institute wrote, “the new government is undertaking what many consider to be an 
overhaul of social programs in British Columbia… taken together, they are among the largest 
budget and public sector cuts in Canadian history” (Caledon Institute 2002; 1). 
BC’s social assistance is currently divided into two programs: disability and temporary 
assistance. The latter category is comprised of four categories, each of which imposes varying 
degrees of requirements. The closer a person is deemed to be to reintegrating into the labour 
market, the more stringent the job search requirements are. For example, someone who is 
“Expected to Work” does not have any exemptions for the job search requirement, whereas 
someone on temporary assistance under the classification Temporarily Excused, such as single 
parents with young children, are excused from these job search requirements for a certain 
period of time. 
Rules for accessing welfare in BC have at times been the strictest in Canada, but today 
they are relatively comparable to other provinces, notably in terms of liquid asset limits and 
earning exemptions (Tweddle, Battle, and Torjman 2014). For a Single Employable Person, 
social assistance offered by the provincial government is equal to a mere 40.1% of the MBM. 
This is clearly the least generous amount of support offered by an already ungenerous 
provincial government; people with disabilities receive 58.6% of the MBM; single parents 
with one child receive 62.7%; and couples with two children receive 56.3% (Tweddle, Battle, 
and Torjman 2015). All of these assistance levels have gone down as a share of the MBM 
since 2013, likely due to the fact that they are not indexed to inflation (see Tweddle, Battle, 
and Torjman 2014). 
Poverty and inequality 
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BC’s child poverty rate is the highest in Canada, with nearly one in five children in BC 
living in poverty (Bramham 2013). Recent studies of inequality in Canada have found that 
inequality is also highest in BC. The Broadbent Institute, for example, has found that “the 
concentration of wealth for the top 10% is highest in British Columbia at 56.2% and lowest in 
Atlantic Canada (31.7%) and Québec (43.4%)” (The Broadbent Institute 2014; 3). The Gini 
index, an internationally accepted measure of inequality, shows that inequality in BC 
increased more slowly than it did in Canada overall since 1990, though inequality was 
comparatively high to begin with. In 1990, the after tax Gini coefficient was .29 and rose to 
.314 in 2011 (Québec, Ministère de l’Emploi, de la Solidarité et de la Famille 2014). No doubt 
contributing to this comparatively high level of inequality is the fact that provincial tax rates in 
BC are among the lowest in Canada (The Globe and Mail and Mail 2012).  
The province still lacks a provincial poverty plan, which is astonishing given the high 
and persistent levels of poverty, including child poverty. The closest thing BC has had to a 
poverty reduction strategy was Action Against Poverty in 1999. Far from an explicit plan to 
fight poverty, the document rather summarized various government actions that were already 
in place, such as social assistance and school meal programs. “Up until now,” the Minister’s 
message says, “there has been no centralized summary of these programs” (British Columbia 
Ministry of Social Development and Economic Security 1999a). During the 2014 provincial 
election, the NDP proposed a province-wide poverty reduction plan as a central part of its 
platform. When the Liberals won the election, any talk of a poverty reduction strategy were 
put on hold. 
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Alberta 
The percentage of the population that is on social assistance in Alberta has tended to be 
low in Alberta, largely due to an oil and gas driven economy that has been booming (until 
recently), and poverty rates in Alberta are among the lowest in the country (Gouvernement du 
Québec 2014; 32). For those living on social assistance, however, the rates remain the least 
generous of those considered here. The government has historically been disinterested in 
introducing measures to reduce poverty, though recent efforts to reform social policy and 
introduce a PRS came very close to being adopted in 2012. The newly elected NDP 
government has promised to raise taxes on certain income brackets and increase the minimum 
wage (Wood and Henton 2015). The province has further announced its intention to work on 
poverty fighting measures in 2016, while at the time same cautioning that a difficult economic 
situation in the province might restrict poverty reduction measures (J. Wood 2015).  
Social assistance 
Ralph Klein, one of the most right-wing premiers that Alberta (and Canada) ever 
elected, has shaped the recent history of Alberta in important ways. The main reform to social 
assistance in Alberta came under his leadership in the 1990s, at which point social assistance 
benefits for single people began a drastic decline that continued until 2009. Rates for other 
recipient groups, notably families, also declined during this period, though not as drastically as 
they did for single people. To understand the context that made it possible for Progressive 
Conservative Premier Ralph Klein to adopt such aggressive budgets that resulted in the 
nickname “King Ralph the deficit slayer”, we need to look at little further back in Alberta’s 
history.  
The Progressive Conservative party had been in power in Alberta from 1971 until May 
5, 2015, at times holding up to 75 of the 79 provincial seats. The dominance of one single 
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party without an effective opposition for so long posed problems for democracy and 
accountability, but the PC nevertheless went through internal ideological swings between red 
and blue conservatism. Peter Lougheed, for example, Premier from 1971-1985, was on the 
progressive side of the PC spectrum (Wesley 2011; Wiseman 2007). In the 1970s when the oil 
and gas industry began to boom, Lougheed’s government used much of the revenue to invest 
in an expanded civil service and hospitals. Thinking ahead to potentially less prosperous 
times, increased revenues were also invested in the Heritage Fund and were set aside as a kind 
of rainy-day savings account for the future.  
When an economic crisis hit in the 1980s, the province of Alberta felt the effects 
acutely; housing foreclosures, bankruptcies, and suicide rates became the highest in the 
country (CBC News 2001). The number of people on the social assistance caseload grew, and 
social spending increased to support the population through the economy’s latest bust. When 
Lougheed stepped down from the Premiership of Alberta in 1985, the province was spending 
more than many in the province believed was necessary, including on social policies. Newly 
elected Premier Don Getty enacted a series of measures to diversify the Alberta economy, 
reduce spending, and generate new revenue sources. Social assistance rate for a single 
employable person dropped from $11,500/year in 1986 (2013 dollars) to $8,000/year in 1989 
(Tweddle, Battle, and Torjman 2014: 34). Families with children also saw their assistance 
rates cut, but not as dramatically.  
Despite Getty’s efforts to balance the books, unemployment rates continued to rise and 
his gamble on new revenue sources did not pay off. By the time Getty left office, Alberta had 
an annual deficit of $3.3 billion and a provincial debt of over $23 billion (Gregg 2006). This 
economic situation set the stage for a charismatic and populist leader who was prepared to 
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make significant cuts to provincial spending in the name of a balanced budget. Many within 
the PCs saw former Calgary mayor Ralph Klein as the best man for the job. With urban roots 
but also popular in rural Alberta, Klein returned the PCs to power in 1993 with 59 out of 73 
seats.  
Klein immediately began cutting across all government departments and programs, 
including social assistance. As Wood observes, “welfare reform was one of the province’s 
flagship deficit-elimination initiatives” (D. Wood 2015, 163). When Klein first took office in 
the early 1990s, Alberta was second only to Saskatchewan in terms of lowest social assistance 
for single employable individuals; by 2003, Alberta was second to none. Indeed, benefit rates 
dropped considerably throughout the 1990s for all family types except for individuals with 
disabilities. Remarkably, Klein balanced the government’s books exclusively through 20 
percent cuts across government departments; he never raised taxes. Through his cuts and 
strong commitment not to raise taxes, the government’s fiscal situation improved so much that 
a surplus emerged by 2006. Rather than reinvesting the surplus or spending it on social or 
other program, Klein sent cheques, often referred to as Ralph bucks, of $400 to every citizen 
of Alberta.  
Klein governed as Premier until 2006. His health was suffering and his party indicated 
through a leadership review that his support was not strong. Ed Stelmach (also a PC premier) 
would take over in 2006. Beginning in 2008, the province began introducing slightly more 
generous social assistance benefits, though they still remained the lowest in the country. This 
was, of course, particularly the case for single employable people. It is interesting to note that 
throughout the period of cuts to social assistance in Alberta through the 1990s and 2000s, 
people receiving disability assistance did not see their rates drop or change as significantly as 
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they did for other recipient categories (see Tweddle, Battle, and Torjman 2014). For example, 
a single employable person on social assistance received annual support of approximately 
$8,500 in 1991; by 2005, support had dropped to just under $6,000 but then rose to just under 
$8,000 by 2007. In contrast, a person with a disability on social assistance had a much more 
stable income over this period. In 1991, a person with a disability received just over $10,000 
in annual income support; in 2005, rates dropped to around $9000 but then returned to what it 
was in the early 1990s. Rates increased slightly upon the election of Alison Redford, who 
represented a return to the Progressive side of the PC party. Rates for all recipient categories 
rose slightly under her leadership. 
The Alberta assistance program for people with severe and permanent disabilities, the 
Assured income for the Severely Handicapped (AISH), is the most generous social assistance 
program in Alberta. Indeed, it is the most generous assistance program in Canada. Introduced 
in 1979 under Peter Lougheed’s government (the first program in Canada destined to people 
who are permanently disabled), income supports for individuals on AISH are substantially 
more generous than they are for a single employable person. Recipients who qualify for social 
assistance on AISH receive 97.1% of the MBM in assistance. People with severe disabilities 
are therefore very well cared for by the province; those who do not qualify for AISH, 
however, face a much harsher reality. This is particularly the case for people in the Barriers to 
Full Employment (BFE) category or for those on disability but who do not have what the 
province deems a severe or permanent disability. Many of these people face significant health 
challenges (both mental and physical), making it very difficult for them to find work. For 
these people, the assistance levels are significant lower than what they are for those receiving 
AISH, but qualifying for AISH is very difficult. 
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Some scholars have concluded that welfare in Alberta remains divided along deserving 
poor and undeserving lines. People with long-term disabilities are supported through 
comparatively generous social assistance policies, whereas those who are able to work receive 
harshly low and restrictive benefits. Wood (2015) writes, “the provincial government readily 
accepts responsibility for the deserving poor – people who are considered as poor through no 
fault of their own – but provides only marginal support for the undeserving poor – for fear of 
encouraging idleness. This approach to welfare has been consistent in Alberta for almost 100 
years” (161).  
Social assistance rates for single employable people hit an all time low in 2005, at 
$5549/year. In 2013, the rate offered for this recipient category represents 38.9% of the MBM. 
Liquid asset exemptions for single employable people are the lowest of the provinces 
considered here at $627, and the earning exemption is $230 of net income plus 25% of 
remaining income. Compared to other recipient groups in Alberta, social assistance rates for 
single employable people as a percentage of the MBM are low. A single parent with one child 
currently receives 58.6% of the MBM and a couple with two children receives 58.1% 
(Tweddle et al. 2015). Compared to other provinces, these levels of assistance remain among 
the lowest that are offered. 
Poverty and inequality 
Inequality rose in Alberta faster than it did anywhere else in Canada; in 1990, the after 
tax Gini coefficient was .289 but had reached .337 by 2011, an increase of .048 (Québec, 
Ministère de l’Emploi, de la Solidarité et de la Famille 2014). In 2011, PC premier Alison 
Redford indicated a firm commitment to re-thinking social policy, and notably to reducing 
poverty and inequality. As Wood notes, “Until Alison Redford became premier in 2011, the 
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established policy of the governing Progressive Conservatives was that the best social policy 
for Alberta was for everyone to get a job” (2015, 171). Redford, a political student of 
Lougheed, represented a swing back to the progressive side of the PCs.  
In 2012, municipal governments and community groups were estimating that the 
annual cost of poverty in the province of Alberta, through health, criminal, intergenerational 
and opportunity costs was between $7.1-9.5 billion/year (Briggs and Lee 2012). Responding 
to these groups and others who were similarly calling for a more interventionist provincial 
government, Redford announced province-wide consultations on poverty, early childhood 
development, and inequality. The Speak, Share, Thrive consultations resulted in a series of 
reports highlighting what Albertans had to say about poverty in their province (Government of 
Alberta 2013a). The consultation process resulted in the Social Policy Framework, released in 
2012, which announced a significant overhaul to social policy in Alberta.  
The Framework took a remarkably critical and honest look at the social supports in 
place; “our current system of social supports is designed and operated based on assumptions 
that may no longer be true. Over the past decades, social policy efforts have tended to focus on 
addressing specific deficiencies and filling particular gaps; the results has been programs that 
address single issues or needs” (Government of Alberta 2013a, 6). Recognizing the role of 
government in the implementation and ultimate success of these goals and initiatives, the 
Framework noted, “the Government of Alberta will fulfill its social responsibility in these 
areas by creating legislation, programs, and standards, as well as by bringing groups together 
to form new networks and by partnering with others to resolve social challenges” 
(Government of Alberta 2013a, 20). To these ends, the Framework promised a series of goals 
and initiatives, including a ten-year plan to reduce poverty in the province.  
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 Alberta was not approaching a Quebec style social assistance regime with progressive 
taxes and generous social programs, but it was nevertheless on the cusp of a remarkable social 
policy transformation. Albertans had begun using words like inequality, social protection, and 
were talking very openly about gaps in the safety net and the need for government 
involvement in the protection of vulnerable Albertans from new risks. This marked a 
significant change in the thinking from the Klein years of cuts. None of these reforms, plans, 
or strategies came to be implemented, however. The project was personally tied to Redford, 
and her political reign in Alberta came to an abrupt end in early 2014 when a series of 
scandals emerged regarding Redford’s dominating personal leadership style and, perhaps more 
importantly, unjustified spending of public funds. Redford stepped down from the premiership 
in March 2014, putting her career and political priorities, including poverty and inequality 
reduction, on ice.  
 In May 2015, Albertans made history by electing a majority NDP government. Alberta 
premier Rachel Notley has indicated that she will introduce progressivity to the fiscal structure 
of the province, and will raise minimum wage to $15/hour by 2018. Her government has so far 
not introduced a comprehensive plan to reduce poverty, but at the end of December 2015 was 
discussing plans to look at the issue in the new year (Braid 2015; J. Wood 2015). A further 
indication of this commitment is the appointment of the passionate anti-homelessness 
advocate and former Calgary City Councillor Joe Ceci as Minister of Finance. Social policies 
do not tend to change rapidly, however, and while Albertans appear ready for change and 
understand the important of progressive taxes and government intervention (Carter, Hogan, 
and Velji 2015), Notley herself has cautioned that the challenging economic reality in the 
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province is a reality that might limit the success of poverty reduction measures (J. Wood 
2015). 
Ontario 
Social assistance incomes in Ontario dropped significantly for single employable 
people and for families in 1994/95 and continued a slow downward trend until they began to 
pick up again in ever so slightly in the mid- to late-2000s. Levels were somewhat more stable 
for people with disabilities, but rates still declined for this population steadily throughout this 
period. Radical changes to the structure of social assistance in Ontario have been repeatedly 
called for, notably in 1988 and 2012. Changes to the social assistance system in Ontario have 
slowly been introduced over the course of the 1990s and 2000s, notably in terms of rules and 
rates. Apart from tinkering within the existing system, however, the recommended changes 
have never been implemented, and many argue that the ungenerous system, particularly 
towards the undeserving poor, is firmly rooted in Ontario politics (Graefe 2015). Rates slowly 
began to increase following the province’s plan to reduce poverty introduced in 2008 ever so 
slightly but have never to what they had been in the early 1990s. The province has introduced 
2 poverty reduction strategies14, which have both been targeted at children. 
Throughout the post-war period and until the 1990s, social assistance in Ontario was 
stingy for people who were able to work (single employable people), but more generous for 
the deserving, such as single mothers or people with disabilities. As Boychuk explains, from 
1950-1990s, “the social assistance system in Ontario demonstrates a high level of continuity, 
based on its well-established historical tradition of highly differentiated assistance provision” 
(Boychuk 1998, 62). The current system, as is the case in other provinces, continues this 
                                                
14 The first for 2008-13 and the second for 2014-19 
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differentiation between people who are able to work and those who are not, providing more 
generous support to those with disabilities or multiple barriers to employment.  
In 1986, social assistance rates began to rise during difficult economic times in 
Ontario, as was the case across the country. Facing an increasing caseload of people on social 
assistance, the Liberal government (governing under a formal accord with the provincial NDP) 
appointed a review of the social assistance system in Ontario, which was at the time the most 
thorough review of social assistance in the province’s history (Sheldrick 1998). Following two 
years of review and consultation, the Social Assistance Review Committee (SARC) submitted 
its final report, Transitions: Report of the Social Assistance Review Committee. The report 
called for measures to lift children out of the welfare system through a national child income 
program, to decouple people with disabilities from the welfare system, and overall to make the 
system smaller and more residual.  
More generally, the report called for a major overhaul of the system, noting that the 
foundations of social assistance that were put in place in the 1960s were no longer relevant for 
the Ontario of the 1980s. Rather, the report argued that the system should be more residual and 
should encourage and prepare those who are able to work to re-enter the job market. Sheldrick 
writes, “the report rejected the argument that entitlement to income support leads to welfare 
dependency and that benefits should be kept deliberately low to compel people to return to the 
labour market” (Sheldrick 1998, 41). Further, in arguing that benefits should be tied to a 
“market basket” of goods, the Transitions report insisted that the basic needs of low-income 
people must be met through social assistance. Writing 15 years after the report, Stapleton 
notes that Transitions “created, however briefly, a broad political consensus on what to do 
about poverty in Canada’s largest province” (Stapleton 2004, 1). 
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The reforms that were proposed in Transitions overwhelmed the government; they 
were, indeed, sweeping. Following pressure from activist groups, then Liberal Premier 
Peterson established an Advisory Committee on new social assistance legislation in 1990 to 
look at implementing some of the proposed measures. When the Liberals were defeated by 
Bob Rae’s NDP in 1991, the Committee’s work continued and had the immediate support of 
the new Minister responsible for social services. In fact, the Committee was instructed to 
advise the government on ways to hasten the implementation of Transitions. To this end, they 
produced two reports, Back on Track in 1991 and Time for Action in 1992; together, the 
reports contained over 120 recommendations regarding the implementation of Transitions. 
The NDP government welcomed both reports initially, but a more challenging economic 
environment in the mid-1990s caused the provincial NDP to change course and to focus more 
on deficit reduction than on social assistance reform (Graefe 2015; Sheldrick 1998). 
As a result of this new economic orientation from the NDP provincial government, the 
implementation of Transitions slowed to a crawl. Cuts were made to social assistance levels 
throughout the early-1990s, but the most drastic cuts would take place under Mike Harris’s PC 
government, which was elected in 1995 on a Common Sense Revolution of cutting spending 
and reducing the size of government. Tweddle et al. write, “1995 marked the beginning of a 
devastating attack on social assistance, with a 21.6% cut in welfare benefits for recipients 
considered able to work. The erosion continued steadily for the next 12 years because welfare 
rates were frozen and so lost value every year” (Tweddle, Battle, and Torjman 2014, 25).  
Having never achieved the complete overhaul that Transitions called for, the social 
assistance system remained flawed and in need of revision according to many observers. In 
2010, the provincial government reluctantly appointed another Social Assistance Review 
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Advisory Council as a part of its Poverty Reduction Strategy (see below). The introduction 
message from the commissioners explained the mandate of the review; “the overarching goal 
of the review was to identify ways to remove barriers and help people move into employment” 
(Lankin and Sheikh 2012, 10). The report recommends a total overhaul of the social assistance 
system towards one that “focuses on ability, not disability… the starting point of the new 
system is that all social assistance recipients, including people with disabilities, should be 
supported to participate in the workforce to the maximum of their abilities and that income 
security should be guaranteed for those who cannot work” (ibid, 11, emphasis added). The 
report proposed to do this by collapsing the various categories and supports into one basic 
level, and then adopting a building block approach by adding on other benefits, such as 
additional supplements for people with disabilities or families with children, where warranted. 
The review contained a total of 108 recommendations. It proposed an ambitious agenda for 
reform, and in using the language and logic of income security and encouraging government 
to adopt one level of support for all recipients, is similar to the majority report of the 1996 
Quebec social assistance review (see below).  
While some measures from this review have been adopted, such as an increase in the 
liquid asset exemption limit for single employable people from $606 to $2500, the 
fundamental nature of the social assistance system remains unchanged. For decades, scholars 
and practitioners have said the social assistance reform is a political non-starter in Ontario. 
Deeply engrained beliefs and deserving and undeserving poor that characterize conservative 
types of social assistance regimes (Boychuk 1998) represent an important obstacle to the 
implementation of income security for all Ontarians (Graefe 2015).  
 160 
Social assistance in Ontario today remains divided along lines of deserving and 
undeserving recipients. Single employable people received 41.8% of the MBM in 2014. This 
is comparable to rates offered in other provinces for single employable people, but is very low 
compared to other recipient categories in Ontario. People with disabilities receive 69.2% of 
the MBM, single parents with children receive 66.1% of the MBM, and couples with children 
receive 63.8% (Tweddle, Battle, and Torjman 2015). With the exception of single employable 
people, for whom benefit levels remained the same, social assistance rates went down as a 
share of the MBM between 2013 and 2014 (see Tweddle et al 2014). Liquid exemption levels 
have been raised to $2500 for single employable people, as noted above, though following 
three months of receiving social assistance, social assistance recipients are only able to keep 
50% of additional earned revenues. Inequality in Ontario rose faster than the national average; 
in 1990, the after tax Gini coefficient was .28 but was .311 in 2011, representing an increase 
of .031 (Québec, Ministère de l’Emploi, de la Solidarité et de la Famille 2014). 
Poverty and inequality 
 In 2007, the Government of Ontario announced that it would introduce a PRS for the 
province. The five-year plan was released in 2008, and had as its main target the reduction of 
child poverty by 25% by 2013; “it’s a plan that marks a bold new direction. It sets an 
aggressive target – reducing the number of children living in poverty by 25 per cent over 5 
years” (Government of Ontario 2008, 1). The plan came with a budget of $2.5 billion over five 
years; only $300 million of this, however, was new funding. In addition to lifting children out 
of poverty, the plan also stressed the importance of moving people back into the labour 
market; “children should have the opportunity to succeed in life, and people facing challenges 
should be given the tools they need to get ahead” (ibid).  
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Some measures were successfully implemented, such as full day kindergarten, an 
increase in minimum wage, and modest increases in social assistance benefits for all recipient 
categories (though the increase was marginal for single employable people). By 2014, 
however, the government admitted that it did not meet its objective of reducing child poverty 
by 25%. At the outset, the PRS set to lift 90,000 children out of poverty, but the most recent 
data available from statistics Canada (2011) indicates that only 46,000 children were in fact 
lifted out of poverty, a little more than half of the original goal15. The Minister places a 
significant portion of the blame for the PRS’s failure at the feet of the federal government; 
“We did everything we said we would do when we released the strategy in 2008 and had the 
other elements of the strategy, particularly the responsibilities we believe lie with the federal 
government, had the federal government done its part we believe we would have come very 
close, if not had achieved, our goal of a 25% reduction in child poverty” (Jones 2014).  
What the government did not acknowledge was the fact that among adults, poverty 
rose faster than it did in any other jurisdiction. The Ontario Poverty Progress Profile, written 
by Canada Without Poverty, writes, “Ontario’s Plan Against Poverty has been seen as a 
positive step towards addressing poverty and has demonstrated initial results in reducing child 
poverty. However, the plan has met criticism for its lack of action to address poverty among 
adults, including people with disabilities and seniors” (Canada Without Poverty 2013, 6). The 
most significant cracks in the Ontario PRS are related to single adults. 
In its most recent PRS, Realizing our Potential: Ontario’s Poverty Reduction Strategy, 
2014-2019, adopted in 2014, the Government of Ontario acknowledges again that the original 
plan was not successful. In a speech to the 2015 Conference to End Homelessness attendees in 
                                                
15 The province stresses, however, that the PRS measures introduced prevented 61,000 
children from falling into poverty. 
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Montreal in November 2015, Minister responsible for the poverty reduction file (and Deputy 
Premier) Deb Matthews expressed a renewed optimism in the province’s ability to fight 
poverty. The new federal Liberal government, Matthews said in no uncertain terms, will be an 
important and active partner for the province.  
The 2014 plan goes much further than the 2008 plan; “we are also turning our attention 
to transitional youth to meaningful employment, education, and training opportunities, while 
expanding our focus to support employment and income security for the most vulnerable in 
our province” (Government of Ontario 2014). This move towards income security is new and 
significant, but without significant reforms to the sticky and change resistant social assistance 
system, it is not yet clear that this concept will translate into reality in any meaningful way. 
The plan also commits to ending homelessness in 10 years. As will be outlined below, Alberta 
and Ontario are now the only two provinces that have committed to ending homelessness. 
In conclusion, the social assistance regime in Ontario remains stingy, particularly for 
single employable people, and imperfect. Activists and researchers continue to call for 
structural reforms to the system, but are not overly optimistic about the likelihood of their 
proposed changes being implemented. Social assistance offered to families and people with 
disabilities are low when compared to what is required according to the MBM, but they are 
generous compared to what Ontario offers to single employable people. The province 
indicated a cautious interest in poverty reduction in 2008, but failed in its goal of reducing 
child poverty by 25%. The province has not used this failure as an excuse to shy away from 
efforts to reduce poverty, but rather introduced a much more ambitious and far reaching PRS 
in 2014, one that includes the goal of ending homelessness. It will be difficult for the province 
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to live up to these expectations, but provincial officials are publicly very optimistic now that 
there is a new federal Liberal government with whom to partner. 
Quebec 
 Depending on the program or policy under consideration, aid to the poor offered by the 
province of Quebec can either be seen as similar or significantly different from what is offered 
in other provinces. Social assistance levels, for example, are very similar. As has been the case 
in other Canadian provinces, single employable people in Quebec have seen a stable decline in 
their social assistance incomes between 1993-2012. There have been small bumps in 
assistance in certain years, such as in 1999 and 2004, but overall there is a steady downward 
trend in assistance rates, reaching a low of $7,686 per year in 2008 (Tweddle et al. 2013). 
Support offered for families is notably more generous in Quebec than it is in the other three 
provinces. That said, families with children, both single and two parent families also saw a dip 
in their assistance rates beginning in 1993, but levels for these recipients begin to rise earlier 
than they did for single employable people in 2003/04. As is the case in most provinces, aid 
for people with a disability is both more generous and more stable throughout this period, at 
around $11,500 per year.  
Looking beyond social assistance, Quebec stands out for its concerted efforts to reduce 
poverty and inequality. In 2004 Quebec implemented its first plan to fight poverty, which 
focused mostly on families with children but also aimed to get single adults back into the 
labour market. It is with respect to its PRS that Quebec stands out as most different from the 
other Canadian provinces, as much for the content of the plan as for the process that led to its 
adoption.  
Social assistance 
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The main reforms to social assistance took place in the 1990s and again in the early 
2000s. Québec is among the most generous provinces in Canada when it comes to social 
assistance rates offered to all recipient categories, though its assistance levels do not by any 
means stand out dramatically from what is offered in other provinces. Quebec is also similar to 
other provinces in that it makes a distinction between social assistance recipients; there are 
different levels of assistance offered to people based on their ability to work, with people who 
are unable to work due to a disability or a severe barrier receiving more generous benefits.  
The early development of the Quebec welfare state was different from what was seen 
in other provinces. Throughout the post-war era when the welfare state was expanding 
throughout most Canadian provinces, welfare in Quebec was based primarily on a charity 
model, and churches rather than the provincial government played a significant role in its 
provision. The Quiet Revolution, which began with Jean LeSage’s government in the 1960s, 
marked a rupture with this past and led to a transformation of the social, political, and 
institutional landscape in the province. French became the official language of business and 
government throughout the province including in Montreal (Béland et al. 2010), citizens began 
to trust in their institutions (Noël 2010), and the state became more interventionist (Rigaud et 
al. 2010). The role of the state in the provision of welfare was solidified in 1969 with the 
Social Aid Act, which provided support to all those in need of it, regardless of their ability to 
work. Like other social assistance programs at the time, this support was provided provincially 
with federal financial help through the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP). 
The more recent evolution of social assistance in Québec has, in some ways, similar to 
what happened in other provinces. In the 1980s, rising unemployment, particularly among 
youth in the province, caused the government to draw into question its social assistance 
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regime. In that context, Bourassa’s Liberal government embarked on a redesign of the social 
assistance system in the 1980s. The new system that resulted from the redesign, like those in 
other provinces, contained two tracks: one for those who were able to work; and another, more 
generous track for those with severe barriers, such as disabilities, to employment.  
In the 1990s, the newly elected, left of centre Parti Québécois (PQ) government 
appointed a panel of experts to again review the system and to bring forward proposals for 
improvements. The panel of five experts yielded two reports; while there were some 
similarities in the reports, they were divergent in their philosophies and overall view of social 
assistance. The majority report insisted that income security (rather than differentiated tracks 
based on one’s ability to work) should be at the heart of the redesigned system, and advocated 
for a move towards more active labour market policies (Bouchard, Labrie, and Noël 1996). 
The minority report emphasized the responsibilities of aid recipients towards the state (as well 
as state responsibilities to aide recipients), and advocated that individuals who did not wish to 
conform to regulations (such as mandatory job searches, even for single mothers) should be 
excluded from the system (Fortin and Séguin 1996).  
The PQ government made reforms to social assistance based on these reports. Active 
policies to help “trampoline” people on assistance back into the labour market were 
introduced, which are seen today by some as a social investment turn. But the PQ kept the 
distinction between recipient categories. Noël writes, “in many ways, this reform completed 
the transition initiated by the Liberals. In the process, the idea of income security was 
abandoned” (2015, 186). In this sense, the changes to social assistance in the 1980s were 
similar to what they were in other provinces in their emphasis on employment (and 
punishments if people do not conform to the regulations), though Quebec also invested more 
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in active social policies to help people get back into the labour force through education, 
training, or apprenticeship programs. The social assistance regime was again reformed in 2005 
under a centre-right Liberal government, at which point incomes for families with children 
increased slightly, but incomes for single adults continued their slow downward trend. 
Quebec is among the most generous provinces when it comes to social assistance 
offered according to the MBM for all recipient categories (including single employable 
people), but it is not the most generous province in the country. According to the MBM, the 
income support offered to the single employable person category is 48.7% of the MBM. 
People with disabilities receive 70.6% and families with children fair even better; a couple 
with two children receives 72.6% and a single parent with one child receives 79.1% of the 
MBM. With the exception of Alberta’s AISH program for people with disabilities, which 
offers nearly the full MBM rate (97.1%), support offered to single parents with one child in 
Quebec is the closest to the MBM rate, at 79.1%.  
Poverty and inequality 
In many ways, reforms to social assistance reflected what was happening in other 
provinces in Canada, which were also faced with limited resources and rising unemployment 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Quebec stands out, however, in a number of important 
respects, notably if we look beyond social assistance rates and reforms. The introduction of 
active social policies, which encourage those who are able to work to enter the job market, a 
universal childcare policy, and a law against poverty are some of the important changes that 
were introduced in the 1990s and early 2000s (when the welfare state was generally being cut 
in other provinces). Looking through the 1990s and 2000s, it is also clear that poverty and 
inequality grew more quickly in the US and other Canadian provinces than in Québec (Noël 
 167 
2013; Paquin and Lévesque 2014; Québec, Ministère de l’Emploi, de la Solidarité et de la 
Famille 2014). In 1990, the after tax Gini coefficient was .269; by 2011 it had grown by .022 
to .291 (ibid). But the efforts to reduce poverty did not benefit all Quebeckers equally. Indeed, 
the most positive effects tend to be concentrated on aid recipients who are able to re-enter the 
job market and for families with children (ibid).  
This paper does not have the time to review fully the events that led to the 
development of the law against poverty, law 11216. Briefly summarized, the law was unique in 
its content, which ambitiously sought to make Quebec a place with the lowest levels of 
poverty in the developed world, but also in the way it was developed. In a truly bottom-up 
process, hundreds of community consultations and street parliaments, in consultation with 
legal experts, led to a draft law against poverty that was symbolically adopted by 2000 people 
in front of the National Assembly in Quebec City in the year 2000. A committee of three 
Members of the National Assembly (MNAs), from each of the three major parties, 
subsequently sponsored the introduction of the law in the national assembly; the law passed 
with unanimity. 
It took some time before the National Assembly implemented a plan to fight against 
poverty. In 2004, two years after the adoption of the law against poverty, the government of 
Quebec (then a Liberal government) adopted its first Action Plan to fight against poverty and 
social exclusion. Perhaps reflective of its orientation, the plan was entitled Concilier liberté et 
justice sociale: un défi pour l’avenir, or Reconciling Freedom and Social Justice: A Challenge 
for the Future. Noting demographic changes throughout the province, including importantly an 
aging population, the Minister of Employment, Social Solidarity and Family Welfare Claude 
                                                
16 For the full history of the adoption of the law, see Larocque 2011 and Noël 2002 
 168 
Béchard wrote, “employment is the key to personal autonomy and social integration – and the 
best way to increase our collective wealth” (Government of Québec 2004, 5). At the 
foundation of the Action Plan are the principles of economic security and social inclusion 
through employment. Believing that measures that promote these principles would at once 
reduce poverty and improve social solidarity, the introduction to the plan concludes, “This 
Action Plan is a beacon of hope. It will mean richer lives for all Québecers, individually and 
as a whole” (ibid). 
The plan was accompanied with $2.5 billion in funding, which would be used to 
increase the income offered to low-income families and individuals, and to invest in social 
housing. The Action plan notes that certain social assistance benefits would be indexed and 
supplemented in various ways, such as through a higher minimum wage and child assistance 
measures. A work premium was also introduced to “make work more profitable,” and 
provided an incentive for people to increase their revenue through income. For example, if a 
single person earned $5,000 per year, the government provided a work premium of $182; if 
the person’s income was $10,000, the work premium would jump to $481. The premium is 
much higher for single-parent families with one or more children. In addition to this work-
related measure, the government also introduced a universal Child Assistance measure 
targeted at low-income families.  
Community groups greeted this first plan with mixed responses. Some measures, such 
as the full indexation of some (but not all) benefits as well as new income supplements for the 
working poor, regardless of whether they had children, were welcomed. The Collectif pour un 
Québec sans pauvreté, the group that mobilized around the idea of a law against poverty in the 
first place, said that the plan was a positive step, but was concerned that there were oversights 
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and that there would continue to be barriers to employment for the most vulnerable (Noël 
2005). 
A new plan to fight poverty was introduced in 2010; in the introduction to this new 
plan, then Premier Jean Charest writes, “Under the first Action Plan… significant strides were 
made of which all of us can be proud… today, with this second government Action Plan, we 
are opting to make our social safety net even stronger and our solidarity more effective 
through congruity and mobilization” (Gouvernement du Québec 2010, 5). The 2010-2015 Plan 
was accompanied with a budget of $7 billion over five years, $1.3 billion of which was new 
funding. Some measures from the old plan, such as the work premium and the child assistance 
measure, were renewed in the 2010 plan; new measures, such as a Solidarity Tax Credit, were 
also introduced.  
 Looking at the results of ten years of efforts to fight poverty, government reports and 
academic analyses have indicated that the two PRSs were most successful at reducing poverty 
among families, single- or two-parent, with children. Single people who are able to work did 
not fair so well, however. A 2014 Government of Quebec evaluation of the changing profile of 
poverty over ten years provides excellent and nuanced research on the results of the plans to 
fight poverty. In 2003, prior to the plan’s implementation, there were around 747,000 people 
in the province who were low-income according to the MBM. Of these 747,000 people, 36.9% 
were single, 19% were couples with children, 19.7% were single parent families and 24.4% 
were other families (for example couples without children or intergenerational families).  By 
2013, the number of low-income people in the province rose to 842,000, but of this 
population, 43% of whom were single people. All other family types had gone down in terms 
of the percentage of the overall low-income population by 1-2%. In other words, while 
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poverty had decreased among families with children, it increased significantly among single 
people. 
In a Centre d’étude sur la pauvreté et l’exclusion study of the state of poverty in 
Quebec in 2013, former president Alain Noël writes that Quebec has made significant progress 
in reducing poverty among families since the introduction of the law against poverty. Nearing 
the end of the second plan to fight poverty, he writes that it is an opportune time to think about 
the next steps. Thinking ahead, he asks if it is possible to accomplish for single people in the 
future what had been accomplished for families with children. At time of writing in early 
2016, the province was beginning consultations for the third government action plan on 
poverty reduction. The third plan announces itself as a continuation of past plans, which have 
aimed to make the Quebec one of the places in the industrialized world with the lowest 
amount of poverty.  
The level of social assistance offered by the province of Quebec, for all recipient 
categories, is comparatively generous when compared with the other big Canadian provinces. 
Quebec is not the most generous province in the federation, however, and its levels of 
assistance do not stand out as being much more generous. While the assistance offered to 
single employable people in Montreal is comparatively generous, it is still not even 50% of the 
MBM, making it very difficult for a single person on social assistance to meet her or his basic 
needs, let alone escape poverty. Where the province of Quebec is most different from other 
provinces is with respect to the fight against poverty. This is both in terms of the content of the 
policy, and also the process that led to its eventual implementation in 2004. Despite putting 
poverty on the provincial agenda in 2004, and keeping it there to this day, the successes that 
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these plans have had have been concentrated on families with children. Poverty among low-
income single people has grown since the introduction of the first PRS in 2004. 
 
Summary 
Below is a summary table that compares the current information regarding poverty and 
inequality in the four provinces reviewed above. It includes the recent Gini coefficient for 
each province, as well as its change since 1990. It also presents social assistance levels for 
four recipient categories (as of 2014) and eligibility rules for accessing social assistance 
(Tweddle, Battle, and Torjman 2015). The four lines regarding the MBM represent the 
percentage of the MBM that is met through the social assistance rate offered for that recipient 
category. For example, in BC, social assistance for a single employable person is only 40.1% 
of what that person needs in order to meet her or his most basic needs according to the MBM. 
Table 2: Poverty and inequality  
 BC AB ON QC 
Gini coefficient (2011)17  
.314 
 
.337 
 
.311 
 
.291 
Change in Gini 
coefficient since 199018 
 
+.024 
 
+.048 
 
+.031 
 
+.022 
MBM (Single person, 
employable)19 
 
40.1% 
 
38.9% 
 
41.8% 
 
48.7% 
MBM (Single person 
with permanent 
disability)20 
 
 
58.6% 
 
 
97.1% 
 
 
69.2% 
 
 
70.6% 
MBM (Single parent, 
one child)21 
 
62.7% 
 
58.6% 
 
66.1% 
 
79.1% 
MBM (Couple, two 
children)22 56.3% 58.1% 63.8% 72.6% 
                                                
17 Data from Gouvernement du Québec, 2014 
18 Data from Gouvernement du Québec, 2014 
19 Data from Tweddle et al., 2015 for the year 2014 
20 Data from Tweddle et al., 2015 for the year 2014 
21 Data from Tweddle et al., 2015 for the year 2014 
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Earning exemptions23  
$200 
(recipients) 
$230 of net 
income plus 25% 
of remaining net 
income 
50% net 
earnings after 3 
months of 
assistance 
 
$200 
Liquid asset 
exemptions24 (single 
person considered 
employable) 
 
$2000 
 
$627 
 
$2500 
 
$1500 
(recipients) 
 
 BC has been stingy with benefits and has at times been the most restrictive and 
difficult to access system in the country. Most of the harshest rules, such as the 2 in 5 rule 
(where recipients only receive support for two years out of a five year period) and zero earning 
exemptions, have been eliminated. The level of assistance offered to a single employable 
person in 2014, however, remains well below half of what is should be according to the MBM. 
Assistance levels for other recipient categories are more generous, but also remain very well 
below the MBM. The province has historically been completely disinterested in introducing 
deliberate measures to reduce poverty and inequality, leaving ample space for other actors to 
innovate. BC today is a one of the most unequal parts of Canada and tolerates remarkably high 
levels of poverty, including among children.  
 Alberta’s story is similar to BC’s; benefits levels are low and are difficult to access. 
The province cares comparatively very well for people with permanent disabilities, who 
receive 97.1% of the MBM in benefits. But the reality is very different for those who are able 
to work and even those with temporary disabilities. Single employable people receive 
approximately 41% of the MBM; benefits for families with children are somewhat higher, but 
remain well below the poverty threshold. The province has been disinterested in poverty or 
                                                                                                                                                    
22 Data from Tweddle et al., 2015 for the year 2014 
23 Data from Tweddle et al., 2015 for the year 2014 
24 Data from Tweddle et al., 2015 for the year 2014 
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inequality reducing measures, though this has changed recently with the near adoption of a 
PRS. The new NDP government is an indication that Albertans might be willing to pursue 
these ideas further.  
 Social assistance in Ontario is seen as a complex, costly, and unfair system that does 
not meet the needs of the most vulnerable. Elaborate reviews and studies of the system have 
led to excellent recommendations for reform, some of which have been adopted, but the most 
fundamental of which have never left the paper they were written on. Assistance levels for 
single employable people are very comparable to what they are in BC and Alberta, hovering 
around 42% of the MBM. Assistance for families with children are well below the MBM, but 
are higher than what is offered in BC and Alberta. This is likely the result of the two PRSs, 
which prioritized lifting children out of poverty. The first iteration of Ontario’s PRS mostly 
targeted children, and was not terribly ambitious in its objectives and ultimate impact. The 
success of the first plan was only partial, as the government failed to meet its original target of 
reducing child poverty by 25% in five years (by 2013). The government is learning from past 
mistakes, however, and has committed to another PRS including a plan to end homelessness.  
 Quebec’s efforts to reduce poverty are the most aggressive and comprehensive of those 
studied here. Compared to the same recipient group in other provinces, Quebec’s support can 
surprisingly be called generous in this stingy group of provinces. It is still, however, less than 
half of the MBM, making it very difficult for single people in Quebec to meet their most basic 
needs. Further, when compared to other recipient groups within the province, social assistance 
offered to single employable people in Quebec is low; families with children receive benefits 
reaching nearly 80% of the MBM. Quebec governments, both left- and right- of centre, have 
confidently stepped into the poverty policy area with two PRSs and one more in the making at 
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time of writing. There have been important results from the PRS in Quebec, notably for 
families and children. Where the plan has fallen short, and where cracks have emerged, has 
been with respect to single employable people. 
Conclusion  
As the introduction explained, the purpose of this chapter is not to explain the 
differences between provincial efforts to reduce poverty. Rather, the purpose is to explain 
why, despite different provincial efforts to reduce poverty, levels of chronic homelessness are 
remarkably similar the four cities under study. Provincial social policies and interventions 
vary greatly across these four provinces, as has been noted above. Quebec in particular has 
been very active in the area of poverty, for example, though Ontario is beginning to become 
more engaged and committed as well. Yet it is clear that, despite these differences, there is a 
significant gap in the safety net in each of the provinces. The most obvious manifestation of 
this gap is chronic homelessness.  
An important fact to bear in mind when considering why different provincial efforts 
have not had different results in these four provinces is that the majority of chronically 
homeless people are single people. It is very rare for a couple to be homeless together, and 
families with children do not often experience homelessness; if this is the case, children are 
usually taken from the parents. Where there have been direct efforts to reduce poverty, which 
is the case in Ontario and Quebec, poverty among single people actually grew, even though it 
decreased somewhat among families. Poverty reduction efforts have not focused on lifting 
single people out of poverty, which is an important reason for why these different 
interventions have not resulted in different levels of chronic homelessness. In other words, up 
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until very recently, provincial governments, despite efforts to reduce poverty, have not 
responded effectively to the specific issue of chronic homelessness. 
Further, even though Quebec is more generous than other provinces when it comes to 
social assistance offered to single employable people, the amount of support offered remains 
very well below the poverty line. Single employable people are the most likely to experience 
homelessness, but they have the least amount of resources at their disposal in all four 
provinces. It is not difficult to see how poverty can quickly become a trap when people 
receiving social assistance are not even able to meet 50% of their most basic needs. This 
conclusion is very similar to what was drawn in the previous chapter on housing; despite the 
differences in provincial social policies, chronic homelessness is very stable in big cities 
across the country because those interventions were not targeted and not generous enough to 
meet the needs of the chronically homeless population. 
Chapter 6: Role of the Local Government 
 
The previous two chapters presented and compared provincial contexts in terms of 
housing and poverty policy. I argued that despite different provincial interventions in these 
areas, the amount of chronic homelessness was and remains very similar in Vancouver, 
Calgary, Toronto and Montreal. This is primarily because those interventions were not 
targeted enough to meet the specific and complex needs of the chronically homeless 
population. There are notable differences in these cities in terms of the amount of temporary or 
episodic homelessness, which is likely the result of these different interventions (notably a 
more affordable housing market in Montreal coupled with substantial and sustained provincial 
investments in the construction of affordable housing). But when it comes to chronic 
homelessness, throughout the 1990s and 2000s no provincial government in Canada was 
responding adequately.  
In response to the policy gaps created by the provinces, the most visible manifestation 
of which is chronic homelessness, groups have formed at the local level to develop and 
implement locally driven responses to homelessness. In this chapter and the one that follows, I 
argue that the question of who, exactly, fills the gaps created by the provinces is a distinctly 
local question. In order to understand the unique dynamics of the governance of homelessness 
in each case, we turn in this chapter to the local level.  
There are two main differences in the local governance models that have emerged: the 
role of the local government and the degree of centralization or fragmentation of the 
governance model. What explains these differences? This first chapter tackles the question of 
the role of the local government in the governance of homelessness. In Vancouver and 
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Toronto, the local government is central and powerful in the governance of homelessness, 
whereas in Calgary and Montreal, the local governments play a much more marginal role 
(though Montreal is more involved than Calgary). I argue that the role of the local government 
in the governance of homelessness is determined by the local housing powers of the city and 
by the by the local elected officials’ political commitment to make homelessness a priority. 
Framework 
As the literature review (Chapter 2) explained, this chapter could take a number of 
approaches to this question. We could compare political culture, political economy, or we 
could use typology tools developed by urban scholars such as Kantor and Savitch (2004) or 
Pierre (2011) to compare types of local governance. These typologies, though valuable, are 
beyond the scope of this thesis; this chapter does not seek to establish and compare the overall 
governance of each city, but rather it seeks to explain the different governance models that 
have formed around a particular issue: homelessness. To this end, I look at each city’s local 
context and compare which local governments have the ability and the interest in stepping into 
the homelessness policy space.  
I do this by comparing the housing powers of local governments and the local political 
commitment to the issue of homelessness. These two dimensions are comprised of eight 
factors. Drawn from the literature, the housing related powers of the local governments is 
measured with four factors: the local autonomy of each city; density bonusing powers; and 
inclusionary zoning powers; and which level of government (provincial or municipal) has the 
official responsibility for social housing. Data for this dimension is drawn mostly from 
primary sources, including provincial legislation regarding municipal powers, as well as 
interviews conducted with key actors in 2014. This first dimension looks specifically at 
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housing related powers, instead of powers related to homelessness. This is intentional. On the 
one hand, chronic homelessness is a very new phenomenon and there is as a result not a lot 
written on the subject. But there is a second important reason; while chronic homelessness is 
about much more than housing, it is, at the most basic level, always about housing. The lack of 
affordable housing in big Canadian cities means that long-term solutions to homelessness must 
involve some way of contributing to or controlling the housing market. In other words, for 
local governments to be serious and long-term actors in the area of homelessness, they must 
have some powers of housing. 
The second dimension that explains the local government’s role in the governance of 
homelessness is the political commitment to the issue of homelessness. Again using a 
framework that has been developed based on the literature on local governance, I evaluate this 
dimension by comparing four factors: the regional governance structure of the city; whether 
there are political parties at the local level; the local electoral system; and the broader political 
goals of senior local elected officials. Data for this dimension is also drawn from primary and 
secondary sources, and is greatly supplemented by interviews conducted in 2014.  
In what following, I first justify and explain the significance of each of the eight 
indicators, including a broad overview of the results of the local autonomy index (for a much 
more thorough theoretical justification of the framework, please see Chapter 2: Literature 
Review). I then compare, case by case, the housing related powers and the political 
commitment to the issue of homelessness in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal. 
 Eight factors 
 
Dimension 1: Local housing related powers 
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1. Local Autonomy: To measure the local autonomy of each city, I use an index that 
was developed by Smith and Spicer (forthcoming) to measure the local autonomy of the 
largest Canadian city in each province, which essentially measures the relationship between 
cities and their respective provincial governments. This index allows us to compare the ability 
of these four cities to act on their own, free from provincial constraints. Though Canadian 
cities are often treated as having very similar powers and interests in the literature on 
intergovernmental relations and federalism, Smith and Spicer find interesting differences in 
the dimensions of autonomy of different big cities. The index contains three dimensions of 
autonomy – legal-administrative, financial, and political – and is comprised of 12 indicators, 
all of which were drawn from a vast review of similar indices from the international and 
Canadian literature on local autonomy.  
Local autonomy is measured from 0-1, where 0 is low autonomy and 1 is high 
autonomy. The results of the cities are presented on a six-part scale, “low-low 0.0-0.19, low-
high 0.2-0.36, medium low 0.37-0.52, medium-high 0.53-0.68, high-low 0.69-0.84, and high-
high 0.85-1.0”. The absolute values of 0 and 1 are in practice impossible; looking at the 
factors, it would for example require that the city have 100% of the province’s public 
employment and be responsible for 100% of its public expenditures. The scale is useful, 
however, in that is allows for a relative, side-by-side comparison of all 10 cities.  
The results of the local autonomy index show that there is some interesting variation in 
the overall level of autonomy. The breakdown of the index into its three component 
dimensions reveals more nuances to this overall result. First, it shows that Canadian cities 
have remarkably similar, and low, levels of financial autonomy. In fact, all ten big Canadian 
cities fall within the low-high (0.2-0.36) category for financial autonomy (see Smith and 
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Spicer forthcoming for the results of all ten cities). This is perhaps the most important 
takeaway of the study of local autonomy in Canada, as the low financial autonomy across the 
country severely limits the ability of all cities to fully exercise their powers.  
There is, however, more variation for the other two dimensions of autonomy. Calgary 
scores the lowest on the legal administrative dimension (.13), Vancouver scores the highest 
(.63), while Toronto and Montreal are in the middle (.38). Vancouver again is the highest 
scoring city for political autonomy, scoring .55 in the index, while Montreal is the lowest (.14) 
and Calgary and Toronto are in between (.26 and .27 respectively). Table 1 compares the 
levels of autonomy of each of the four cities side-by-side, in terms of individual dimensions 
and overall level of autonomy. These are the results that will be considered below for the local 
autonomy factor of the housing related powers dimension. 
Table 3: Local autonomy of Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, and Montreal 
 Low-low 
(0.0-0.19) 
Low-high 
(0.2-0.36) 
Medium-
low (0.37-
0.52) 
Medium-
high (0.53-
0.68) 
High-low 
(0.69-
0.84) 
High-high 
(0.85-1.0) 
Legal-
admin 
Calgary 
(0.13) 
 Toronto 
(0.38) 
Montréal 
(0.38) 
Vancouver 
(0.63) 
  
Financial  Vancouver 
(0.29) 
Calgary 
(0.32) 
Toronto 
(0.32) 
Montréal 
(0.35) 
    
Political Montréal 
(0.14) 
Calgary 
(0.26) 
Toronto 
(0.27) 
 Vancouver 
(0.55) 
  
Total  Calgary 
(0.24) 
Vancouver 
(0.48) 
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Toronto 
(0.34) 
Montréal 
(0.30) 
 
Source: Smith and Spicer, forthcoming. 
2. Density bonusing: Through density bonusing powers, cities can increase the 
allowable density in new private housing developments in exchange for public amenities, such 
as affordable housing, parks, libraries, or public art. Moore explains, “density for benefit 
agreements (DBAs) allow municipalities to secure cash contributions or amenities from 
developers in return for allowing developers to exceed currently prevailing height and density 
restrictions” (Moore 2013, 1). The power itself is important to the city’s ability to contribute to 
affordable housing, and therefore to be an important actor in the governance of homelessness, 
but certain contextual factors (including the availability of land and the rules of the negotiation 
process) are also important to consider. In other words, density bonusing is a more powerful 
power in some cities than it is in others. 
3. Inclusionary Zoning: Another tool that cities can use to encourage other actors, 
notably the private sector but also provincial governments, to invest in affordable housing is 
inclusionary zoning. Inclusionary zoning policies do not necessarily require developers to 
build affordable housing units, but it means that cities can require that developers provide the 
city with land that can be used for future affordable housing developments. A CPRN report 
specifies; “the sites were either vacant land or air space parcels over a parking garage or other 
structure” (Mah 2009, 25). Once provided to the city, the city can lease this land to a non-
profit, which is responsible for securing funding from a senior level of government to build 
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housing. Again, the strength of this power depends on some contextual factors, including the 
availability of land and the details of the negotiations between private developers and the city. 
4. Responsibility for housing: If a municipality has been given the responsibility for 
social housing through provincial legislation, this responsibility extends implicitly to 
homelessness. Municipalities that do not have the responsibility for social housing can, of 
course, be involved in this area, but they do not have a mandate and a responsibility to do so. 
Insofar as there is one factor that is one most important factor in determining the role of the 
local government in the governance of homelessness, it is this one. 
 
Dimension 2: Political commitment to homelessness  
5. Regional structure: This factor considers whether the broader regional structure is 
fragmented or consolidated. In other words, does the municipal government encompass the 
suburbs around the city, or are those suburbs their own municipalities? This factor is important 
for two reasons. First, research has shown that downtown cores tend to be more progressive 
and socially minded, in federal as well as municipal elections, than suburbs (Fiedler and Addie 
2008). For example, “inner cities have become more likely to vote for left-wing parties, whilst 
suburban areas increasingly support right wing parties and exhibit attitudes consistent with 
right-wing politics” (ibid, 10; see also Walks 2004; Walks 2006). Indeed, the rise of Rob 
Ford’s populist, “stop the gravy train” brand of conservatism was largely a suburban 
phenomenon.  
Secondly, homeless counts across Canada have shown that chronic homelessness is 
concentrated in the downtown core of big cities (City of Toronto 2013; Greater Vancouver 
Regional Steering Committee on Homelessness 2014; Latimer et al. 2015). Where there is 
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homelessness in the suburbs, it is much more hidden and does not tend to be chronic 
(Sengupta 2015).  In local elections, mayors (and political parties, where they exist) seek to 
campaign on issues that affect and concern as many people in their city as possible. In a large 
city that contains both urban and suburban areas, the fight against homelessness is likely to be 
a less salient issue because it does not resonate as much with suburban voters, who are not 
confronted with the uncomfortable reality of homelessness on a regular basis. Further, voters 
in suburbs tend to be more skeptical of government intervention and social spending. In 
fragmented systems where downtown cores are separate from suburbs, homelessness is more 
likely to be on the agenda of local politicians, as a greater proportion of the voter base 
(including citizens and businesses) will have direct contact with homelessness. The voter base 
in these downtown, urban municipalities also tends to be more progressive and open to 
government solutions to social problems. Fragmented regional structures therefore contribute 
to a local government’s political commitment to homelessness. 
6. Political party system: A small number of local governments in Canada feature 
political parties. Political parties, in order to be elected to power, must create platforms that 
appeal to a broad range of voters throughout the city. Where there are no political parties, 
candidates are free to campaign on whatever local issues they want, because they are less 
constrained by the need to align their message with that of a political party that needs wide-
ranging appeal. Given the geographically concentrated nature of homelessness, it is unlikely 
that many city councilors or mayoral candidates will make it a priority without a party 
structure and platform behind them. The existence of a party system at the local level therefore 
increases the likelihood that the local government will make homelessness a priority. Further, 
political parties are in a stronger position to make commitments and promises to reduce 
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homelessness; if elected to a majority on City Council, candidates of the same political party 
usually vote together and are thus more powerful in dealing with a complex issue like 
homelessness than individual counselors.  
7. Electoral system: There are two types of electoral systems at the local level in 
Canada: ward and at-large. In ward systems, councilors campaign in a single district (as is the 
case in provincial and federal elections). If elected, that councilor is responsible to and 
represents that particular part of the city. In at-large systems, councilors campaign in and are 
elected by the entire city. Citizens vote directly all city councilors, and if elected, councilors 
are not responsible to a particular ward but rather to the entire city. (Mayors are always elected 
in at-large systems and must campaign in the entire city.) This is important for homelessness, 
which tends to be concentrated in certain areas, notably downtown. In ward systems, the 
concentration of homelessness in a few wards makes it less likely that a sufficient number of 
local elected officials, and therefore City Hall, will make homelessness a priority. The 
electoral pay-off is too small. In at-large systems, however, where councilors are responsible 
to the entire city, the concentration of homelessness in a few parts of the city is less of a 
barrier, and homelessness is thus more likely to be on the political agenda of local officials. 
8. Broader political goals: This final factor relates to the overall goals of the local 
elected officials, notably the mayor. In some cities, homelessness may not be a direct priority 
of the mayor, but it might fit very well with another goal or priority of the mayor. In these 
cases, homelessness can become a powerful weapon in another battle, for more financial 
powers, for example. If homelessness does not fit with the broader goals, the local political 
commitment to it will be weaker. To compare the broader political goals, I consider the main 
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priorities of the mayors in the four cities, and evaluate whether homelessness can help to 
further than political agenda. 
Hypothesis 1: Housing Related Powers 
 
Vancouver 
The index of local autonomy clearly shows that Vancouver is the most autonomous 
city of the four under examination here. Indeed, Vancouver is the most autonomous city in all 
of Canada, and by a significant margin, a finding that is consistent with the literature on 
municipalities in Canada (Hutton 2012; Sancton and Young 2009; Smith and Stewart 2009). 
In terms of its overall autonomy, Vancouver scores 0.48; the second most autonomous city 
(Toronto) scores 0.34. On the fiscal dimension, of course, Vancouver remains as restricted as 
every other city in terms of its ability to borrow money, to raise revenues, and in terms of 
expenditures.  
In terms of its legal-administrative and political capacities, however, Vancouver is 
significantly more autonomous than other cities. One of the autonomy enhancing tools 
considered by the autonomy index is the Vancouver Charter, which gives the city a special 
status within the province (compared with other municipalities). Vancouver also has 
considerable political autonomy. There are, for example, no provincially imposed limits to 
donations and for spending in municipal elections. Further strengthening its autonomy is the 
fact that all municipalities in BC have strong representation to protect their interests through 
the unified and powerful Union of BC Municipalities (UBCM), one of the strongest such 
bodies in the country (Smith and Stewart 2009). Municipalities must be consulted by the 
 186 
province on matters that directly affect them, including on issues relating to municipal 
structure and finance (British Columbia Ministry of Municipal Affairs 2000).  
The severe financial constraints highlighted in the index, however, seriously limit the 
city’s autonomy and ability to invest in the construction of affordable housing. These 
constraints mean that the city must constantly look for affordable housing partners who are 
able to bring substantial capital funding to the table. This brings us to the second and third 
indicators, density bonusing and inclusionary zoning. Vancouver is the only city under study 
here that has both of these important housing powers, which it actively uses to find partners 
who will invest capital dollars in the construction of affordable housing. Further, the City of 
Vancouver is able to decide who is prioritized for these new units of housing; because of 
Vision Vancouver’s promise to end street homelessness, new housing has become highly 
targeted to homeless people, many of whom come directly from the street. 
Each density bonusing agreement (DBA) is negotiated separately, and city staff lead 
the process. Moore uses a comparison with Toronto to explain the significance of this; “while 
Vancouver’s process is largely driven by city staff, and to some extent insulated from politics, 
councilors in Toronto largely direct the use of DBA contributions in the city. Toronto’s 
councilors tend to focus on securing visually desirable amenities for their residents close to the 
developments. In contrast, Vancouver focuses on security amenities such as affordable 
housing and community services” (Moore 2013, 35). This had had a real consequence on what 
cities are able to get in exchange for density. Clayton and Schwartz have found that housing 
contributions make up 48% of the contributions that Vancouver is able to acquire through 
negotiations, whereas in Toronto, only 9% of contributions are housing (Clayton and Schwartz 
2015). 
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Introduced in Vancouver in 1988 when core housing need in the city was 20%, the 
inclusionary zoning policy in Vancouver requires that the equivalent of 20% of the units in 
new developments be affordable (half of those units must be for families). The ability to 
impose this requirement is provided by law in the Vancouver Charter, Section 565.1; other 
municipalities in BC also have this power (British Columbia Ministry of Forests and Range 
Housing Department 2005). Through its inclusionary zoning policy, the city does not require 
that developers necessarily build the affordable housing units themselves, but rather that they 
provide land upon which future housing developments can be built. 
 Because the city obtains land and not units through inclusionary zoning, the 
construction of affordable housing through inclusionary zoning in Vancouver is heavily, if not 
exclusively, dependent on funding from senior levels of government. When funding for 
affordable housing was cut federally in the 1990s and then provincially in the 2000s, the 
development of affordable housing through inclusionary zoning powers in Vancouver slowed 
considerably (Mah 2009). As the province and private sector have since regained interest in 
building affordable housing, this land has subsequently been used to develop new affordable 
and supportive housing through a partnership involving the city, the province, and the 
Streetohome Foundation (STHF). 
In comparative terms, Vancouver’s mandatory inclusionary zoning power and density 
bonusing power are significant; the local context in Vancouver makes these powers 
meaningful. For the inclusionary zoning power, it is significant that land in Vancouver is very 
limited and expensive; water, mountains, and suburbs surround the city. In order to be able to 
build in Vancouver, a profitable enterprise given the housing market in Vancouver, developers 
must first get permission from the city. If the city is willing to exercise its housing related 
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powers, which it is because housing and homelessness is currently a priority of city hall, this 
requires that developers conform to the city’s demands and provide the city with land for 
affordable housing. 
Further, as land prices have gone up, so too have the profits associated with building 
condos or other developments. Developers who are interested in making money (and most 
are!) seek greater height or density to cover the expensive costs of building in Vancouver and 
to make their development as profitable as possible; the best way to do this is to build higher 
or denser buildings. To do this, developments must first get city approval and agree to some 
sort of exchange to add this increased height or density. Again, if the city is committed to 
affordable and supportive housing, which it currently is, the developer may have no choice but 
to contribute to the affordable housing stock in exchange for this desired density.  
A city councilor in Vancouver explained this strategy; “We’re plugging the holes. The 
quickest way for us to plug the holes without us having to pay for it was to use our by-laws to 
incentivize. I think we pushed the envelope in terms of what we can do without government 
funding” (interview #3). A senior member of the city of Vancouver’s housing staff reiterated 
this point; “We use every tool in our box… we’ll provide a bunch of relaxations, fast track the 
process, we are using rezoning to get developers, in exchange for additional height and 
density, to provide us with additional turn-key social housing units that they can give to the 
city. So we are using our regulatory land use tools to create housing” (interview #5). 
When the province reemerged as an eager partner in the area of affordable housing and 
homelessness in the mid-2000s, city-owned land (acquired often through the inclusionary 
zoning policy) became a hot commodity, and the city was able to use it to negotiate with the 
province to build new supportive housing units.  A city bureaucrat emphasized this strategy of 
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provoking further action by the province: “we are trying to do the most we can with our tools, 
but really, for social housing, we need the province to come and provide some level of 
operating subsidy… And that’s what we try to do. We say, ‘oh look! We have [land]! Come!’ 
I would say we have been quite successful in doing that” (interview #5). Another bureaucrat 
put this in different terms. When asked how to characterize the relationship between 
Vancouver and the province when it comes to working together on issues such as affordable 
housing, the bureaucrat made the following analogy: “it’s like big brother, little brother. Little 
brother is going ‘come on, come on, let’s do this! And big brother keeps saying ‘stop being so 
annoying and shouting about it all the time.’ But it’s Vancouver making the noise and 
trouble… drawing attention to and measuring the problem” (interview #4).  
Finally, the provincial government has kept (and has fully exercised) the responsibility 
for social and affordable housing. This is the one housing related power that the city of 
Vancouver does not have. The city is not able to build affordable housing and end 
homelessness on its own; but indeed, no level of government or sector can do that. As the 
above has demonstrated, the city has significant tools and powers – notably heightened 
autonomy, inclusionary zoning and density bonusing – that allow it to negotiate and leverage 
other actors into partnering in the construction of affordable housing. Much of this happens in 
a non-political way, such as the process for negotiating additional density agreements by city 
bureaucrats, which makes it more likely for the city to obtain affordable housing from 
developers and from the private sector. The local context of Vancouver’s expensive and 
limited housing market makes these powers even more meaningful by providing strong 
incentives for the private sector to give something back to the city when investing in a new 
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development. Through exercising these powers aggressively, the city has made itself and 
important actor in the fight against homelessness. 
 
Calgary 
 Of the four cities studied here, the overall autonomy of the City of Calgary is the 
lowest according to the index of local autonomy (though in the context of all ten Canadian 
cities, it is in the middle of the municipal pack). Calgary is particularly low on the legal-
administrative dimension, in part because it does not have a City Charter. Big city mayors in 
Alberta, including Calgary Mayor Naheed Nenshi and Edmonton Mayor Don Iveson, have 
been advocating powerfully for City Charters, and met with Premier Rachel Notley to discuss 
Charters. But as of 2015, Albertan cities do not benefit from Charter legislation. As is the case 
with all other cities, Calgary’s financial autonomy is also very low. On the political 
dimension, Calgary has a moderate level of autonomy, in part due to the fractured way in 
which Alberta cities organize themselves to advocate for municipal interests at the provincial 
level (Lesage and McMillan 2008).  
Looking at Calgary’s housing related powers, it is clear that Calgary is also in a weak 
position to lead, or even be a powerful actor in a governing coalition around housing and 
homelessness. In short, the city has few housing related powers; the powers that it does have 
are not very meaningful in the Calgary context (as is explained below), making the city a weak 
actor within the policy area of housing and homelessness. To understand why, it is first 
necessary to look at recent changes to the city since the 1990s to put these housing powers into 
context. 
 Compared to the other cities studied here, Calgary has grown (in terms of both 
physical size and population) the most rapidly. Census data indicates that the population of 
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Calgary was 768,082 in 1996, but had exploded to 1,096,833 by 2011 (Statistics Canada 2001; 
2011). Throughout this period, very little affordable housing was built by the private sector, 
and as previous chapters illustrated, the province was completely disengaged in the area of 
affordable housing from the 1990s until 2008. Rental housing was also not a priority of 
developers during this period, and the majority of the new housing developments were large 
detached houses. Indeed, between 2001-2009, the city actually lost 7,500 units of rental 
housing, an important source of affordable housing (through conversions to condos) (CMHC 
2010). As the population of the city began to rise and the housing market struggled to keep up, 
rents and housing prices also grew, causing a massive housing crunch throughout the city. The 
vacancy rate in Calgary was .5% in 2006 (Stroick and Hubac 2007) and has continued to 
hover around 1% ever since (Calgary Homeless Foundation 2015a). Rental prices in Calgary 
have become the highest in Canada, surpassing even Vancouver in some cases (CBC News 
2014a).  
In the present environment, rental housing is becoming somewhat more profitable and 
sought after, developers have begun to see value in constructing rental housing. It is 
significant, therefore, that the City of Calgary recently obtained density bonusing powers in 
2013. The ability of the city to exchange density for benefits is limited to certain 
neighbourhoods, but more importantly, developers are given the choice of what public 
amenity they give. As affordable housing is highly expensive, public projects tend to be public 
art (Barrett 2014). Further, developers are not often interested in entering into DBAs, which 
eat into their profits, because they can always build profitable large detached houses at the 
edge of the city (where land is plentiful, unlike Vancouver). Density bonusing therefore does 
not often result in the creation of affordable housing; it is a relatively weak power. As is the 
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case in Vancouver, the strength of this power can in large part be explained by the unique 
geographical nature of Calgary.  
A senior official at the Calgary Housing Corporation explained this in an interview. 
Walking over to his corner-office window, he said, “look anywhere you want, look at the 
skyline. The only place that has high-rises is the core of the city. When you look everywhere 
else you won’t see more than 2 or 3 stories… When you get ten feet out of Vancouver heading 
east, you run into Burnaby, then Coquitlam, and on and on. Ten feet outside of Calgary in any 
direction, you are in fields. So the land has a different pressure. Toronto, you are in Brampton; 
you can’t go out, so you have to go up. In Calgary, we can keep going out, there is no one for 
hundreds of miles… You can’t do that in Toronto or Vancouver” (interview #30). The value 
of the density bonusing power in Calgary is therefore mitigated by the endless supply of land 
on which to build new developments. 
A Globe and Mail article noted in 2014, “there are 12 rental towers in the works now, 
compared to only three that were constructed over the previous 2 decades” (Mason 2014). 
This is not nearly enough to meet the pent up need for rental and affordable housing in 
Calgary, but it indicates a new interest on the part of the private sector to build rental housing. 
The Mayor had previously tried to use the power of persuasion to convince developers to 
contribute to affordable housing in the city, but had no luck. The City of Calgary does not 
have the power over inclusionary zoning, which would leverage these and future 
developments into affordable housing contributions. In the context of a severe housing crunch 
and an increasing interest in rental and condo developments, Mayor Nenshi has come to fully 
support inclusionary zoning, and is asking the province to give the city the power to mandate 
it for new developments. He told the Globe, “I think this kind of zoning must be part of the 
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solution… You don’t want to interfere too much with the private market but you want to make 
sure something is in place. This is something where regulation is required. A total free market 
doesn’t work” (Mason 2014). There is, however, fierce opposition to inclusionary zoning in 
Calgary, which could undermine its effectiveness if it is ever given to the city by the province. 
Finally, the provincial government has the official responsibility for housing policy. 
The province has not, of course, fully exercised that power since it was downloaded in the 
1990s. But municipalities in Alberta, including Calgary, do not have the mandate or 
responsibility to develop and implement housing policy, meaning their involvement in housing 
(and therefore homelessness) policy is not required. 
 
Toronto 
According to the local autonomy index, Toronto is the second most autonomous city of 
the four studied here; in fact, Toronto is the second most autonomous city of all ten large 
Canadian cities, though by a very small margin (Toronto scores .34 overall and Winnipeg 
scores .33). Toronto’s fiscal autonomy is of course as limited as it is for other cities, but the 
city scores relatively highly on the legal-administrative dimension, in part because it has a 
City Charter, which enhances its autonomy. Politically, Toronto’s autonomy is fairly limited; 
there are strict provincial guidelines for municipal elections, for example, and the association 
that represents municipal interests at the provincial level is not as strong as it is in other 
provinces such as BC. 
The City of Toronto has the power over density bonusing. As outlined in Section 37 of 
the Planning Act, municipalities in Ontario can allow developers to surpass normal height and 
density bylaws in exchange for fairly minimal community benefits. Drdla explains, “the value 
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of the community benefits provided is assessed only against the added density or height, and 
not against the entire development” (Drdla 2014). He goes on to note that this has not led to 
significant affordable housing contributions. Further, as was mentioned above, city councilors 
in Toronto have significant input into the community benefit that is obtained through a density 
bonus agreement (Moore 2013). Affordable housing, even when desperately needed, is hidden 
and its direct benefit is limited. Seeking reelection or credit for positive contributions to their 
communities, councilors in Toronto usually seek visible and publicly accessible benefits, such 
as public art or community space. As a result, only around 9% of the amenities that are 
acquired through density bonusing agreements are housing (compared to 48% in Vancouver). 
Many at the local level are advocating for the inclusionary zoning power. The battle 
for inclusionary zoning powers in Toronto has been going on since at least the Golden report 
on homelessness in 1999; recommendation 93 stated, “The City of Toronto should request and 
the Province of Ontario should approve amendments to the City of Toronto Act to permit the 
City to require the inclusion of affordable housing in new residential developments” (Golden, 
Currie, Greaves, and Latimer 1999, 165). The province, however, repeatedly expressed very 
little interest in giving Ontario cities inclusionary zoning powers, without explaining why 
(Drdla 2014). More recently, City Councilors Mike Layton and Ana Bailao (the chair of the 
affordable housing committee) introduced a motion to city council in May 2015 that would 
require the city to develop a mandatory inclusionary zoning strategy.  
The Layton-Bailao motion notes, “there appears to be an appetite for inclusionary 
zoning from some Members of Provincial Parliament and across political party lines” (City of 
Toronto 2015). This is referring, among others, to NDP MPP Cheri De Novo and Liberal MPP 
Steve Milczyn. Milczyn, a member of the governing Liberal party, introduced a Private 
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Member’s Bill (Bill 39), which would require the province to give municipalities inclusionary 
zoning powers (among other planning related powers). Bill 39 includes changing section 37 of 
the Planning Act so that it includes the following: “The council of a local municipality may, in 
a by-law passed under section 34, (1) require that a specified percentage of all housing units 
described in subsection (2) be affordable; and (b) specify the percentage” (Milczyn 2014). 
Cheri De Novo has similarly used Private Member’s Legislation to encourage the government 
to give cities this power. Land is expensive in Toronto, particularly in the downtown core, 
making developments and condominiums profitable. Leveraging these developments into 
affordable housing contributions would be a meaningful power in Toronto, as it is in 
Vancouver. Yet despite its broad support across parties at the provincial and local level, as of 
2015, inclusionary zoning powers continue to be denied by the province25.  
The City of Toronto is the only city of the four examined here to have the official 
responsibility for social housing. As the chapter on housing policy outlined, this responsibility 
was given to all Ontario municipalities in the 1990s, through the Local Services Realignment 
policy of Progressive Conservative Premier Mike Harris. If for no other reason, the fact that 
Toronto has the official responsibility for housing means that it will by necessity be involved 
in this policy area. The Housing Stability Service Planning Framework clearly explains the 
city powers over housing, which were given to the city by the province in the 1990s; “the City 
is responsible for planning, administering and delivering affordable and social housing 
programs and service initiatives that help individuals and families at-risk of or experiencing 
                                                
25 This chapter, and dissertation more generally, consider events up until the end of 2015. An 
important development in the spring of 2016 was that the province finally agreed to give 
Ontario municipalities (not just Toronto) the power over inclusionary zoning. This 
development is not considered in this dissertation, largely because it has not come fully into 
effect, but future studies of the local role in housing should pay attention to how this new 
power affects the city’s ability to contribute to the affordable housing stock. 
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homelessness to find and maintain permanent housing” (Toronto Shelter, Support & Housing 
Administration 2014, 8–9). The annual budget of the Shelter, Support and Housing 
Administration is around $670 million, which includes funding from all levels of government 
(including federal Homelessness Partnering Strategy funding and provincial Community 
Homelessness Prevention Initiative funding), but the most important source of funding is the 
municipality itself. Approximately 70% of this budget goes to social housing (Toronto Shelter, 
Support & Housing Administration 2014; interviews #46, #52 and #53). 
Even though Toronto has jurisdiction over housing, its ability to fully exercise this 
power is severely constrained by the fact that its revenue base is largely limited to the property 
tax. As a senior administrator with the city of Toronto explained, “have you noticed the 
elevated expressway at the bottom of the city? The Gardener Expressway is falling down and 
it needs hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollar to keep it standing up. Our 
subway system needs billions and billions and billions of dollars of investment. That is what 
we are up against. And City Council makes those kinds of choices. Money is an issue” 
(interview #53). So this is not to say that Toronto spends all that is should in areas such as 
social housing; as this chapter has repeatedly stressed, financial restrains severely limit a city’s 
ability to exercise the powers that it does have. When revenues are scarce, cities must make 
decisions about how to use their limited funds, and the city has not dedicated as much funding 
to housing as many (including many city councilors and bureaucrats) would like. 
 
Montreal 
 Local autonomy in the city of Montreal is low according to the index. This is 
unsurprising, in light of literature that has highlighted the restrictive framework that governs 
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Quebec municipalities (Belley et al. 2009). The financial autonomy in Montreal is limited and 
is highly similar to what is seen in other cities. Political autonomy is the lowest of the cities 
examined here; this is in part due to provincial regulations on local elections in Montreal  (and 
other Quebec municipalities) and comparatively weak municipal representation at the 
provincial level. 
The next two factors are density bonusing and inclusionary zoning. In Montreal, the 
line between the two is fuzzy and confusing at times; the city has density bonusing powers and 
not the power for inclusionary zoning. The confusion comes from the fact that Montreal has an 
inclusionary housing strategy, which some call a non-mandatory or incentive-based type of 
inclusionary zoning (Drdla 2010). This strategy uses existing provincial legislation to 
incentivize the private sector to construct affordable housing. The City does not, however, 
have the power to mandate inclusionary zoning for new affordable housing in new 
developments (as is the case in Vancouver). In 2005, advocates pushed the city to try to obtain 
this power from the province so that affordable housing could be mandated in all new 
developments, but the city decided to use existing legislating to create the inclusionary 
housing strategy, thinking that it would take too long to get the formal power from the 
province (Drdla 2014). Instead, the city opted to use existing powers on a voluntary basis, and 
to provide incentives, including selling land at below market value and increasing the 
allowable density in new developments, to obtain more affordable housing. For these reasons, 
the strategy and the power is best characterized as density bonusing; indeed, according to the 
CMHC, incentive-based inclusionary zoning powers are considered density bonusing because 
they incentivize the contribution of affordable housing (CMHC 1999). 
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Density bonusing agreements (DBAs) are therefore voluntary, in part because the 
ability to mandate it has not been given to the city from the province. They are also voluntary 
also because of the two-tiered structure of local governance in Montreal, where there is a 
municipal government and also 19 borough councils. In order for the city to enter into density 
bonusing negotiations with developers, the boroughs must agree. If the boroughs agree, and 
many do (notably the South -West borough, see Arrondissement du Sud-Ouest Montréal 
2012), inclusionary housing requirements can effectively be imposed on all new developments 
over 200 units, though this is always through an incentive-based negotiation. The borough 
structure can, however, weaken the city’s ability to contribute to affordable housing by not 
agreeing to density bonusing agreements, and municipal reviews of the inclusionary zoning 
strategy note that greater borough buy-in is needed to make the strategy more effective (Ville 
de Montréal 2008). 
The Strategy for the inclusion of affordable housing in new developments was adopted 
in 2005, when the city of Montreal was facing a variety of pressures on the real estate market; 
the city was looking for ways to encourage the private sector to contribute more to the 
affordable housing stock. As outlined in the Strategy, Montreal aims for 30% of new 
developments to be affordable, a higher percentage than what is required in Vancouver. 
Developers are not responsible for actually building these affordable housing units, but rather 
must provide land upon which affordable housing can be built. This allows the city to leverage 
the land and incentive other actors – non-profits, the provincial government, or the private 
sector – to bring capital dollars to the table. This is one of the reasons the line between DBAs 
and inclusionary zoning in Montreal is at times blurred; in Vancouver, for example, DBAs 
 199 
often require that developers provide the units of housing, whereas inclusionary zoning results 
in the city obtaining land from developers. 
The definition of “affordable” in Montreal, however, is different than what it is in 
Vancouver. Half of the affordable units that are developed though DBAs are for social 
housing, and the other half are for affordable home ownership, which in 2006 was defined as 
homes worth up to $170,000. The housing that is obtained through density bonusing is 
therefore for low and moderate incomes, which “assist[s] households at the margins of market 
affordability” (Gladki and Pomeroy 2007, 25). The policy applies to developments with 200 or 
more units (Ville de Montréal 2005); in other cities in Canada and the US, smaller 
developments with 50 or more units can also be included in either optional DBAs or 
mandatory inclusionary zoning policies, but this is not the case in Montreal. Recently, the city 
of Montreal has allowed developers to give the city cash in lieu of affordable housing (Drdla 
2010). This usually occurs in large condominium developments where an income-mix of 
residents is seen by some to be more difficult.  
In leveraging the land obtained through DBAs, Montreal (like Vancouver) depends a 
great deal on funding for housing from senior governments. Montreal’s inclusionary housing 
strategy has thus benefited greatly from long-term, predictable housing funding from the 
provincial budget, which has allowed the city to take the final step of transforming the land 
obtained from the private sector through the DBA into affordable housing.  
The majority of the units that have been built through this policy have been for 
families or seniors, with a small number for people with special needs, though the most recent 
comprehensive review was conducted several years ago in 2007 (Ville de Montréal 2007). 
This is another difference between the policy in Vancouver and Montreal; in Vancouver, the 
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majority of the housing obtained through DBAs and inclusionary zoning is targeted at 
homeless people, in keeping with the city’s priority of ending street homelessness. In 
Montreal, the units are targeted much more broadly, even benefiting moderate-income 
households. 
The final indicator for this first dimension is the responsibility for social housing. As 
the previous chapter on provincial housing policy demonstrated, the province of Quebec has 
developed and funded housing policy ever since the federal government downloaded the 
responsibility for housing in the 1990s. The province maintains, and fully exercises, the power 
for social housing policy. 
 
Summary - Housing related powers 
 
 Table 4 summarizes the first dimension that determines the role of the local 
government in the governance of homelessness: the housing related powers of the four local 
governments. The bolded result in the table indicates a power. The City of Toronto is the most 
involved government in the governance of homelessness; the other housing related powers are 
relevant to consider, but in this case, the fact that the city has the official responsibility for 
social housing largely explains its significant involvement in the area of housing and therefore 
in the fight against homelessness. Vancouver does not have the power for social housing, but 
it has the most other housing related powers and is the most autonomous city studied here. 
Calgary and Montreal have few housing related powers and comparatively low local 
autonomy.  
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Table 4: Housing related powers 
 Vancouver Calgary Toronto Montreal 
1. Autonomy  
0.48 
 
0.24 
 
0.34 
 
0.22 
2. Density 
Bonusing 
 
Yes (strong) 
 
Yes (weak) 
 
Yes (weak) 
 
Yes (strong) 
3. Inclusionary 
Zoning 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
4. Responsibility 
for social 
housing 
 
Province 
 
Province 
 
Municipalities 
 
Province 
 
Hypothesis 2: Political Commitment 
 The housing related powers begin to explain why these four local governments are 
involved to such different degrees in the governance of homelessness. Vancouver and Toronto 
clearly have more housing related powers than Calgary and Montreal do, making the former 
two cities more likely to become powerful actors in the governance of homelessness. But this 
is only part of the story; Montreal and Calgary have similarly few housing related powers, but 
Montreal is more involved in the governance of homelessness than Calgary is. To explain this, 
and to further explain why Vancouver and Toronto are so involved in the governance of 
homelessness, we turn to the second dimension: the local political commitment to 
homelessness. The four indicators that are compared are the regional structure, the party 
system, the electoral system, and the broader political goals of the local elected officials. 
Vancouver 
The regional governance in Vancouver is highly fragmented; the City of Vancouver is 
itself very small both in terms of size and population. With a population of 600,000 and a total 
size of 115 km2, Vancouver is the smallest city studied here. The suburbs around Vancouver 
(such as Surrey and Burnaby) are their own municipalities, and the Greater Vancouver 
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Regional District (GVRD) is comprised of 23 municipalities. The fact that Vancouver is such 
a small and urban city is significant for the governance of homelessness for two reasons. First, 
voters in Vancouver elections are a very downtown, urban population; research has shown that 
this type of voter tends to be more progressive than his or her suburban counterpart. Second, in 
such a small urban city like Vancouver, the majority of the population lives downtown, which 
is also where homelessness is concentrated. This voter base is therefore likely to be in regular 
contact with chronically homeless people. This type of regional governance structure, where 
there is no urban-suburban divide, is important and makes it more likely that local elected 
officials will see a benefit in prioritizing the fight against homelessness. 
The second factor in this dimension is the local electoral system. In most Canadian 
cities, the electoral system is ward-based; city councilors, like federal Members of Parliament, 
are responsible for a ward or defined territory of land. In contrast, in Vancouver (and most 
other cities in BC) the mayor, city councilors, park and school board representatives are all 
elected through an at-large system. In other words, each citizen in Vancouver votes directly 
for each and every one of these positions. Including the mayor, ten councilors, seven school 
board trustees, parks boards and other local representatives, citizens in Vancouver cast a total 
of 27 votes in municipal elections; one for the mayor, 10 for councilors, seven commissioners 
for the Board of Parks and Recreation and nine for school trustees (City of Vancouver 2014).  
This electoral system makes it more likely that an issue like homelessness will become 
a priority of city council. Former mayor of Vancouver Sam Sullivan explains; “wards are 
inherently conservative and parochial. You don’t get many points for being parochial here in 
Vancouver… You have to campaign in the whole city. So broader issues like homelessness 
have more traction; politically, there is more emphasis given” (interview #21). In a small, 
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urban, downtown city like Vancouver, many citizens are affected by chronic homelessness on 
a regular basis, making homelessness an issue that councilors are able to put on the political 
agenda without alienating a large portion of their voter base.  
 The local party system is the third factor in this dimension. Vancouver is also one of 
the few big cities in Canada that has a local party system (Montreal is another). There are 
currently two main parties in Vancouver: the Non-Partisan Association (NPA), which has 
existed since the 1940s and sits to the centre-right of the political spectrum; and Vision 
Vancouver (VV), a new centre-left political party. Throughout various periods of Vancouver’s 
history, there have been different political parties, but there is often a left-right divide at the 
local level (see Campbell et al. 2009). The party system makes local elected officials more 
likely to commit to fighting homelessness because a party platform must have broad appeal to 
citizens not just in a single part of the city, but throughout it. Combined with the at-large 
system, the party system makes it so that political parties must campaign on topical, citywide 
issues, rather than on highly localized issues that are only relevant to particular parts of the 
city, like stop signs in particular neighbourhoods (interview #21). Vision Vancouver 
councilors wagered in 2008 that homelessness would resonate with Vancouver’s downtown, 
progressive voter base throughout the city, and they were right. 
 Because of the party system, the city also has significant control over shelters, 
including where in the city they are located because the majority party has enough votes at 
City Hall to implement its priorities. The party system therefore allows the leaders at City Hall 
to be bolder in their promises regarding homelessness; once elected, a mayor can effectively 
control city council through party discipline. This was particularly evident in 2008, when, 
immediately following Robertson’s election with a Vision Vancouver majority, City Council 
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voted to open 4 new emergency shelters. Mayor Robertson had control of Council and a 
mandate from the people of Vancouver to end street homelessness, and was thus able to 
bypass the lengthy process and quickly obtained permits for four new emergency shelters that 
would be located in city operated facilities, and began opening them shortly after his first day 
in office. (There was, however, considerable controversy surrounding these shelters, notably 
because they were opened so quickly and without public consultation26.) 
 The final factor is the broader political goals of local elected officials. In Vancouver, 
homelessness does not just fit with the broader political goals of the Mayor and local officials, 
but it is, in fact, one of Robertson’s three main political priorities. The fact that homelessness 
has become such a high priority is likely a function of the fact that the city has important 
housing related powers and due to the fact that the issue resonates well with a downtown, 
progressive voter base. 
Calgary 
As noted above, the City of Calgary has grown extraordinarily fast since the 1980s. 
Not only has the city’s population exploded, but the physical size of the city has also sprawled 
significantly. Across this very large territory, the regional governance structure is 
consolidated, though there are no official municipal suburbs and no borough councils. 
However, because the city is so large, many urban planners and scholars have come to 
characterize the city has having an urban-suburban divide. The downtown core, while not as 
densely populated as Vancouver or Toronto, is nevertheless the urban centre, and the 
remainder of the city surrounding the small core is more accurately characterized as suburban 
                                                
26 Eventually, the mayor closed two of the shelters, citing community opposition. 
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(Cooper 2006). Calgary’s regional structure is thus a barrier to the city becoming a strong 
actor in the governance of homelessness. 
The physical aspect of the city does not lead local elected officials to make 
homelessness a priority. This is further affected by the fact that the electoral system, a ward 
system, does not offer strong incentives to politicians to make homelessness a priority either. 
Councilors are responsible to small wards, and thus run on highly localized individual 
platforms. Unless the councilor is running in one of the few downtown wards that is affected 
by a high concentration of homelessness, it is not likely something that her or his electors are 
concerned about as a ballot box issue. Because suburban wards are far more numerous than 
downtown ones in a city as sprawled out as Calgary, even if homelessness is the priority of a 
few downtown councilors, it is unlikely to become a priority for all of City Council. 
There are no political parties in Calgary. Some city councilors see this as a strength; as 
one Calgary city councilor who has been active on the homelessness file explained in an 
interview, “I don’t work within a party system. I can get stuff done, I am a free-agent in the 
world… I am a free agent and that is really fabulous” (interview #23). In this context, 
however, it can be difficult to make homelessness a priority and to do something about it. To 
make homelessness a priority, this councilor would have to convince other councilors, also 
free agents, to work with him. If homelessness is not a top concern to their electors (which it 
likely is not), building a coalition to fight homelessness without a party structure to bring some 
cohesion to the group is difficult.  
The final factor is the broader political goals of the local elected officials. The mayor, 
who must campaign in the whole city, must make an electoral calculation in choosing his or 
her priority issues; in the majority of the city’s electoral districts, homelessness is not a 
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winning strategy because it is only relevant to a minority of voters in the downtown core. The 
mayor must, to get elected, campaign on issues that are relevant to a broader range of people 
in this urban-suburban city. Indeed, the main political goals of the current mayor of Calgary, 
Naheed Nenshi, have been issues that affect a broad range of Calgarians, including public 
transport and transparency at city hall. The fight against homelessness does not fit easily 
within this agenda, and it is too risky to make it a top priority in a city like Calgary, where 
only a small portion of electors is affected by it. 
Overall, therefore there are no real electoral incentives to make homelessness a 
political priority in Calgary. To illustrate how the above factors have combined to affect 
homelessness services, consider the following: Calgary is unique in that its main homeless 
shelter, the Drop-In Centre, regularly accommodates up to 800-1000 people per night. No 
other city has such a concentration of homelessness in one building; the largest homeless 
shelter in Toronto (which has a larger overall population and homeless population than 
Calgary) is Seaton House with 500 people. A former senior official with the Calgary 
Homeless Foundation explained how city councilors in Calgary would respond to homeless 
shelters in the late 1990s and early 2000s; “It should have been easier to disperse things, but it 
wasn’t. I think council had an unofficial veto for each individual alderman. Because they 
trade… it was easy for an alderman to say ‘well I’ll support you on this and you support me on 
that.’ It was easy to organize opposition [to new shelters] in their ward” (interview #33). He 
continued, “it was the worst case of a weak council combined with NIMBY thinking. It was 
easier for councils to say no to having more shelter beds in their ward and pushing to have 
more at the Drop-In site.”  
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In Calgary, a large, sprawling city with a strong concentration of homelessness in the 
downtown core and a ward electoral system without political parties, local candidates have 
few reasons to take the risk of making the fight against a priority. In other words, the electoral 
system, party system, and physical landscape of the city do not offer any kind of incentive to 
politicians wishing to make homelessness an electoral issue. The main priorities of the current 
mayor are issues that unite a broad group of Calgarians: transport and transparency. For these 
reasons, the city plays a minor role in the overall governance of homelessness. It is, of course, 
a partner, and was involved in the development of the plan, and gave input and lent public 
support. But the content of the plan, its financial resources, and implementation is not driven 
in any meaningful way by the city; this is because the political commitment to homelessness 
in Calgary is very low. 
Toronto 
The City of Toronto is sometimes called a “mega-city”. As a part of his Common 
Sense Revolution, Progressive Conservative Premier Mike Harris amalgamated a number of 
Ontario municipalities in the late 1990s; in a four-year period, the number of municipalities in 
Ontario was reduced from 850 to 445. Siegel explains, “The Harris government felt that 
service delivery and accountability would be improved if municipalities were consolidated 
into larger units” (Siegel 2009, 28). The City of Toronto as we know it today was created by 
merging five former municipalities: North York, East York, York, Scarborough, and 
Etobicoke. This created a large and consolidated regional governance structure with a very 
strong urban-suburban divide. Today, the city is the largest in Canada, with approximately 2.8 
million inhabitants and a population that is projected to continue growing rapidly (City of 
Toronto 2014).  
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The vast majority of homeless shelters, drop-in centres and out from the cold sites 
(churches that offer shelter during winter months) are concentrated in the downtown core of 
Toronto; social housing is more evenly distributed throughout the city, but services for the 
chronically homeless are mostly downtown, reflecting the concentration of needs in that area 
(see page 14 of SSHA 2014). The City of Toronto’s 2013 Street Needs Assessment homeless 
census, which takes place throughout the city including in the suburban parts, confirms the 
concentration of needs in the downtown core. The 2013 homeless count found 447 people 
sleeping outdoors on the night of April 17; 363 were in downtown Toronto or East York, 
compared with 24 in Etobicoke and York and 16 in North York (City of Toronto 2013, 13). 
This regional structure is a barrier to making the fight against homelessness a priority of City 
Hall, as it is only salient with the small urban portion of the mega-city’s population. 
The local electoral system in Toronto is a ward system, meaning city councilors 
campaign on localized issues in a particular area of the city. Because the city is so large, a 
significant number of City Council seats are in the suburbs, where the voter base tends to be 
less progressive and where homelessness is less salient as a political issue. The electoral 
system therefore makes it less likely that local elected officials will see a political payoff in 
making homelessness a priority. Further, there are no political parties in Toronto, which 
encourages councilors to campaign on localized issues that are important to their individual 
wards. The City of Toronto does often see informal coalitions of progressive councilors and 
conservative councilors (Horak 2012), but in a ward system with no political parties, it is 
difficult for councilors to make homelessness a priority for colleagues who represent wards 
that are not affected by homelessness. 
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Mayors must win a majority of support of the entire mega-city of Toronto; it is 
therefore risky to campaign just on issues that affect the downtown core (such as 
homelessness), but must rather prioritize issues that affect the entire city. In the most recent 
municipal election in Toronto (2014), one of the most significant issues was public transit, an 
issue that bridges downtown and urban voters. This most recently election was also somewhat 
unique in that it featured a strong movement of citizens who were intent on making sure Rob 
Ford, or later his brother Doug Ford, was not re-elected to power. The questions of trust and 
integrity therefore were also important questions in the 2014 municipal election. 
Homelessness was not one of the top priorities of this election, nor was it strongly linked to 
one of these priorities. 
The City of Toronto is a very large city with a strong urban-rural divide. There is no 
party system and the electoral system is ward-based. The most recent election saw a 
prioritization of public transport and integrity among the candidates. It is politically risky for a 
mayor or for local city councilors to make fighting homelessness a key priority in this context; 
it simply does not resonate with a large portion of the City of Toronto voters outside of the 
downtown core. The city does, of course, have the official responsibility for housing, making 
it the most involved local government in the governance of homelessness, but as the 
conclusion and discussion will explain, the city has not innovated or expanded its 
homelessness policy since 2005. This is, I argue, largely due to the lack of political incentives 
to make homelessness a priority and to seek a mandate to invest in expanded homelessness 
services. 
Montreal 
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 Like Toronto, the City of Montreal is a large city with a strong urban-suburban divide. 
The City of Montreal’s local governance structure is consolidated on the regional level, but it 
also features a second tier of governance: boroughs (arrondissements). Both of these features 
of the local governance structure in Montreal make it difficult for a mayor or City Council to 
make the fight against homelessness a priority. In terms of the regional structure, 
homelessness is an issue that only directly affects a minority of Montreal citizens (those who 
live downtown). Further, in order to act in this area, the municipal government needs the 
consent or support of the borough mayors, of whom there are 19. This is also the case, as 
noted above, with respect to density bonusing (Drdla 2014; see also Belley et al. 2009). Some 
boroughs might be willing partners, notably the most downtown boroughs, but homelessness 
is not likely to resonate with more suburban boroughs on the outskirts of the city. 
 The local electoral system is Montreal is ward-based. Citizens vote directly for the 
Mayor of the City of Montreal, the Mayor of their Borough (who is elected at-large throughout 
the borough), and for a City Councilor to represent their ward. The Mayor, as is the case in all 
big cities, must appeal to citizens throughout the city, but individual councilors must only 
appeal to the residents of their own wards. Some cohesion is nevertheless brought to local 
elections through the party system, which has been in place since 1977. This party structure, 
which assumes a party platform that is ambitious and appealing to a wide range of voters, 
encourages local candidates to think not just about issues that are salient to their particular 
wards, but also to other Montrealers. Councilors must therefore balance the needs of their 
individual wards with a party platform, which must have broader appeal throughout the entire 
city, making it somewhat more likely that homelessness could make it onto the agenda of City 
Hall.  
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Further, once elected to power, Montreal’s City Council features a powerful executive 
committee, much like a federal or provincial Cabinet. The members of the executive council 
are appointed by the Mayor and are usually members of his (or her) own political party, 
though Mayor Denis Coderre recently appointed the leader of the opposing party Projet 
Montréal, Richard Bergeron, to the executive committee (Radio-Canada 2014). Individual 
councilors on the executive committee are very influential, and the governing party, through 
this structure, is highly organized and powerful. This means that local elected officials can be 
more ambitious and bold with their commitments to homelessness; once elected, the Mayor 
and the majority party control City Hall and can make changes and implement policies by 
depending on party discipline. 
 One of the top priorities of Montreal Mayor Denis Coderre, and his political party 
(Team Denis Coderre for Montreal) is to gain more political and financial powers from the 
province. The main way Coderre is seeking to do this is through metropolitan status for the 
city, which would give City Council much more control over the municipal budget and would 
allow Councilors and the Mayor to set the city’s priorities with much more autonomy from the 
province. Mayor Denis Coderre often highlights the importance of metropolitan status for the 
City of Montréal. According to Radio-Canada, “le maire a rappelé que Montréal doit jouer 
son rôle de locomotive économique « pour l'ensemble du Québec », mais qu'il « ne dispose 
pas des outils nécessaires » pour le faire pleinement” (Radio-Canada 2015).  
A City Councilor and member of the Executive Committee explained the significance 
of metropolitan status in Montreal; “Avec le statut de métropole, on peut faire ce qu’on veut 
avec l’argent. On va pouvoir mettre moins quelque part et transférer nos budgets plus 
facilement… Parce que ça va être un budget global et ça va être la ville qui va l’administrer 
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au lieu d’avoir de l’argent d’un ministre qui dit « tu fais ça avec, tu es obligé de faire ça ». 
Donc présentement le ministère de santé nous donne de l’argent mais ça doit servir à la santé. 
Mais si on avait un budget global, à la ville, on va administrer ce que le gouvernement nous 
donne, a notre façon”” (interview #71).  
This is a strong priority that was announced during the municipal election, and one in 
which the fight against homelessness has become an important weapon. With more financial 
and political powers, Coderre argues, the City can respond more adequately to the needs of its 
homeless citizens. Indeed, before I even had a chance to bring up the metropolitan status in an 
interview with the City Councilor and member of the Executive Committee responsible for 
homelessness, she brought it up herself, mentioning that homelessness is a part of the broader 
negotiations for metropolitan status; “Le statut métropole va aider avec ça. Ça touche tout, 
tous les domaines de la ville. L’itinérance est comprise dans le développement social et 
communautaire. C’est un ensemble – les infrastructures, transports, on négocie tout ça dans 
un ensemble. Ils ne vont pas demander juste l’itinérance, c’est compris dans un tout” 
(interview #71).  
Coderre himself has very directly drawn the link between homelessness and the need 
for metropolitan status, saying that the fight against homelessness would be much more 
effective if the city had greater powers and control over its budget. He further notes that the 
city has the expertise and the knowledge of the housing needs of its population, making it the 
best suited government to respond to these needs. Referencing a study of the housing situation 
in Montreal that found that 40% of renters pay more than 30% of their income on housing 
(meaning they are in core housing need and pay too much for housing), Coderre recently told 
Le Devoir, “On est indignés par ça. On a les chiffres, on sait quels sont les enjeux. La solution 
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concrète, c’est d’avoir la capacité de pouvoir les réaliser. Le statut de métropole d’ici 2016 va 
nous permettre de réaliser ce qu’on veut faire. Il faut avoir non seulement les pouvoirs, mais 
les moyens pour travailler en ce sens” (Paré 2015). 
In terms of the political commitment, therefore, the situation in Montreal presents 
some obstacles but also some opportunities for those who wish to make homelessness a 
priority of the local government. Montreal is a large city with a strong urban-suburban divide, 
and one that elects its City Councillors through a ward system; in this environment, 
homelessness is therefore not the most obvious choice for a political priority. The party system 
means that local candidates and elected officials do need to have a broad appeal throughout 
the city and not just in their own ward. The final factor, the broader political goals, is 
personally linked to the ambitions of the current Mayor, Denis Coderre. Coderre has been an 
aggressive and outspoken Mayor, one who is openly asking for more powers for the city from 
the province; his preferred vehicle for this transfer of power is metropolitan status. He further 
argues that homelessness is best dealt with at the local level, and has made fighting 
homelessness more effectively an important component of his broader political goal of 
obtaining more powers for the City of Montreal. For this reason, the city of Montreal has 
become more involved in the governance of homelessness, despite lacking many of the tools 
that would make it a more powerful actor. 
Summary - Political Commitment to Homelessness 
Table 5 summarizes the four factors that were considered above. It is clear that there 
are many incentives in Vancouver to make homelessness a priority for local elected officials. 
The bolded results indicate an incentive. In Calgary and Toronto, making homelessness a key 
priority of the local government is a risky enterprise, as there are few, if any, incentives to do 
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so. This is why, combined with its lack of housing related powers, the City of Calgary is not 
involved in the governance of homelessness. Toronto, of course, is responsible for social 
housing, which explains its significant involvement in this area, but the lack of incentives 
mean that updating or expanding homelessness policy in the city is not a significant priority. 
In Montreal, some factors make it so that the political payoff of making homelessness a 
priority of City Council will be worth it, but there are still some barriers (notably the regional 
structure and electoral system).  
Table 5: Political Commitment 
 Vancouver Calgary Toronto Montreal 
5. Regional 
Structure 
Fragmented Consolidated Consolidated Consolidated 
6. Electoral 
system 
At large Ward Ward Ward 
7. Party system Yes No No Yes 
8. Broader 
political goals 
Yes No No Yes 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that local housing related powers and the local political 
commitment determine the role of the local government in the governance of homelessness in 
these four cities. The emphasis on housing in the first dimension has been purposeful; in order 
for big cities to contribute meaningfully and sustainably to the fight against homelessness, 
they need to have some power over housing. This chapter has also focused on the political 
commitment to the issue of homelessness at the local level, a dimension that is comprised of 
four factors: regional structure; local party system; local electoral system; and the broader 
political goals of local elected officials. Cities can become actors in the area of homelessness 
if there is a strong political will to make it a priority, even when they do not have significant 
 215 
housing related tools (as is the case with Montreal). Indeed, the cities under study here have 
demonstrated that they are not simply waiting for more housing related powers from the 
provinces, but are also being very creative in how they make homelessness a priority. Table 6 
summarizes these two dimensions and explains why Toronto and Vancouver are such 
powerful actors whereas Montreal and Calgary are less so (though the City of Montreal is 
more powerful than Calgary). 
 
 
Table 6: Summary of housing related powers and political commitment 
 
 Vancouver Calgary Toronto Montreal 
1. Autonomy 0.48 0.24 0.34 0.22 
2. Density 
Bonusing 
Yes (strong) Yes (weak) Yes (weak) Yes (strong) 
3. Inclusionary 
Zoning 
Yes No No No 
4. Responsibility 
for social 
housing 
Province Province Municipalities Province 
5. Regional 
structure 
Fragmented Consolidated Consolidated Consolidated 
6. Electoral 
system 
At large Ward Ward Ward 
7. Party system Party system No party system No party system Party system 
8. Broader 
political goals 
Yes No No Yes 
 
 It is clear from this table that the city of Vancouver is powerfully positioned to become 
an actor of significant influence in the development of affordable housing and the fight against 
homelessness. Toronto has significant control over housing and homelessness, though those 
powers are limited by financial constraints and a lack of incentives to innovate or expand the 
city’s policy. There are a few incentives that can increase the likelihood that the City of 
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Montreal would risk making homelessness a priority, but the lack of housing related powers 
means that the city is not in a very strong position to lead in a housing or homelessness related 
coalition. The city has, however, become a more important actor in the governance of 
homelessness recently, in part because homelessness fits with the broader political agenda of 
the Mayor: metropolitan status. The City of Calgary has the fewest powers and incentives to 
prioritize homelessness. 
In Vancouver, a small, urban city with strong political parties and an at-large electoral 
system, local politicians have correctly wagered that homelessness, including effective 
responses to it, is an issue that citizens care about. Local dynamics, including the regional 
structure, the electoral system and the party system, have made it so that fighting 
homelessness can be a winning electoral strategy for the city because it is an issue that appeals 
to a significant portion of Vancouver voters. Importantly, the city has various powers that give 
it a real ability to incentivize and promote the development of supportive housing units (by 
either the provincial government or the private sector), units that are then targeted at the 
formerly homeless. Combined with its strong legal-administrative and political powers, the 
city has come to occupy the central policy space surrounding homelessness and is a powerful 
actor in this area of public policy.  
 The City of Calgary, in contrast, has few tools to encourage the development of 
affordable housing. The one existing tool, density bonusing, is limited largely because there is 
no real pressure for increased density in Calgary; there is ample space at the edge of the city 
for more new housing developments meaning increased density is not valuable to developers 
the way it is in Vancouver or Toronto. The seemingly limitless ability of the city to grow has 
further weakened the value of Calgary’s one housing powers. This is beginning to change as 
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the housing crunch in Calgary has created a pent up need for affordable or rental housing, but 
the province has so far been reluctant to give cities powers to leverage these new 
developments into affordable housing contributions. Combined with the lack of housing 
related powers, the political landscape of the city, including its urban-suburban divide and 
ward-based electoral system, means that finding creative ways of fighting against 
homelessness is not likely to be a winning strategy in Calgary.  
The City of Toronto has the official responsibility for housing and homelessness, as is 
the case for all Ontario cities. For this reason, the city is the most involved in the governance 
of homelessness of all the cities studied here. There are, however, few incentives to exercise 
those powers due to the ward electoral system and the urban-suburban nature of the city. There 
is no significant electoral or political incentive for the city to innovate in the area of 
homelessness. Political constraints related to the ward electoral system and the urban-suburban 
divide limit the city’s ability (and willingness) to make homelessness a key priority; it is not 
likely an issue that appeals to a broad base of voters in such a large, urban-suburban city. 
Making homelessness a key plank in any local election and getting a public mandate to invest 
in its reduction is therefore unlikely given the political and electoral structure of Toronto.  
Montreal has some housing and homelessness related powers, including a 
comparatively successful density bonusing strategy. There are some electoral incentives to 
prioritize homelessness, such as the local party system, but the urban-suburban nature of the 
city and the ward electoral system are barriers to making homelessness a priority of City 
Council. Importantly, one of the main political objectives of current Mayor Denis Coderre is 
to gain metropolitan status for the city; homelessness fits in very will with this agenda and 
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indeed has become a powerful weapon for the Mayor in this fight. Because of this, there is an 
incentive for the city to engage in the area of homelessness, which it has done. 
 This chapter has therefore made clear that the cities of Vancouver and Toronto are well 
positioned to be lead actors in a coalition governing homelessness, whereas Montreal and 
Calgary are much less so. Though the City of Vancouver is a powerful actor in this area, the 
governance of homelessness is fragmented. The governance of homelessness is similarly 
fragmented in Montreal, whereas it is highly centralized in Toronto and Calgary. The question 
of why this is the case is the subject of the next chapter of this thesis, which relates to the 
organization of local social forces (including the private sector and the non-profit sector) in 
Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal.
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Chapter 7: Local Social Forces 
The local government is not the only important actor in the governance of homelessness, 
but civil society, including the private sector and the third sector, is also important27. As Bherer 
and Hamel write, “cities’ problems are rarely solved by municipalities alone… To study 
municipal policies requires examination not just of the initiatives and programs municipalities 
develop, but also those developed by other economic and social actors” (2012, 104). Bramwell 
and Wolfe agree that cities must work with other actors in order to develop effective responses to 
new problems; “the dual challenges of maintaining economic competitiveness and addressing the 
emerging social inequalities resulting from these changes place new demands on local 
governments that are often too complex for them to meet on their own. In response, novel 
relations are emerging between various levels of government and among public, private, and 
community actors at the local level” (2014, 58).  
As this chapter argues, the organization of these local social forces explains why the 
governance of homelessness is fragmented among many actors in Vancouver and Montreal 
whereas it is centralized in Toronto and Calgary. In other words, the power dynamics between 
the private sector and the third sector at the local level determines whether the governance of 
homelessness is centralized in one sector or fragmented among many bodies. This final empirical 
chapter argues that the governance of homelessness in Vancouver and Montreal is fragmented 
because local social forces are strong but discordant and divided. In Calgary and Toronto, there 
are some divisions among the local social forces, but these divisions are trumped by the 
                                                
27 In this chapter, civil society and local social forces both refer to the private sector as well as 
the third sector. 
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dominance of one particularly strong actor: the private sector in Calgary and the municipal 
government in Toronto.  
Drawing on the limited but very useful literature on urban governance in Canada, this 
chapter reviews the role of the private sector and the third sector in the urban governance 
structure of Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal. I use the framework and results of 
recent urban scholars, including those who contributed to the edited collection of Bradford and 
Bramwell (2014) as well as to that of Horak and Young (2012), to first establish the overall 
structure and relative strength of local social forces. I then argue that this organization of local 
social forces has determined the fragmentation or centralization of the governance of 
homelessness in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal. This qualitative analysis of the 
strength of the private sector and the third sector is primarily based on interviews conducted with 
key actors involved in the governance of homelessness in 2014 and 2015. 
Vancouver 
 In Vancouver, there are two main actors involved in the local governance of 
homelessness: the City and the StreetoHome Foundation (STHF). Though they work together 
regularly, they nevertheless have two plans on chronic homelessness. The city’s plan involves a 
promise to end street homelessness, and aims to achieve this through ensuring that there is 
enough emergency shelter space for homeless people in Vancouver. The city has a broader 
housing and homelessness plan, but its main objective has been ending street homelessness, 
which has relied extensively on the emergency shelter system. The STHF’s plan aims to end 
chronic homelessness by 2018, and aims to do this by moving homeless people directly into 
housing. The city does this as well, where possible, but the main difference between the two 
plans is the role of the emergency shelter system. The City sees shelters as a part of the solution 
and has continually opened new emergency shelters to meet the needs of the street homeless 
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population. The STHF, in contrast, does not support opening new emergency shelters and does 
not fund shelters as a part of its long-term strategy on homelessness.  
This section argues that the two plans are the result of a civil society that is divided 
between private sector developers on the one hand and community groups, a division that breaks 
down fairly neatly along partisan, ideological lines. These two sectors are not equally powerful 
in the local governance of Vancouver, with the private sector wielding more influence. But the 
third sector is nevertheless strongly organized, particularly in the Downtown Eastside 
neighbourhood. Further, the third sector is aligned with the political party that is currently in 
power, Vision Vancouver, which has served to increase its influence in the governance of 
homelessness. 
The City of Vancouver has changed greatly since the 1970s, going from a resource-based 
economy (fishing, lumber) with a small “skid row” in the East Side of Vancouver, to a 
“transnational metropolis” with a “new economy” (Hutton 2012). In the city with “the most 
geographically constricted land base of all Canada’s major city-regions” (Hutton 2012, 266), this 
transformation of Vancouver’s economy has been contentious and has often pitted private 
developers against community groups and activists. Developers have considerable political 
influence and financial resources, and they have great interest in the future of the city; profits 
associated with development in Vancouver are significant. As Hutton writes, “the private sector 
has wielded a preponderance of influence in the city’s growth” (2012, 270). However, 
community groups and the third sector in general are strongly organized and have powerful legal 
advocates, including the BC Civil Liberties Association and Pivot Legal Society. This is 
particularly the case in the Downtown Eastside (DTES) where there is a high concentration of 
homeless people with significant support needs and where there are over 260 service providers 
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and non-profits, including housing providers (Culbert and McMartin 2014).  Though developers 
have been successful in transforming many previously low-income neighbourhoods into upscale 
communities with high-rises and condominiums, such as Yaletown (see Barnes and Hutton 
2009), community groups have at numerous times exercised enough influence to force the end of 
lucrative private sector plans. 
 This discord between the private sector and community groups can be seen in a number 
of projects over the course of Vancouver’s history. Project 200 in the 1970s is seen by many as a 
“seminal experience in the evolution of social movements in Vancouver” (Hutton 2012, 273). 
Proponents of Project 200 sought to build a large freeway through Vancouver, including through 
parts of the DTES. Developers, the private sector, and local politicians with strong business ties 
supported the project, but there was significant opposition in the DTES because of concerns that 
the freeway would displace low-income people. As Hutton writes, “an increasingly assertive and 
confident public opposition to this plan and its project externalities contributed to the 
abandonment of most elements of Project 200” (273). 
 Another example of successful community opposition to developer interests was the 
redevelopment of the Woodward’s building. Up until the early 1990s, Woodward’s was the main 
retail store in East Vancouver. When it went bankrupt in 1993, there was extensive conflict and 
tension over what to do with the site, which, given the limited availability of land in Vancouver, 
was worth a lot of money; “the original developer wanted to refurbish the building and construct 
350 separate market-based condominium units. Downtown Eastside community groups wanted 
social housing” (Barnes and Hutton 2009, 1263). The provincial NDP bought the Woodward’s 
building in 2001, but when the Liberal Party of BC was elected to power shortly thereafter, the 
building was put on the market and open to private bidding. This resulted in a strong backlash 
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from community groups, including nearly 200 homeless people who squatted in protest in the 
building (interview #2).  
 Left-wing Vancouver Mayor Larry Campbell eventually negotiated for the city to 
purchase the building from the province (for much less than the province paid for it originally, 
see Barnes and Hutton 2009). The development that resulted is not as focused on social housing 
as many community groups wanted, but of the 700 units of housing that have been built on the 
former Woodward’s site, 200 are non-market. Further, the space contains a number of 
community spaces and amenities, including childcare facilities.  
These and various other development projects, including the Canada Line and the 
Olympics, saw continuous and heated opposition between developers and community groups. 
Through years of contentious local politics, Vancouver has become “a city typified by coincident 
processes of professionalization and polarization” (Hutton 2012, 269). Developers have had their 
fair share of wins and have been more influential than the third sector in the city’s development, 
but community groups have continued to put up an energetic and influential fight. 
These private and third sector local social forces can broadly be understood as being 
divided along the left-right political axis, or along the lines of the two main local political 
parties: the long-existing centre-right Non-Partisan Association (NPA) and the progressive 
opposition to it (Vision Vancouver currently or previously the Coalition of Progressive Electors, 
COPE). There are of course nuances to this; there are shades of conservatism and progressivism 
in the city, and there are more than two local political parties in Vancouver. With that caveat, 
however, the private sector and the third sector are broadly aligned with one of the two main 
local political parties. Developers contribute substantially to the right-of-centre Non-Partisan 
Association (NPA), with donations sometimes reaching nearly $1 million (there are no donation 
 224 
limits in local elections in Vancouver, see Howell 2014). While community groups do not have 
this kind of cash flow, their allies in the main unions in Vancouver are strong financial 
supporters of Vision Vancouver (ibid). The BC division of CUPE, for example, gave Vision a 
donation of $152,000 in 2014 (Cole 2014). (Vision Vancouver does receive donations from 
developers as well, but not at the same scale as the NPA, see Howell 2014 and Cole 2014). 
The local party system also lines up ideologically with provincial politics. There are very 
close ties between the centre-right NPA membership and the BC Liberal Party, and are there 
close ties between Vision Vancouver (and its predecessor) and the BC and federal New 
Democratic Party. Two former NPA mayors of Vancouver, Gordon Campbell and Sam Sullivan, 
went on to provincial politics in the BC Liberal Party. Former BC Liberal Auditor General 
Geoffrey Plant served as the NPA’s “commissioner” of homelessness while Sam Sullivan was 
mayor. Current Vision Vancouver Mayor Gregor Robertson was an NDP MLA in the province, 
and many prominent Vision Vancouver figureheads, such as David Eby, are current BC NDP 
MLAs. Another Vision Vancouver city councilor touted his NDP roots in a personal interview; 
“I’ve been an New Democrat my whole life. I am from a labour family. Growing up my dad was 
one of the first Chinese plumbers, the only reason he got to be a plumber is because the union 
stuck up for him” (interview #3). Libby Davies, a powerful force within the federal NDP, ran for 
Mayor of Vancouver with the left-wing Coalition Of Progressive Electors (COPE).  
Civil society in Vancouver is highly fragmented along the local partisan or ideological 
lines. There are notable exceptions to this; harm reduction and the creation of InSite, North 
America’s first safe injection site in East Vancouver was broadly supported by both conservative 
and progressive political parties, the private and the third sectors at the local level. But overall, 
local social forces line up neatly with the local party system. Because of these partisan ties, the 
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local party system has historically helped to tip the balance of power towards either the private 
sector or the third sector in the Vancouver’s urban governance (as was the case with Larry 
Campbell of COPE when he purchased the Woodward’s site from the province).  
This left-right, developer-community group division has led to the fragmentation of the 
governance of homelessness in Vancouver. Developers, powerful private sector interests, and 
their political allies in the NPA worked together to create the StreetoHome Foundation (STHF) 
and its ten-year plan to end homelessness. Vision Vancouver is politically opposed to the NPA 
and was originally opposed to the creation of the STHF. Upon becoming elected, Vision 
Vancouver brought community groups and the third sector into the homelessness policy-making 
and implementing process to implement its own emergency-shelter focused plan on chronic 
homelessness. 
The STHF, which began its work in 2008, was one of the results of former NPA Mayor 
Sam Sullivan’s controversial plan to reduce street disorder, Project Civil City. Sullivan said in an 
interview, “my trick, when I have a cause that I care about, is to set up a foundation” (interview 
#21). The board of the organization was, in the words of a prominent volunteer, “self-appointed”. 
Specifically, Frank Guistra28, a powerful mining executive and philanthropist in the City of 
Vancouver, took an interest in the issue of homelessness. He offered $5 million to start up the 
STHF and helped bring together the STHF board. A prominent official with the STHF said, “it 
takes important incubators, like Frank. He was able to bring [the board] together” (interview 
#11). Guistra relied largely on the NPA and private sector network to do so; founding members 
of the STHF board include people from private law firms such as Heenan Blaikie and Fasken 
Martineau, business associations such as the Business Council of British Columbia, and 
                                                
28 Like many of the STHF board members, Giustra has strong ties to the BC Liberal party 
(Mackin 2013). 
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international development firms including Colliers International and Strand Properties 
Corporation. There are some government and third sector representatives on the board, but the 
balance was and remains tilted towards private sector representatives, many of whom have ties to 
the NPA.  
 The founders of the STHF and those currently involved in on its board see themselves as 
playing an important and unique role. A number of actors highlighted the value of bringing 
private sector money to the fight against homelessness; “we brought money… So when we went 
to talk to the Premier, he said ‘everyone comes and asks me for money, no one bring me money 
and says if I give you this, what will you do?’” (interview #11). The “newness” of the money 
was also often emphasized in interviews; “we bring new money, this is all private sector money” 
(interview #13).  
 Influential members of the STHF are also of the opinion that finding a solution to 
homelessness is not the job of government alone, reflecting a centre-right ideological approach 
that favours a smaller role for government. A senior member of the STHF board said, “we are a 
frank, free enterprise people. I don’t think the government should do everything. And the 
government seems to agree on some level… when you leave it to the government, it’s a cop out” 
(interview #11). When I asked another senior official with the STHF if the private sector was 
letting the government off the hook, he responded; “I think the government is looking for 
direction” (interview #13), and suggested that the STHF and its private sector leadership was 
providing that direction. 
Largely due to its powerful connections in the business and philanthropic community, 
many community groups see the STHF as a source of competition for limited funding dollars 
(interview #18). But it is also criticized by some for being overly reliant on the private sector for 
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its vision and leadership; “often the people who are on the board… know nothing or next to 
nothing or worse than nothing about what they are talking about. So they are in a high position 
but have never actually worked in the street, they have never experienced what it’s like” 
(interview #2). The actor continued, “they should have had actual outreach workers and 
supportive housing staff on the board of StreetoHome. I think that would have cut out a lot of 
mistakes”. Community groups are involved with STHF projects, though the board remains 
dominated by either senior government officials or business sector leaders. Community groups 
are consulted in the STHF decisions and strategic directions, but have little institutionalized say 
in the high-level governance of the STHF. 
In contrast to the STHF, which is heavily weighted to the private sector and to the NPA 
network, the plan on homelessness put in place by Robertson and Vision Vancouver was more 
dependent on the support of community groups. Ensuring that there would always be enough 
emergency shelter beds has become a crucial plank of Robertson’s approach to ending street 
homelessness and even his broader ten-year housing plan. This action requires the support of the 
homeless serving system. Having campaigned on a promise to end street homelessness, the first 
action Robertson took as Mayor of Vancouver in 2008 was to open four low-barrier emergency 
shelters for the winter months. To do this, he assembled the Homelessness Emergency Action 
Team (HEAT), which was comprised of prominent community leaders and service providers, 
such Atira housing for women, the head of the aboriginal steering committee on homelessness 
and a member of the BC Civil Liberties Association. The HEAT team also involved three elected 
members, all of whom from Vision Vancouver (Gregor Robertson, Raymond Louie and Kerry 
Jang). There was, it is important to note, some overlap with the STHF board, notably Shayne 
Ramsey, the CEO of BC Housing and John MacKay, president of Strand Properties Corporation. 
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The balance, however, on the HEAT team was heavily weighted towards community groups and 
the centre-left Vision Vancouver councillors and network.  
Community groups, either being sympathetic to Robertson’s plan or being active 
supporters of Vision, were keen to help. An actor involved with the HEAT team described the 
mood of the community groups around the table when the HEAT team first got to work; “We 
were excited. We were really excited… We were able to participate in the political process and 
make a difference. We were trying to be effective in what we were doing in the DTES and so it 
seemed like an opportunity” (interview #14).  
There are some important differences between the approaches to homelessness that are 
taken by the STHF and Vision Vancouver, notably in their understanding of homelessness and in 
their belief in the role of emergency shelters in the solution to homelessness. These differences 
are of consequence, but they are not completely irreconcilable. The two groups work together 
regularly and relatively harmoniously. But when I asked a prominent board member with the 
STHF how the two plans fit together on a high level he laughed and said, “they don’t” (interview 
#11). The two plans, and groups behind the plans, have different funders, supporters, and 
ideologies in terms of what to do about homelessness and even what kind of homelessness 
should be prioritized.  
Indeed, the two plans and groups have not merged together. This is because of the 
partisan origins and ties of the plans. Both the NPA and Vision, along with their respective 
homelessness fighting allies, see the other side as using the issue of homelessness to score 
political points. In an interview with an actor aligned with the STHF and the NPA, the actor 
asked me a question following my interview with him: “I was wondering if, in some of your 
other interviews, if the undercurrent of the politics of this came out at all?” The actor noted that 
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there was a “liberal sprinkling of politics” in Robertson’s HEAT response, notably in “the need 
to be seen acting quickly” (interview #16). 
 Another actor closely associated with the NPA and the STHF did recognize the merits of 
Vision’s approach, which focused very heavily on emergency shelters (which the STHF opposes 
quite strongly). But this actor also argued that the move was very political: 
But I do want to say, to be a politician for a moment, that [Vision Vancouver Councilor] 
Raymond Louie and the other members of the Vision Council, when they were in 
opposition, would have screamed, they would have shouted from the rooftops that 
shelters are not the answer. When Gregor campaigned for office, it was on the basis that 
he would fix homelessness. It was the moment after he was elected that end homelessness 
got changed to end street homelessness, and the insertion of that word let him off a huge 
hook and gave him the opportunity to do the shelter thing… He gets into office and either 
he then realizes or he always knew that homelessness is an expensive, complicated 
problem, and he’s got people sleeping on the streets. And his constituents will kill him if 
he doesn’t get people off the streets (interview #8). 
  
 The NPA and the STHF recognize some of the merits of the HEAT approach, but firmly 
underscore how political the issue was as well. Similarly, Vision Vancouver and its allies 
criticized the STHF, especially when it was first created. Meeting minutes from City Hall in 
2007 show that all Vision Vancouver members voted against a motion to support in principle the 
creation of the STHF (City of Vancouver 2007). David Eby, then a housing advocate with the 
progressive and influential Pivot Legal Society and prominent Vision member, said of the STHF; 
“I agree that it is important that there be some private sector funding of social housing. But the 
idea of forcing charity to pay for it is both unworkable and un-Canadian” (quoted in Paulsen 
2007). Eby further politicized the STHF by questioning then NPA Mayor Sullivan’s motives in 
pushing for its creation. Referencing an important report written by Ken Dobell (a strong 
proponent of PPPs, see Hutton 2012), which led to the creation of the STHF. Eby stated; “I don’t 
understand how this report is worth $300,000. I do understand that it was written by a friend of 
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the premier. That leads me to the question, ‘did Mayor Sullivan believe he was buying 
something else?’” (ibid). 
The two groups have worked together in the past and exist relatively harmoniously in 
Vancouver. But the fact remains that they are two distinct groups involved in the governance of 
homelessness. This is because, like the overall urban governance dynamics in Vancouver, the 
governance of homelessness is characterized by a strong opposition between the private sector 
and the third sector. Each of these groups has its own powerful partisan connections at the local 
level. Local social forces in Vancouver are organized and energetic, and have a strong stake in 
the future of the city. Urban governance is strongly influenced by both of these groups of actors, 
who must interact with a city government that is, within the Canadian context, very strong and 
autonomous. Combined with the ideological division of local social forces in Vancouver, the 
party system in Vancouver (also unusual in a Canadian city) means that the party in power at 
City Hall can result in a shift in the balance of power between private developers and community 
groups. This has been the case with homelessness; when the NPA was in power, Sullivan was 
able to leverage mostly right-of-centre business connections that resulted in the creation of the 
STHF. Vision, upon getting elected, gave more influence to community groups, as was seen with 
the HEAT team. The ideological and partisan divide in Vancouver is strong and goes well 
beyond the parties at City Hall; it has also resulted in the fragmented governance of 
homelessness. 
Calgary 
 The governance of homelessness in Calgary is highly centralized in the Calgary 
Homeless Foundation (CHF). Public and privately raised funding flows to community groups 
through the CHF, which determines priorities and decides which projects will get funded. The 
CHF has long-standing ties to the private sector, and while the CHF seeks the input of 
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community groups in the development and implementation of its plan on homelessness, its board 
is heavily weighted with representatives from the private sector. This is keeping with the urban 
governance model in Calgary, which sees the private sector (notably oil and gas) exercise 
considerable influence, even in relation to the local government. 
Like other major cities in Canada, Calgary has changed remarkably in the past quarter 
century, though the direction and speed of the change has been somewhat unique as previous 
chapters have noted. The massive growth of the city, in terms of its economy, size, and 
population, has been directly tied to the booming (and at times busting) oil and gas sector. This 
has given the private sector strong interest in the urban development of Calgary, and significant 
power in the governance of the city. Community groups have at times challenged or even 
thwarted the private sector’s development ambitions, but overall, the private sector exercises far 
more influence in the urban governance of Calgary than the third sector. Its influence is so strong 
that it even eclipses the role of the local and provincial governments at times. 
 Since the discovery of oil in Alberta in 1947, “the oil industry has dictated the overall 
pace of investment and development in the Calgary region” (Ghitter and Smart 2009, 630). One 
example of the influence of the industry on the city’s development was Imperial Oil’s decision to 
relocate from Toronto to Calgary in 2005, a move that was directly responsible for the relocation 
of 3000 employees to Calgary. In addition to this move, there was also an “avalanche” of a 
further 2200 people moving to the city per month looking for work in the oil and gas sector since 
2001. Given this intense oil and gas related migration, Ghitter and Smart write, “it is easy to see 
how development pressures – the need for housing, infrastructure, schools, utilities and so on – 
are in turn influenced by increased oil industry activity” (ibid 640). 
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 Developers looking to accommodate a growing population have sought influence over 
urban development in terms of housing, neighbourhood design and entertainment venues. These 
initiatives have at times been challenged by the third sector, and some of the challenges have 
indeed been successful. The Beltline Initiative is an example of this. Rather than see a declining 
and low-income community gentrify or slowly fade away, “activists successfully pressured City 
Hall to begin a full-fledged planning update” (Miller 2007, 242), including increasing affordable 
housing, diversity, and density in the neighbourhood. Examples such as this, where local 
community groups drive development over private sector interests, are relatively rare in Calgary, 
however; “social forces are clearly dominated by business interests” (Miller and Smart 2012, 
46).  
Looking more closely at the influential private sector in Calgary has led some authors to 
conclude that there is, even more specifically, “a relatively small group of well-connected 
citizens [that] has influence over which social initiatives gain momentum and traction in the city” 
(Feng, Li, and Langford 2014, 199). They continue; “this group, sometimes nicknamed ‘the 300’ 
for its estimated size, is composed mainly (but not exclusively) of private-sector leaders who act 
as community leaders and civic entrepreneurs. These are the well-connected, influential 
members of Calgary society whose support is crucial if one wishes to launch a new social 
initiative” (2014, 199).  
 In Calgary’s local governance network, “where entrepreneurs draw primarily on 
informal, personal networks rather than formal, institutionalized networks,” (Feng et al 2014, 
184), it is very difficult for groups in the third sector to spearhead initiatives on their own. To be 
successful, they must find allies in “the 300”. To do so, community groups have come to rely 
less on moral language to make their case, but rather, “NGOs need to make a business case that 
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shows that action is in the interests of business, highlighting the benefits for business or the city 
as a whole” (Miller and Smart 2012, 30). Feng et al agree, writing, “invariably, a business case 
must be made to support any investments” (2014, 201). 
 The private sector is so influential that it is often seen as even more important that the 
local government; “Calgary’s business leaders are active in the community and are arguably 
more effective than municipal or provincial governments in bringing about social change at the 
community level” (Feng et al 2014, 197). Miller and Smart draw the same conclusion; “the 
NGOs also feel that, without corporate support for their initiatives, it is difficult to get sufficient 
support from city council to move forward” (2012, 30). 
 Some accounts of urban governance in Calgary have argued that recent initiatives, such 
as demands to raise the minimum wage or to build more affordable housing, have in fact found 
support at the local level for moral reasons. Noting that certain initiatives have been defined in 
moral terms, Miller writes, “broad civil umbrella organizations, such as Vibrant Communities 
Calgary and the Alberta Urban Municipal Association, have played vital roles in promoting such 
measures and have in fact achieved a degree of success” (Miller 2007, 244). Yet Miller’s account 
of the successful moral case is misleading. Both of the groups mentioned by Miller in fact made 
a business case in order to win the support business leaders. While there was moral language in 
Vibrant Communities Calgary’s messaging around the minimum wage and poverty, the group 
also used very clear economic language to make its point. As noted in the chapter on poverty, 
VCC’s reports were entitled “Poverty Costs: An Economic Case for A Preventative Poverty 
Reduction Strategy.” The reports estimated that poverty costs between $7.1-$9.5 billion per year 
in Alberta, drawing attention to the economic cost of poverty in Calgary, and insisting that 
reducing poverty in Calgary and Alberta would ultimately save money. 
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 It is clear that the balance of power in Calgary is strongly tilted towards the private 
sector. Community groups can exercise influence and build support for their preferred initiatives, 
but to do so, they must first make an economic case to win over powerful private sector 
representatives, ideally those among “the 300”. The literature on urban governance in Calgary 
also notes that this urban governance style is informal and relies on chance encounters as 
opposed to institutionalized meetings between groups. This is the case for the fight against 
homelessness in Calgary29. 
The CHF, which has become the single most important actor in the governance of 
homelessness in Calgary, has clear financial and personnel ties to the oil and gas sector, which 
date back to its creation in the 1990s. From the beginning of its work on the 10-year-plan on 
homelessness, the CHF has argued repeatedly that “managing” chronic homelessness is 
expensive and that ending it will in fact save money. Continually making a business case for 
ending homelessness, a small group of policy entrepreneurs won the needed support of oil and 
gas leaders, who then built the CHF into the influential foundation it is today. The largest 
homelessness fighting groups or services that did not make a business case for their work 
(because they do not believe that ending homelessness will, in fact, save money) have been 
marginalized in the local homelessness governance network.  
 Though the CHF had existed since the 1990s (and was originally set up by prominent 
Calgary businessman Art Smith), homelessness only became an important issue on the public 
agenda in the mid-2000s when it became a much more visible and troubling problem. The 
interest of a few key entrepreneurs, including oil and gas mogul Jim Gray and then President of 
the CHF Terry Roberts, slowly spread throughout the influential private sector. An important 
                                                
29 The argument advanced in this section is not entirely novel; the issue of homelessness is in 
fact often used to illustrate Calgary’s overall governance style, see Miller and Smart 2012. 
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event that galvanized the private sector into constructing the CHF network was Phillip 
Mangano’s visit to Calgary. Mangano was invited to Calgary by then CHF President Terry 
Roberts, who, knowing the governance culture in Calgary, knew that he needed private sector 
buy-in to his project. He further knew that Mangano was the best placed person to convince the 
private sector to support the CHF. Mangano was President Bush’s point-person on homelessness 
in the US. He wasn’t someone that community groups naturally trusted; “[w]ith his dark suit, 
silver hair and bronzed complexion that likely owed more to a lotion or a tanning salon than 
nature… Mangano is curiously uncomfortable in the presence of individual people experiencing 
homelessness” (Scott 2012, 73–74). He was unabashed about the business case for ending 
homelessness, which he promised would ultimately save money. Early results were indicating 
that his idea of a 10-year-plan (10YP) to end homelessness was having extensive success in the 
American cities (Scott 2012; interviews #22, #24, #34, #37 and #39). 
 Highlighting the power dynamics in Calgary, the event where Mangano shared the 10YP 
formula is described in Scott’s book about the history of the CHF: “the social service people 
mainly sat at the back; some with legs apart, their arms across their chests, skepticism and 
disbelief writ large across their faces… Excitement rippled through the business crowd, they 
looked like they ‘had discovered the moon,’ recalls a social worker” (2012, 74-75). The business 
people in attendance were sold on Mangano’s formula. An important actor in the development of 
Calgary’s 10YP said, “we were importing a model directly from the US, hook line and sinker. 
Everything was off the shelf” (interview #34).  
 Following the event, oil and gas mogul and entrepreneur in the area of homelessness Jim 
Gray took it upon himself to build an influential board to oversee the development of a 10YP in 
Calgary. The network he built was mainly comprised of his oil and gas friends. His top choice 
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for chair of the committee to oversee the development of Calgary’s own 10YP was Steve Snyder, 
himself an influential oil and gas executive with TransAlta. Snyder admitted that he was 
skeptical at first; “I’m just an observer. I don’t know the facts. I’m not qualified. I’m just a 
business guy” (quoted in Scott 2012, 92). But Gray was convinced that Snyder was the guy to 
chair the group that led the 10YP; “we need a more visible member of the community, someone 
who can attract other people and focus us” (quoted in Scott 2012, 92). A highly respected 
executive in the oil and gas sector in Calgary, and Gray and Roberts knew that if Snyder was on 
board, he could bring the other influential players to the table. 
Snyder was aware of the problem of homelessness in Calgary. One actor noted, “Steve's 
office was… a big corner office, he looked out right at the Mustard Seed [a local shelter], and 
every day he'd see men lined up, a line a block and a half long at lunch time” (interview #37). 
Snyder was shocked and dismayed every day when he saw the same scene. Like Snyder, the oil 
and gas CEOs that he recruited undoubtedly felt a human concern for homelessness. But there 
was a also sense that homelessness was getting in the way of the business community; “the 
people at the oil and gas companies were saying, ‘look, we have got people coming in and out of 
here every day, and they were very concerned about this, about the appearance.’ A lot of women 
going to work every day being panhandled” (interview #24). The same actor noted, “we had to 
do something because it was in your face”. Oil and gas leaders saw Calgary as on the cusp of 
becoming Canada’s economic engine and an international city; the appearance of homelessness 
was, for many of them, embarrassing.  
There was a further belief that homelessness, because of its newly discovered economic 
cost, was holding the city back from reaching its truly great potential (interviews #24, #34 and 
#37). An actor involved with the CHF said that the money saving potential of ending 
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homelessness was a key reason why the group came together so quickly; “it costs you less 
money, you save money. There are people out there who have got no faith but they understand 
economics. The current situation costs $110,000 but our solution costs $45,000. They understand 
there’s a big change there, there is a lot of savings here. So we tried to use some economic 
arguments. We just said ‘hey, this is a cost saving measure’” (interview #73). 
Snyder eventually agreed to be chair of the 10YP committee, and he immediately began 
assembling a board for the CHF. Scott writes that Synder was indeed effective at recruiting other 
oil and gas executives; “December is a busy month, but when Steve Synder, president and CEO 
of TransAlta, makes a call to Tim Hearn, president and CEO of Imperial Oil, there’s always time 
to listen” (2012, 101). With a strong business case to make for ending homelessness and 
regarding the benefits to the private sector that would result from it, oil and gas executives such 
as Tim Hearn became involved in determining the work of the CHF, including the content of the 
plan and the personnel who would lead its development. A former President of the CHF explains 
the importance of one of his first hires, Tim Richter, a former government relations specialist for 
TransAlta; “the chair of the leadership committee was Steve Snyder, and I had to go with Steve 
and say I want to hire one of your guys.” Snyder gave his blessing, and Richter was hired to 
direct the development of the 10YP. “Richter was key, he was government relations, a really 
important guy in the energy business” (interview #37). Richter would oversee the development 
of the 10-year plan and became a future president of the CHF. Today, he is one of the most 
influential people in the country in this area, having built the influential Canadian Alliance to 
End Homelessness.  
The CHF board welcomed a few people from the non-profit and NGO community, 
notably from the United Way. But a former president of the CHF emphasized that the board was 
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ultimately comprised of the most powerful people in town; “We said we will put together a 
group that no one can say no to” (interview #37). Referring to the third sector, this actor recalled, 
“we said ok, we’ll get input from [community groups], but not on the leadership team. So they 
were on the subcommittees”. The balance of power on the committee was thus very strongly 
tipped towards the private sector. This private sector leadership was also key in getting the 
province on board. Another former President of the CHF recalled, “I met with Ed Stelmach 
recently, I said to him why is it that you have been so supportive of what we were doing? A 
couple reasons he said… he said I knew that if Imperial Oil and Suncor were behind the plan, 
you couldn't possibly **** it up” (interview #34). 
The private sector was also influential at getting the local government on board, a fact 
that was confirmed by a former Mayor of the city; “I said look, I was born and raised in the city, 
this will not be successful if it is the mayor standing up and saying I am going to run it. It needs 
to be seen as a community driven initiative. It needs to be owned by the community. And it 
needs a private sector business leader to lead” (interview #24). This sentiment, and the need for 
private sector leadership, is also reflected in Scott’s book; “Snyder also knew that a social 
solution wouldn’t appeal to a broad spectrum of the community; that in this city the demand 
would be for a performance-based plan that would ultimately save taxpayer’s money” (2012, 
93).  
A former CEO of the CHF with a history in both the private sector and the non-profit 
sector, said that this leadership model was inevitable; “We know that in Calgary. We know that 
is how you get things done” (interview #37). He told the story of a pilot project that the CHF 
wanted to run, but was held back by a lack of funding. “It was going to cost $400,000 and we 
didn’t have the money. We had a sense that the money was coming, we had put in a grant 
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application. Then one of the guys on the committee said, ‘$400,000 eh? If you don’t get the 
money, I’ll write you the cheque. Just start.’” Linking that story to the current poverty reduction 
strategy run by the city of Calgary, the actor concluded; “But see the mayor constructed the 
Poverty reduction strategy and it had to represent all facets of community… He has two co-
chairs, they are pretty good, but they are not CEOs... Neither one of them could write a cheque 
for $400,000. So we are fumbling around, playing on the edges, running pilots, and I don’t think 
we have helped a poor person yet. My view is we haven’t done a friggin thing. So that is the 
difference, see. That is why you take it outside of government” (interview #37).  
The governance of homelessness in Calgary is thus dominated by the private sector. It 
has been this way from the very beginning, and this has been intentional. In light of this, some 
community groups felt excluded from their own turf, and they voiced early opposition to the 
CHF’s plan. A former president of the CHF was not overly concerned with this opposition. He 
compared the fight against homelessness to the world of politics; “In a process of change like 
this, you are going to have 20% of the people with you and enthusiastic and kind of evangelical 
about the work you are trying to do. Then there will be 50% of the people in the system in the 
mushy middle… and then 30% are just a vocal, active opposition. No matter what. So I worked 
with the supporters, and then tried to get the undecideds on board, and I didn't spend a lot of time 
on people that had dug in their heels” (interview #34).  
Of course, some community groups were offended by this approach; “we are the largest 
shelter in Canada we have been in the business for almost 53 years… look at the homeless 
foundation, they have had a number of people leading the organization, CEOs, who wanted to 
bring in a business model. The board was more heavily weighted with people from the business 
community. They felt that we didn’t know what we were doing. That it needed a business model 
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to turn homelessness around. What they didn’t realize is just how complex human behavior is” 
(interview #25).  
The opposition from these groups touched a number of areas of the CHF’s plan. Indeed, 
for these groups, ending homelessness will not save money; “in the end, it is going to cost 
money” (interview #25). Another actor with no involvement in the private sector agreed that the 
CHF’s calculus was wrong; “they said that homelessness is too expensive, all these people who 
use all the services. One of the figures is over $135,000 a year. That is nonsense. If you multiply 
that by 3000 [homeless people] that is like billions per annum, which isn’t true. There are some 
people who [cost that much], but it’s not everyone. So they used an economic argument, which 
demeaned the humanity of the person… there are some people who will save money if you put 
them in a house, but not all of them” (interview #35).  
A former CEO of the CHF, without a background in the private sector, agreed with this 
sentiment and lamented the lack of third sector involvement. But in a nod to “the 300”, he noted 
that this how things happen in Calgary; “Calgary has some very big, wealthy, heavy hitters who 
try to run things. They only get one vote but they have tons of influence, more than anywhere I 
have ever worked. And they want it their way, so you have got to get those guys on your side. It 
is really tricky” (interview #28). 
By continually making the business case for ending homelessness and overshadowing the 
opposition from community groups, the CHF has come to fully dominate the governance of 
homelessness ever since the mid-2000s. The majority of federal, provincial, and local funds for 
homelessness flow through the CHF, which sets the priorities and decides how that funding will 
be distributed. The city and community groups were at included in the development of the plan, 
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but the balance of power was, as is the case with urban governance more generally in Calgary, 
heavily weighted towards the private sector.  
Oppositions and challenges to the CHF’s dominance were strong at first, but they have 
largely faded from the public eye. Philosophical disagreements still exist just below the surface, 
but they are muted (Rassel 2014; interviews #22, #25, #31, #34 and #35). Groups opposed to the 
CHF have failed to build a powerful network of private sector supporters for their vision of 
homelessness (and solutions to it). Previously powerful actors, including community groups with 
significant influence and experience in the area of homelessness, have been marginalized from 
the CHF’s governance network because they were unable and unwilling to make an economic 
argument but relied more on moral language. In Calgary, a city where local governance networks 
are dominated by the private sector, this line of argumentation is not successful at bringing the 
necessary private sector support onside.  
Toronto 
 The governance of homelessness in the City of Toronto is centralized in the city. This 
centralized governance structure can be explained by the fact that local social forces in Toronto, 
while vibrant, are disorganized, scattered and lack institutionalized influence. In the late 1990s, a 
powerful group of service providers, community groups, and academics formed the Toronto 
Disaster Relief Committee (TDRC), which was successful in influencing city (and national) 
policy on homelessness. The TDRC disbanded in 2012, however, and many of its prominent 
members have become much less critical of city policy than they were in the 1990s. Very 
recently, the Toronto Alliance to End Homelessness (TAEH) has emerged to give a greater voice 
to homeless serving groups. It is still too early to judge how powerful this group has been, and as 
such it will not be fully considered below, but future studies of homelessness policy in Toronto 
should pay careful attention to the role of the TAEH. The private sector has also at times 
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influenced city policy, notably in the area of urban poverty, exclusion, and housing. Like the 
third sector, however, this influence was limited to a short period of time.  
 The lack of a formal and powerful role for either the private sector or the third sector in 
the governance of homelessness in Toronto is in keeping with the overall governance structure in 
the city. In their contribution to the book Governing Urban Economies, David Wolfe and Allison 
Bramwell write, “our research reveals ongoing obstacles to collaborative efforts in Toronto, 
specifically the challenges of regional unity, the weak organization of societal interests, and the 
absence of municipal political support” (Bramwell and Wolfe 2014, 59). There are a number of 
factors that make it difficult to collaborate among sectors in Toronto, including the sheer size of 
the GTA. Bramwell and Wolfe write that the governance of an area as large as the GTA requires 
some “key supports and administrative structures” (62) to allow for the coordination among the 
different regions, supports and structures that are lacking in Toronto. The authors also note that 
the third sector is very weakly organized, with few regular or institutionalized occasion to work 
together. This is partly a function of weak leadership, but also is the result of discord among the 
community groups. 
Studies of urban governance in Toronto or of the dynamics of civil society in the city 
have highlighted these divisions among community groups. Isin writes that these divisions have 
become more prominent in the late 1990s; “the amalgamation of the constituent municipalities of 
Metropolitan Toronto has sharpened, and brought to the fore the main political fault lines in the 
city” (Isin 1998, 179). Hudson and Graefe noted the ideological divisions among the third sector, 
which separated into “social democratic” and “social liberal” groups leading up to the adoption 
of the provincial PRS (Hudson and Graefe 2012). These authors write that “while these programs 
can coexist peacefully, and there are ways that they do…” (2012, 12), tensions remain and the 
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two sides have created different vehicles that they use to continue to advocate for and represent 
their interests in an ongoing way. 
 Wolfe and Bramwell highlight the Greater Toronto Civic Action Alliance (CivicAction) 
as one important counter-example to this narrative. CivicAction is an example of strong civic 
leadership as well as lasting and productive relationships between the third sector and the private 
sector. Interestingly, however, CivicAction has few direct links with the city government; “there 
was little evidence that the mayor or senior staff sought to build linkages with the original 
[CivicAction], and there was some suggestion of political competition between the mayor and 
the civic leaders for political control and legitimacy, and that the senior city staff were not keen 
to share or relinquish control over the city’s political agenda” (79). While CivicAction has “gone 
a long way towards filling the civic governance gap in the city” (76), the authors nevertheless 
conclude the there continue to be major challenges with coordination and concerted governance 
between the private sector, the third sector, and the local government. 
 The weakness of third sector groups in the governance of Toronto is also highlighted in 
Martin Horak’s chapter in Sites of Governance. Or perhaps more accurately, their weakness is 
implicit in the fact that community groups and service providers are barely mentioned in his 
analysis of urban governance. Horak writes, “Toronto’s constellation of local societal actors also 
influences the landscape of policy-making power and agendas in the city” (233), yet the majority 
of his discussion regarding “local societal actors” is dedicated to the private sector; “the City’s 
business elite thus has tremendous influence in multilevel policy processes, which it has 
increasingly chosen to participate in in recent years” (ibid). This influence is mostly related to 
local development. Where Horak does mention community groups, it is with respect to 
immigrants, who are largely absent from governing tables; “the striking absence of ethno cultural 
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concerns also suggests that recent immigrants tend to remain outsiders to politics in a city were 
the voices of established resident groups dominate the ‘community’ agenda” (234). The strength 
of the private sector is also noted by Keil (2002) and Kipfer and Keil (2002), who highlight the 
important role played by local private sector actors in the implementation of Premier Mike 
Harris’s neoliberal agenda.  
The private sector has not only been involved with development projects, but has also 
occasionally ventured into social issues. The private sector in Toronto has at times used its 
influence to advocate at the local (and provincial and federal level) for urban renewal and social 
inclusion (see Hanna and Walton-Roberts 2004). In an interesting parallel with Calgary, the 
private sector has done this in part, perhaps, out of the goodness of its heart, but also when there 
is a perceived private sector interest. 
An example of such private sector involvement in urban governance in Toronto was the 
2002 TD Bank report, “A Choice Between Investing in Canada’s Cities or Disinvesting in 
Canada’s Future”. In the early 2000s, then CEO of TD Bank, Charles Baillie put forward the 
challenge that the Canadian quality of life should surpass the American quality of life within 15 
years. Recognizing that cities would be key to this agenda, he tasked TD Economics with a study 
of cities in Canada. The final report highlights the many ways that cities are necessary players in 
this goal of helping Canada to achieve a superior quality of life, but it notes that because of 
financial, legal, and constitutional constraints on cities, Canada risks falling behind; “Canada’s 
cities face certain threats that, if left untended, could choke off economic expansion and gains in 
living standards down the road” (TD Economics 2002, 9). 
Noting that infrastructure is in need of repair in part due to the lack of a national housing 
strategy since the 1980s, the report calls on federal and provincial governments to give cities 
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more financial tools, but also insists that there is an important role for the private sector; “one 
key ingredient that must be added to the mix to ensure success if a greater contribution by the 
private sector… the entrepreneurship of the private sector must be leveraged to bring cities closer 
to achieving their long-term goals” (ibid 27). The report insists, “we are all stakeholders in our 
nation’s future,” but sees a clear objective to reinvesting in infrastructure, including housing, in 
cities; “without robust and vibrant cities, we will not achieve the goal of beating US standards of 
living within 15 years” (TD Economics 2002, 2; emphasis original).  
Examples of strong private sector involvement and leadership such as this, however, are 
hard to find. And while this shows a willingness on the part of the private sector to engage in the 
governance of certain social policy questions, it also illustrates that the private sector’s 
involvement has been limited to one-time interventions as opposed to long-term involvement. 
The characterization of civil society as weakly organized, divided, and lacking in influence is 
also true when it comes to the governance of homelessness in Toronto. The third sector and the 
private sector have at times been influential, but neither of these sectors has been able to 
maintain long-term involvement in the governance of homelessness. The story of the city 
government jealously guarding its powers is also in evidence with respect to homelessness. 
The private sector in Toronto is strong as the authors cited above observe, and it has at 
key moments provided important advocacy around the questions of homelessness and social 
inclusion. In 2000, the Toronto Board of Trade wrote an influential report on the business 
perspective on homelessness. The Board insisted that homelessness is the responsibility of all 
three levels of government, who should come together to create a national housing strategy. The 
Board was clear that the private sector should be involved, but should not lead the solutions to 
homelessness, which is the job of the government. Nevertheless, the Board insisted that the 
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entrepreneurship of the private sector should be drawn upon; “traditional programs designed, 
funded and implemented exclusively by government will not suffice. The Board believes that 
innovative approaches, particularly the use of PPPs are a far more efficient and cost-effective 
way” (The Toronto Board of Trade 2000, 10).  
The report notes that homelessness in Toronto has become a crisis, and it emphasizes 
how homelessness negatively impacts businesses in Toronto; “For Toronto’s business 
community, homelessness affects the size of our productive and motivated workforce. It has an 
impact on tourism and business, particularly the retail sector” (ibid, 2). The report continues to 
highlight how homelessness will negatively impact Toronto’s future; “unless it is addressed, 
homelessness will reduce Toronto’s global competitiveness.” Like the TD Bank report, and like 
the private sector’s involvement in social issues in Calgary, the private sector’s involvement in 
this area of social policy is driven at least in part out of self-interest. 
Not all the recommendations of the Toronto Board of Trade report were implemented, 
but the report was nevertheless influential at the local level (Hanna and Walton-Roberts 2004). 
While prominent private sector representatives provided an important kick-start to the issue, 
there has been no sustained private sector involvement in the issue. This was in keeping with the 
private sector’s vision, which is that government is ultimately responsible for homelessness, but 
needed a push in order to act. A former senior bureaucrat with the city confirmed this. In the 
early 2000s, when the city was developing its homelessness policy, the city cautiously 
approached the private sector regarding a partnership in the area of homelessness; “[The 
response of the private sector] was very clear: ‘we pay our taxes already. You are asking us to 
pay more?’ And we said ‘hmm, good point.’ So we knew there was probably someone out there 
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with deep pockets… But the business community said ‘we’ll support you, but don’t ask us to pay 
because we already pay our taxes.’ Fair comment” (interview #52).  
The private sector in Toronto is powerful, and is recognized by many involved in the 
fight against homelessness as having “deep pockets”. But for the reasons described above, they 
have not been overly involved in the governance of homelessness, preferring to leave that job to 
the local government. Community groups and the third sector, however, have a more diverse 
history, going through periods of strong organization and influence in the 1990s to their 
relatively weak organization today.  
In the late 1990s, there was a very strong and active group of activists and service 
providers, the Toronto Disaster Relief Committee (TDRC). The TDRC sought to influence 
homelessness policy through protests and highly (and surprisingly, by their own admission) 
successful stunts, such as getting big city mayors to declare that homelessness was an “unnatural 
disaster” in the late 1990s. One former member of the TDRC described the role the organization 
played in policy-making at the local level. Referring to the influential Golden Report (named 
after its author Dr Anne Golden), written for the City of Toronto in the late 1990s about 
homelessness: “we kind of stood on the outside and we pushed and pushed and pushed. We said, 
‘not good enough, you have to do more’. Because Dr Golden… would have her finger in the 
wind and would say ‘I think I can push this far but I can’t push any farther. It won’t work’. And 
we would say ‘no, you have got to push farther’. So we created a political space for her to be a 
lot more bold” (interview #50). Many of the recommendations of the Golden report were not 
implemented, but this example shows the role that the TDRC often played in Toronto: pushing 
politicians and other prominent public figures to go farther in their interventions and solutions. In 
this way, the TDRC was successful in pushing through reforms regarding shelter standards, 
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which ensured a minimum standard of care in shelters, including capacity (interviews #42 and 
#54). 
The TDRC’s role was recognized by a number of senior bureaucrats and politicians who 
were involved in the area of housing and homelessness in the 1990s and 2000s. A senior political 
official said, “we listened to them and tried to make sure that they were a part of the broader 
thinking” (interview #43). A senior bureaucrat confirmed their influence: “the TDRC played a 
significant community advocacy role in first identifying what were historically issues of concern 
around quality of facilities and services. No question that community activists played a central 
role in helping to advance progressive change” (interview #49). Another senior bureaucrat, who 
had a number of high profile (and not always positive!) interactions with the TDRC, insisted, “I 
think the advocates are terrific. They help make better public-policy” (interview #54). 
The troubles of the TDRC that led to its dissolution were in part related to funding. A 
senior bureaucrat noted, “it is hard to sustain any type of political organization… They were not 
able to get donations” (interview #54). This was confirmed, in somewhat more bitter terms, by a 
prominent former member of the group; “advocacy is extremely extremely weak in Ontario right 
now… because of the funding situation” (interview #42). Discussing work regarding the sexual 
abuse of homeless women, the actor said, “I work with a few people, but it is a very small 
number compared to the old days. Agencies are very much silenced by the funding streams they 
have got” (interview #42). The actor went on to explain how funding is tied to particular 
approaches or philosophies, notably Housing First, and that groups that do not agree with that 
approach will face consequences: “an agency will be ostracized or have their funding cut because 
of advocacy”. 
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Further, an important source of influence for the TDRC was Jack Layton, who was a city 
councilor in Toronto in the 1990s. At the time, he was one of the only politicians in the entire 
country paying attention to the issue of homelessness (see Layton 2008). Layton provided an 
important bridge between advocates and city council, greatly increasing their influence. This 
informal (ie non-institutional) link to City Hall was key, and losing Layton to the national level 
certainly weakened the TDRC at the local level.  
In addition to losing their key bridge to city hall, important divisions arose within the 
group, divisions that are not uncommon at the local level among community groups as Hudson 
and Graefe and Isin write. Interviews for this thesis did not probe the full extent of the 
disagreement, but a number of former TDRC members brought up competing interpretations of 
their history and what they had accomplished. Some former members are pessimistic and bitter 
about the state of homelessness in the city, sarcastically saying, “a positive step is that shelters 
are now closer to refugee camps than they were. It is not a big win…” The actor continued, this 
time regarding warming centres for homeless people in the winter, “we fought tooth and nail, 
and we finally won. Well, we call it a win, but we won mats, blankets, and one meal a day that a 
church has to provide.” The actor then reflected on the current situation in Toronto: “we are 
taking a draconian right wing approach based on the work of people in the US. It is totally 
inappropriate and it is violating human rights, diminishing any possibility that you’ll ever get 
national or provincial housing programs” (interview #42). 
Another version of the story, told by a different member of the TDRC, is more optimistic 
and is worth quoting at length: 
Most of the people I have worked [in the TDRC] with have gone by the wayside. I feel 
sad about that. Many of them are bitter, and when they look at the history I just told you, 
they see it as a history of failure. That despite all our incredible efforts, the conditions are 
still worse, more people in poverty, more people are precariously housed, more are 
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homeless than ever since the end of WW2. So objectively, we have failed. I think slightly 
differently. This is a very personal thing for me, and I don’t want to discount that there 
are lots of people who are suffering and dying, we know that. Many of them are people I 
have known. I go to the homeless memorial every month. I feel strongly a continuing 
sense of anger and loss… but one of the dangers of housing advocates is that we start to 
really believe our own rhetoric, like the world is ending and so on. It is terrible, 
objectively. The conditions are awful. But in the midst of these terrible conditions, we 
have actually had some important successes… (interview #50). 
 
 Some former TDRC members remain active in terms of advocating on behalf of the 
homeless in Toronto, and even continuing some of their previous work, such as the Toronto 
homelessness memorial every month. But these disagreements and the end of the TDRC have 
created a void in the area of homelessness that has never been filled. Interestingly, some senior 
city bureaucrats lament this fact, one of whom said, “We have a deficit on so many levels. That 
is why the advocacy is so important, I’d like to see a TDRC reinvent itself and come back” 
(interview #54). 
Even when the TDRC was active, there was, however, a belief among senior elected 
politicians and senior bureaucrats that the issue of homelessness was (and continues to be) the 
government’s job. This was especially the case in the 2000s, when the issue of chronic 
homelessness became more visible and concerning. During this period, which would set the tone 
for many years to come30, Toronto’s Mayor was a left-of-centre politician who believed in 
government intervention. In an interview for this thesis, a former Toronto mayor said, “in the 
bottom half [of the income scale] it is very very hard to find housing. And that has to be 
subsidized somehow by government… the only way the market will provide it is if we create 
slums. So if we don’t want people to live in slums where they are going to catch on fire and 
die… and you might think I’m exaggerating, but that is what happened to me when I was a city 
                                                
30 In part because of Mayor Rob Ford’s total disinterest in the area of homelessness, at which 
point the policy essentially went into autopilot 
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counselor. Twice in my ward rooming houses caught on fire and people died. So there is a very 
important place for government” (interview #43). A senior bureaucrat agreed; responding to a 
question about whether the private sector could play a larger role in the governance of 
homelessness in Toronto, this person responded, “I think charities and the private sector can help 
point the way. But they cannot substitute for the role of government” (interview #54). 
Even when the community sector was organized and when the TDRC was active, the 
City of Toronto was jealously guarding its power over housing and homelessness. This is also 
consistent with the overall story of urban governance in Toronto, where the local government 
does not go out of its way to institutionalize the input of community groups. A bureaucrat 
praised the TDRC for its advocacy role, but also insisted that the city’s role was of central 
importance; “[a]ctivism always has a central role in terms of identifying issues, identifying 
solutions, being part of that process. But it also takes leadership at senior levels in government to 
establish and support policy change. And that did happen. There was a seismic shift in terms of 
the approach of service delivery and the interpretation and understanding of service delivery... It 
really is the obligation of senior public servants to identify needs, to make recommendations to 
council, and to advance responsive approaches to serving marginalized communities” (interview 
#49).  
Indeed, the city government had a clear idea of where it wanted to go in terms of 
homelessness. The city would, and continues to, consult with community groups and non-profits 
regarding the development and implementation of homelessness policy, but in the early 2000s, 
the city was firmly committed to a Housing First approach to homelessness and to conducting 
regular homeless counts, which were controversial among community groups, including TDRC 
members (German 2008; Toronto Disaster Relief Committee 2006). When I asked local actors 
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about the origins of the Housing First Streets to Homes program, they all pointed to the 
bureaucracy; indeed, one bureaucrat, in response to the question “whose idea was Streets to 
Homes?” raised his hand: it was his idea. A former mayor confirmed this story; when asked 
where the Streets to Homes idea came from, he responded; “mostly from the civil service doing 
really good work” (interview #43). 
The city is the most powerful actor in the area of homelessness in Toronto, because it was 
given the responsibility for housing and by extension homelessness by the province in the 1990s. 
The city has been influenced at key moments by civil society and the private sector, notably 
during the 1990s and early 2000s. But these sectors have been either too disorganized, too 
divided, or too disinterested to remain influential over the long term in the governance of 
homelessness31. Yet in the 1990s and early 2000s, the city was committed to a course of action, 
with powerful, senior bureaucrats pushing a particular response: Housing First. The city took its 
responsibility for housing seriously and saw itself as the main actor in the development of 
housing and homelessness policy.  
This conclusion is also interesting in light of the evidence found by Wolfe and Bramwell, 
that the city government sees strong advocates as a challenge to its power. The city sees itself as 
a full-fledged government and takes the few responsibilities it has very seriously. This was 
particularly true in the area of housing, where the city was advocating for a seat at the 
intergovernmental table on housing with provincial governments; “one of the things I said is that 
Toronto is Canada’s biggest landlord. How can you have a conference on housing without 
having the biggest landlord there?” (interview #43). Despite its attempts to attend the 
                                                
31 Future research should keep a close eye on the relationship between the newly formed Toronto 
Alliance to End Homelessness, which hopes to regain some influence for the third sector, and the 
City of Toronto. 
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intergovernmental meeting on housing, Toronto was not allowed to go (even just as an observer). 
Indeed, in the late 1990s, the city of Toronto grew in terms of size and powers, and was feeling 
very much like a government. It was open to third and private sector influence, but did not make 
significant efforts to institutionalize those voices in the governance of homelessness because city 
officials believed that the responsibility for housing was with the city government. 
Montreal 
The governance of homelessness in Montreal is fragmented among a number of actors. 
Of all of the cases, the governance of homelessness in Montreal is the most divided at the local 
level, with three different groups advancing different agendas. At the local level, one of the most 
important actors is the Réseau d’aide au personnes seules et itinérantes de Montréal (RAPSIM), 
an advocacy body that has existed since the 1970s. Like the TDRC, the RAPSIM does not have a 
plan on homelessness but is very influential in the policy-making process and in advocating for 
its preferred solution to homelessness, social housing with community support. As the previous 
chapter presented, the city government has recently become more involved and authoritative in 
this area, introducing a plan on homelessness in 2013. The city has had homelessness plans in the 
past, but the 2013 plan is new in that it breaks completely from provincial priorities and 
advances the city’s own agenda for the first time. Another relatively new group, the Mouvement 
pour mettre fin à l’itinérance de Montréal (MMFIM), recently released a plan to end 
homelessness. The plan is fully costed and has some financial support from the city, but does still 
not have the funding it needs in order to be fully implemented. This chapter argues that the 
existence of these three groups is due to the unique configuration of local social forces involved 
in urban governance Montreal, notably a weak private sector and a strong, but divided, civil 
society. 
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Studies of local governance in Montreal illustrate that the third sector is very influential, 
though this has not always been the case. Prior to the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, the Catholic 
Church was a very important actor in local governance. Klein et al write, “the local level was 
structured as a strong institutional framework based on a coalition between civil municipalities 
and religious parishes” (Klein, Tremblay, and Fontan 2009). Fougères notes the importance of 
the Church prior to the 1960s, but his two part series on the history of Montreal also pays great 
attention to the role of cultural institutions. He notes that the Church along with the Anglophone 
elite were dominant in the governance of Montreal; “le clergé catholique et les élites 
économiques anglo-protestantes contrôlent en fait, directement ou indirectement, les principales 
institutions et entreprises culturelles locales” (Fougères 2012, 1290).  
This local governance structure, which gave significant power to the Catholic Church and 
a small Anglophone minority, underwent a total transformation in the 1960s. A broad coalition 
of actors modernized the institutions of governance and worked to increase public trust in those 
institutions through what is known as the Quiet Revolution (see Noël 2010). Not only was there 
institutional change at the provincial and local level, but Fougères notes that there was radical 
cultural and identity change as well, which saw the emergence of “une nouvelle forme de pouvoir 
culturel, proprement québécois, modern et laïque, à la fois plus hétérogène et plus diffuse” (ibid 
1289). 
During this period and the decades that followed, there was also an important linguistic 
transformation throughout the province of Quebec, but particularly in Montreal32. During the 
1960s, the dominance of the Anglophone elite meant that “l’économie de Montréal se 
caractérisait par une nette hiérarchie linguistique” (Levine 1997, 255). A movement to 
                                                
32 For this full history, see Levine 1997 
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transform this linguistic dynamic in Montreal began, one that had as its main objective to “faire 
du français la langue normale et habituelle du travail” (ibid 294). This battle over the linguistic 
dynamic of the city was not just for economic means, but was also deeply cultural: “il est évident 
que des raisons matérielles motivaient la communauté francophone à vouloir éliminer la division 
linguistique dans l’économie de Montréal. La question du lien entre la langue et l’économie était 
d’ailleurs culturelle dans la mesure où le pouvoir économique des Anglophones semblait 
menacer la langue et la culture françaises” (Levine 1997, 225). 
By the 1980s, and continuing today, there was still a fair bit of English spoken in the 
business world in Montreal, but there was also a new francophone elite33. A study of the pay gap 
between anglophones and francophones in Montreal has shown that more recently, the gap 
between the economic power of the two linguistic groups has closed (Béland, Forgues, and 
Beaudin 2010). Scholars of urban governance in Montreal note that during the 1980s and 1990s, 
Toronto emerged as the main business centre of Canada. The private sector in Montreal is as a 
result not as vibrant as it once was; “Montreal no longer has the lustre it enjoyed at the end of the 
19th century” (Bherer and Hamel 2012, 105). Of the four cities studied here, the private sector 
exercises the least influence in the urban governance of Montreal.  
In addition to this linguistic and cultural transformation, the 1980s saw a shift in power 
among actors in Quebec that eventually resulted in what is often called the Quebec model (see 
Bourque 2000). The Quebec model is a “partnership-based socio-economic regime… 
characterized by the participation of a plurality of actors and multiple and diverse hybrid forms 
of governance” (Klein, Tremblay, and Fontan 2014, 40; see also Bourque 2000). This is the case 
                                                
33 While the official language of Montreal is French, tensions between pressures for the city to 
become more bilingual or Anglophone remain, though they are not as contentious as they once 
were (Cooper 2016; Laporte and Gagnon 2015; Valiante 2015). 
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at the provincial level (as the chapters on housing and poverty demonstrated), but also for the 
local level of governance; “the evolution of local development shows the importance of the 
actors representing civil society in the governance of development and in the definition of the 
public policies in domains that matter to the community” (Klein et al 2014, 51). These authors 
argue that community organizations do not just protest government decisions but have become 
important policy actors in their own right, equipping themselves with the necessary tools to 
participate fully in the policy-making process. 
Bherer and Hamel agree with this characterization of a strong civil society while also 
emphasizing the relative weakness of the private sector in Montreal’s structures of urban 
governance; “while the agglomeration does show a general lack of economic vitality, it must also 
be acknowledged that Montreal’s civil society shows remarkable energy and resilience” (Bherer 
and Hamel 2012, 107). Laforest explains that this energy has come from a history of conflicted 
relations with the provincial government; “L’État québécois a historiquement eu tendance à 
vouloir saisir ou coopter les projets du tiers secteur, donc le secteur a cherché continuellement à 
protéger son autonomie, sans pour autant compromettre sa participation au processus politique” 
(Laforest 2011, 49). While the private sector exercises the least influence in Montreal of all the 
cities studied, the third sector in Montreal is perhaps the strongest: “le tiers secteur occupe une 
place privilégiée dans l’arène politique québécoise” (ibid). 
These are the most important historical forces that have shaped urban governance in 
Montreal, which is characterized by a strong and highly organized civil society, on-going 
(though muted) tension surrounding questions of language and identity, and a relatively weak 
private sector. These same divisions and governance dynamics can be seen with respect to the 
governance of homelessness in Montreal. The private sector is a relatively weak actor, though 
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this has been changing recently with respect to homelessness. Some private business 
representatives have become involved with the MMFIM, such as the Chamber of Commerce. 
Further, the Société de développement social de Ville-Marie (SDSVM), created in 2008, seeks to 
promote the involvement of Montreal businesses in social questions, notably homelessness, 
through philanthropy. The SDSVM has, for example, created a program where homeless or 
formerly homeless people are hired in downtown Montreal as local guides and interpreters. 
Private sector representatives are also often involved on the boards of individual shelters or 
social services, as is the case in many other cities. But the private sector is much less influential 
in the overall governance dynamics of homelessness in Montreal than it is in other big cities; in 
other words, there is no organization like the Calgary Homeless Foundation or the StreetoHome 
Foundation in Montreal, which gives significant governance and decision-making power directly 
to private sector representatives.  
In Montreal, it is rather civil society that has wielded the most significant influence in the 
governance of homelessness at the local level, though these local actors are always vocal in their 
demand that the provincial government should play a key and leading role in this policy area. 
Actors at both the provincial and local level confirmed the important place of community groups 
in the creation of homelessness policy. An actor involved with the Société d’habitation du 
Québec described the consultations that took place throughout the province, which led to the 
adoption of the provincial homelessness policy in 2014; “à partir de ce forum et les 
consultations il y a eu la politique… justement les membres de la table on n’avait pas le droit de 
parole, mais il y avait les groupes communautaires d’à travers la province au complet, qui 
avaient le droit de parole pendant deux jours… on était des backbenchers” (personal interview 
2014). Another important actor from the third sector noted his constant contact with government 
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officials; “We have something to say. So yes I have been in contact with the Minister’s office 
this week… I saw the Minister of Health on Tuesday, the mayor a week and a half ago… we are 
influencing policy, we see it as a responsibility of our organization” (interview #65). 
At the local level, the RAPSIM, the MMFIM and the city are the most important actors in 
the governance of homelessness. It would be simple to say that the divide between these local 
groups is linguistic; indeed, for this thesis, all interviews with actors aligned with the RAPSIM 
or who work for the city were conducted in French, whereas interviews with MMFIM actors 
were all in English. But two points are worth noting. First, divisions among community groups 
are clearly in evidence in all three other anglophone cities, even Calgary (especially at the 
beginning). For example, one Calgary-based actor who is very closely aligned with the CHF 
expressed profound disagreement with the very central goal of ending homelessness by 2018; 
when asked if he thought it was possible, he said, “No no no no no. A big resounding no” 
(interview #31).  
Secondly, there are disagreements among actors of the same language group regarding 
some fundamental questions about homelessness. For example, regarding whether it is possible 
to “end homelessness,” one actor closely associated with the RAPSIM said, “moi je pense qu’on 
peut mettre fin à l’itinérance, je ne suis pas du tout pessimiste là dessus” (interview #60). 
Another actor closely associated with the RAPSIM was of a different opinion: “Je ne sais pas. Je 
ne sais pas si on peut complètement envisager qu’il n’y aura plus jamais… je trouve ça difficile 
à croire… il y aura toujours les gens qui décrochent, les gens qui s’opposent, les gens qui ont 
des familles qui sont incapables de s’en occuper… je ne sais pas. Je ne sais pas”. Finally, the 
actor concluded simply, “non” (interview #67). 
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There are perhaps some ideological divisions between the two groups as well, with the 
RAPSIM being more social democratic in its approach. Yet the MMFIM features some 
prominent left-of-centre members, including James Hughes who ran in the 2015 federal election 
for the NDP, and his campaign was actively supported by senior members of the MMFIM. The 
divisions between the RAPSIM and the MMFIM are in fact more accurately defined as being 
along identity lines. The RAPSIM is a very Quebec-based group and defends a particular way of 
responding to homelessness in Montreal, whereas the MMFIM is more closely linked to 
Canadian groups and approaches to homelessness. 
Today there are over 100 members of the RAPSIM, though the largest homeless service 
provider in Montreal, the Old Brewery Mission, is not and has never been a member of the 
RAPSIM. The RAPSIM is highly critical of federal policy, including the federal government’s 
decision to cut funding to housing in the 1990s (though groups across the country were critical of 
this). The RAPSIM has also been intensely critical of the federal decision to orient a majority of 
its homelessness funding to Housing First interventions, and more recently of its decision to 
implement a federally coordinated point in time homeless count, which it criticizes as being “au 
courant” in English Canada.  
The approach that the RAPSIM favours is “logement social avec soutien 
communautaire”, a model that was, according to RAPSIM actors, developed in and for Montreal. 
One actor insisted that Housing First is in fact the same as social housing with community 
support; “Le Housing First, c’est une copie. Ils n’ont rien inventé” (interview #67). Another 
actor agreed that the solutions to homelessness in Montreal were developed in Montreal, and not 
by the federal government, and was offended that Housing First was suddenly announced 
throughout Canada as the new solution to homelessness; “ça fait comme si ça faisait 30 ans que 
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les gens travaillent en itinérance mais qu’ils n’avaient pas compris comment faire et là, tout 
d’un coup il y a une pensée magique qui peut régler ça. ” He continued, “Le logement social, ce 
n’est pas le gouvernement fédéral qui a inventé ça. Le développement du logement social avec 
support communautaire, c’est fait de manière très précise dans les années 80 ici dans la région 
de Montréal” (interview #60). 
 Another actor involved with the RAPSIM noted that RAPSIM members are proud of the 
approaches to homelessness that they have developed and do not want to be told what to do; “ils 
ne veulent pas se faire imposer des models top-down.” He spoke directly of the MMFIM’s 
approach to homelessness; “ils s’inscrivent en rupture avec la manière dont on travaille. Eux, ils 
souhaitent travailler autrement, ils souhaitent un modèle plus canadien avec les trois paliers de 
gouvernement autour de la table. Malheureusement, ce n’est pas une façon de travailler qui est 
possible au Québec… C’est un peu les deux solitudes” (interview #58).  
 The MMFIM, on the other hand, has close alliances with Canadian organizations and its 
members have strong ties to Canadian projects, including the At Home/Chez Soi project and the 
20,000 Homes Campaign. (The RAPSIM as an organization opposes both, though some of its 
members have been involved in them). Matthew Pearce (CEO of the Old Brewery Mission) is on 
the board of the MMFIM and on the board of the national Canadian Alliance to End 
Homelessness, for example.  
There is a sense among members of the MMFIM that homelessness in Montreal is not all 
that different from homelessness in other Canadian (or American) cities. It follows for these 
actors that solutions to homelessness (such as Housing First) should work just as well in 
Montreal as they do in other cities. One actor who has not always worked in Montreal put this in 
the following terms; “this is one of the problems I find in this sector in Montreal, the reluctance 
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to lift up your head and look around and find the best practices. There is a comfort in the sense 
that we are very different here, those things might work there but they won’t work here” 
(interview #65). Saying that chronic homelessness in Montreal is very similar to what it is in 
other Canadian cities, the actor insisted, “I’m pretty sure that if they found a cure for cancer, it 
would work here, even if it was discovered in New York” (interview #65). 
 Another actor with the MMFIM said that the Montreal way of doing things seemed 
absurd; “we are really good at feeding people, good at providing clean environments, hot 
showers. But we are not very good at actually clearing the place out. It is a kind of porte-
tournante” (interview #64). After looking around Canada and internationally, he noted that 
inspiration for a new approach to homelessness came in part from Trois-Rivières but also from 
other Canadian and American cities as well. Proposing change within his organization was 
difficult – “we lost some board members” – but he worked with other community groups in 
Montreal to bring the change within his organization to the broader Montreal community. “I 
would say we are behind in Montreal,” he said, and he stated that eventually the MMFIM formed 
to fill what was perceived to be a leadership void in the province; “the community has been 
calling for the province to take leadership. And the province has been putting up its hand 
politically to say that it will take leadership, but it hasn’t… so a few of us kind of said ‘ok, we’ll 
do it’” (interview #64). 
 There is clear disagreement between the MMFIM and the RAPSIM, notably on what the 
solution to homelessness should be and even on the definition of homelessness. There is 
considerable overlap in the membership of the two groups, including members of the RAPSIM’s 
board who are also members of the MMFIM. Both organizations, at the board level, are driven 
mostly by the third sector. The difference between the two is in terms of their identity. Simply 
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put, the RAPSIM is a nationalist, Quebec-based group, whereas the MMFIM strongly identifies 
with both Quebec and Canada. 
 The City of Montreal has done a good job interacting with the two groups. The city is an 
actor in its own right as explained in the previous chapter, but also provides important funding 
and political support to both the RAPSIM and the MMFIM (interviews #63 and #71). The ability 
to coexist with two groups that are, in their mission and philosophy quite different, can also be 
explained at least in part through an understanding of identity. Denis Coderre, current mayor of 
Montreal, is a former federal Liberal Cabinet Minister. He is a federalist and not skeptical of 
Canadian responses to social issues, including homelessness. But he is also, as Mayor of 
Montreal, the number one defender of the city within Canada. This job often leads him to 
highlight how unique Montreal is, a line of thinking that is compatible with the RAPSIM’s 
narrative of a unique Quebec and Montreal approach to homelessness. 
 With three local plans or approaches to homelessness, the governance of homelessness at 
the local level in Montreal is the most fragmented of any city under study here. As the previous 
pages have illustrated, this fragmentation is the result of a strong, but divided, third sector. 
Identity disagreements, while not as contentious as they have been in the past, have led to a 
fractured and poorly organized system of urban governance in Montreal. This has in turn created 
a fragmented model of governance of homelessness. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has argued that the centralization or fragmentation of the governance of 
homelessness in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal is determined by the broader urban 
governance dynamics in each respective city. In Vancouver, the private sector and the third 
sector have often been on opposing sides of development projects for much of Vancouver’s 
recent history. These groups are, overall, largely aligned with one of the two main political 
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parties at the local level. This dynamic has resulted in a fragmented model of urban governance 
and also of the homelessness governance. The StreetoHome Foundation was created during a 
Non-Partisan Association government, and is comprised mostly of private sector and NPA 
actors. Vision Vancouver’s plan at city hall has depended more on Vision’s left-of-centre allies 
in the city, including those in the third sector. Though these two plans are by no means 
irreconcilable, and the two groups do work together on projects, they both continue to exist and 
to promote their own plans. This is because of the partisan and ideological origins of the plans. 
 In Calgary, the oil and gas sector exercises significant influence in the city’s urban 
governance, so much so that the third sector and even the local government, to develop and 
implement social projects, must have the support of the key private sector representaives. This is 
very clearly the case for the governance of homelessness, where even large homeless serving 
groups were sidelined from the CHF’s plan and the overall governance of homelessness. Two 
policy entrepreneurs, one non-profit (Terry Roberts) and one private (Jim Gray), worked to bring 
other influential oil and gas leaders on board with their goal of ending homelessness. To do so, 
they made a carefully crafted business case that appealed to this private sector crowd: ending 
homelessness will save money. 
 The city government is the main actor in the governance of homelessness in Toronto. At 
times, the city has been strongly influenced by the private sector or by the third sector, but 
neither sector has maintained the organization and capacity to become a long-term influential 
actor in the governance of homelessness. This is in keeping with the overall governance structure 
in Toronto, where there are few formal, institutionalized interactions between the city and civil 
society. The City would appear, in some respects, to like it this way; deeply annoyed by its status 
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as a creature of the province, the City of Toronto sees itself as a full-fledged and powerful 
government and thus guards its few responsibilities very jealously. 
 In Montreal, the third sector is very strong and vibrant, whereas the private sector is 
comparatively weak. Third sector actors have become important policy actors in their own right, 
influencing and crafting provincial and local social policies, including in the area of 
homelessness. The third sector is, nevertheless, divided along identity lines, which has led to the 
fragmentation of the governance of homelessness. The RAPSIM is very proud of and attached to 
the way of doing things in Montreal, and defends its model against federal (and sometimes 
provincial) attempts to impose new approaches. The MMFIM is more Canadian in its identity, 
seeking to bring lessons from other cities to Montreal (and to share Montreal practices with other 
Canadian cities as well). For this reason, the governance of homelessness in Montreal is highly 
fragmented.
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Chapter 8: Analysis and Conclusions 
 There have always been people unable to find housing of their own in Canada. 
Montreal’s largest homeless shelter, the Old Brewery Mission, has served the homeless in the 
city for over 125 years. The people who were homeless 125 years ago were mainly white men 
unable to work due to a physical limitation, such as an injury or alcoholism. The profile of this 
population has changed recently, necessitating the creation of a new word: homelessness 
(Hulchanski 2009). Homelessness is a vague and complex problem that affects a large group of 
people – including not just men but also youth, women, children, and aboriginal people – and for 
many different reasons – not just a physical inability to work but also mental illness, domestic 
violence, anti-LGBT attitudes, and poverty.  
To give a clear example of this change, many homeless shelters in Canada are on social 
media and often Tweet regarding their donation needs. A Canadian shelter, Inn from the Cold, 
has tweeted more than once about its need for baby supplies, such as soothers or diapers. This 
has not always happened in Canada. Emergency shelters have not always needed to provide a 
safe space for homeless women and their babies. Demographic and societal changes have 
certainly contributed to this (greater independence and equality of women, for example, leading 
to family breakdowns and single parent households), but political decisions have also been made 
to cut supports offered to low-income or vulnerable people. Previously, vulnerable women with 
babies had options other than homelessness; today, that is not always the case. The federal and 
provincial governments have been slow to respond to this new reality, and this thesis has looked 
at how local level actors have sought to fill the gaps in the safety net that have resulted in more 
people experiencing homelessness than was the case in the past. 
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Thesis Overview 
This thesis confronted an empirical question in the study of Canadian politics. When 
faced with the same problem of chronic homelessness at a similar scale, why have actors at the 
local level in Canada’s biggest cities come together to form very different local governing 
coalitions? In other words, in the absence of federal and provincial interventions in the area of 
homelessness, actors at the local level have come together to respond to homelessness, but they 
have done so in very different ways. Why? 
Before answering this main research question, the first two empirical chapters explained 
why the level of homelessness in each of the cities studied is similar despite different social 
policy interventions by the provinces, a mini-puzzle in itself. I argued that this is because none of 
the provinces was responding adequately to the specific problem of chronic homelessness. 
Quebec has been the most active in the areas of poverty and housing, building affordable and 
social housing non-stop since the federal disinvestment in the 1990s and prioritizing the fight 
against poverty since the early 2000s. These interventions in Quebec have made a difference in 
terms of the profile of poverty and the housing security of low-income Montrealers, but they 
were not targeted or specialized enough to make a difference in reducing or even preventing 
chronic homelessness. Further, the income support offered to people through social assistance is 
comparable across the four provinces, which is to say it is comparably stingy and inadequate. For 
these reasons, the level of chronic homelessness in Montreal is very comparable to what it is in 
Vancouver, Calgary and Toronto. In other words, holes in the safety net might have been 
somewhat smaller in Quebec, preventing some people from experiencing temporary 
homelessness, but they were still big enough for chronically homeless people to fall through. 
With that in mind, there are two main differences in the local governance models in 
Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal: the role of the local government (is very involved in 
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Vancouver and Toronto but less so in Montreal and Calgary) and the degree of centralization or 
fragmentation of the local governing coalition (fragmented in Vancouver and Montreal, 
centralized in Calgary and Toronto). I argued that the role of the local government in the 
governing coalition is determined by its housing related powers and the local political 
commitment to homelessness. In Vancouver and Toronto, there are either significant local 
housing related powers, a strong political commitment to homelessness, or both. In Montreal and 
Calgary, there are comparatively few housing related powers and the political commitment to the 
issue is relatively weak (though it is stronger in Montreal than it is in Calgary).  
The fragmentation or centralization of the governing coalition is determined by the 
organization of local social forces in each city, which includes the private sector and the third 
sector. In Vancouver and Montreal, where the governance of homelessness is fragmented, local 
social forces are strong and organized, but divided. In Calgary, local social forces are 
overwhelmingly dominated by the private sector. In contrast, local social forces are vibrant but 
poorly organized in Toronto, and the city government is a strong and somewhat domineering 
actor. This explains the centralization of the governance of homelessness in these two cities.  
Before discussing the implications of these findings for the study of Canadian politics and the 
comparative welfare state, as well as the practical implications for those involved directly in the 
fight against homelessness, I will first put all the chapters together and present the final argument 
for each case.  
The City of Vancouver has many housing related powers, including mandatory 
inclusionary zoning and density bonusing, and has relatively strong overall autonomy (within the 
Canadian context). In exercising these powers and autonomy aggressively, the city has been able 
to leverage private development interests into affordable or social housing units, and has made 
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itself a powerful actor in the fight against homelessness. Vancouver also has unique incentives to 
use its housing related powers and even to make homelessness a priority, in and of itself, in 
elected politics. In such a small, urban city, local politicians do not need to campaign on issues 
that appeal to both an urban and a suburban population; homelessness is an issue that is salient to 
the majority of Vancouver’s downtown electorate, a population that is regularly confronted with 
chronic, visible homelessness and is also generally less skeptical of government intervention. 
The local party system and local electoral system (at-large instead of ward) provide further 
incentives for local councilors to make homelessness a priority. There is nothing inevitable about 
the fact that local elected officials have made homelessness a priority; it was a political choice, 
and a risky one at that. But the City of Vancouver’s toolbox is uniquely well equipped for the 
fight against homelessness. 
The City of Vancouver is a powerful actor, yet the StreetoHome Foundation (STHF) has 
its own plan for Vancouver on homelessness. The STHF has a ten-year plan to end chronic 
homelessness by moving people directly from homelessness into permanent housing, a difficult 
task in a city where affordable housing is severely limited. The city’s promise, in contrast, has 
been to end street homelessness and Robertson’s coalition at City Hall has focused its efforts in 
part on ensuring that there is enough shelter space so that no one has to sleep or live on the city’s 
streets. These two approaches are not irreconcilable, but the STHF generally opposes shelters, 
believing they do not have a role to play in the solution to homelessness. 
The city and the STHF work together regularly, and coexist fairly harmoniously, yet they 
continue to exist as two distinct groups with two distinct plans. This is because the third sector 
and the private sector are both strongly organized, but divided. Further, they are, in general, 
aligned with one of the two main political parties in the city. The STHF has strong links to the 
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private sector and the centre-right Non-Partisan Association (NPA) political party. The city, 
currently controlled by the centre-left Vision Vancouver, has stronger ties to community groups 
(though Vision Vancouver also works with and receives donations from developers). The two 
groups and plans have never merged into one because of their partisan origins and strong ties to 
particular segments of civil society.  
The governance of homelessness in Calgary is very different; it is centralized in the 
Calgary Homeless Foundation, an NGO with very strong ties to the oil and gas sector. As the 6th 
chapter explained, the city has few housing related powers. The one power that the city does 
have – density bonusing – is severely weakened by the physical landscape of the city. There is 
always space at the edge of the city for new developments, meaning density is not something that 
developers need in order to build a profitable project. Further, there are few political incentives 
to make homelessness a priority of city council. Calgary is a large city with an urban-suburban 
divide, where the majority of the electorate lives outside the downtown core (where 
homelessness is overwhelmingly concentrated). The lack of a party system and the ward 
electoral system has made the campaign for public office in Calgary, notably for councilors, very 
focused on highly localized issues that resonate with particular wards; homelessness is not a 
relevant issue for the majority of Calgary wards. The mayor must campaign in the whole city, 
but given its sprawled nature, mayoral candidates must campaign on issues that are salient to a 
diverse electorate. In Calgary, the issues of public transit and transparency resonate throughout 
the city and are more commonly on the public agenda than homelessness. 
The organization of local social forces in Calgary is unique. Simply put, the private sector 
exercises unusual influence in the overall governance of the city, even when it comes to deciding 
which social issues will become priorities. Community groups, to advance their social causes, 
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must win over influential private sector oil and gas executives. To do so, they must make a 
“business case” for their cause, which generally means illustrating how solving a particular 
social problem will be good for economic development or will save taxpayer money. Policy 
entrepreneurs concerned about homelessness in Calgary employed this strategy very effectively 
and were able to convince the private sector to buy into the cause of ending homelessness. By 
winning over some of the most influential oil and gas CEOs in the city, the CHF made itself the 
most powerful body in the governance of homelessness, even marginalizing some large and 
long-existing homelessness services from the governance of homelessness. Those who have been 
marginalized are those who have not agreed with the business case for ending homelessness and 
have been unable to win over private sector support for their vision. 
Ontario cities were given the responsibility for housing (and by extension homelessness) 
from the province in the late 1990s. For this simple reason, the city of Toronto is the most 
important actor in the governance of homelessness at the local level. (However, cities were not 
also given the financial tools that are needed to adequately invest in the renovation and 
construction of affordable housing and in the fight against homelessness, a fact that has been 
lamented by the city, the private sector, and the third sector alike.) The city guards its power over 
housing and homelessness jealously. Local officials have at times been open to private or third 
sector influence, but it has not made significant efforts to institutionalize either of those voices in 
the governance of homelessness. 
The private sector and third sector are both vibrant and strong in Toronto, but they are 
also poorly organized. While they have at important points in Toronto’s history exercised 
influence in the governance of homelessness, neither sector has developed a lasting and 
institutionalized place in the governance of homelessness. This is in part because of the logistical 
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challenges to collaborative governance that are created by the massive scale of the city. But there 
are also ideological divisions among social actors, notably those in the third sector. The Toronto 
Disaster Relief Committee, which existed until 2012, dissolved following a lack of funding and 
disagreements among members. Divisions among third sector actors is common in Toronto, and 
this is another factor that has made it difficult for these actors to develop and maintain an active 
role in Toronto’s urban governance and in the governance of homelessness. Finally, as noted 
above, the city has taken its responsibility for housing very seriously, and has historically taken a 
“command and control” approach to working with community groups (informal interview 2016). 
In other words, the city has been open to input and has appreciated the work of activists in the 
past, but it has not actively sought community contributions to its homelessness strategy. 
The third sector in Montreal is very strong and influential, and has been at the heart of 
local (and provincial) efforts to combat homelessness; the private sector has been much less 
influential. The City of Montreal is becoming a more important actor, but it is still playing a 
comparatively limited role in terms of its financial and political commitment to the issue. The 
city has some housing related powers, including density bonusing, but its toolbox is quite limited 
when it comes to the fight against homelessness. The local party system helps the issue of 
homelessness to gain traction in Montreal by making local elections about city-wide issues as 
opposed to highly localized issues in particular wards. But another reason the city has recently 
become more involved in the area of homelessness is because it fits nicely with the broader 
political goal of the Mayor: Metropolitan status, which would allow the city greater financial 
freedom and autonomy to govern itself. Mayor Coderre has taken an interest in homelessness no 
doubt because he cares deeply about the issue, but also because, to make his argument to the 
province, he needs to be able to say that he needs more powers to solve problems that are unique 
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to Montreal. He has invested significantly in understanding and measuring homelessness and 
housing insecurity, and has used this information to make a case to the province for why he 
needs greater political, legal, and financial resources to adequately respond to the unique housing 
needs of Montrealers (which, he would argue, are different from those needs in Quebec City or 
Sherbrooke, for example).  
But the city is not, however, the only local actor involved in the governance of 
homelessness. The third sector is very powerful in Montreal, but it is also deeply divided, which 
has led to the fragmentation of the governance of homelessness. The division of community 
groups is largely the result of competing identities. The RAPSIM, a long existing advocacy body 
in the area of homelessness, identifies strongly with the Quebec model and its preferred approach 
to homelessness in Montreal, social housing with community support. Members of the MMFIM, 
in contrast, identify more with the Canadian and even North American context, and have strong 
ties to other Canadian cities and to the Canadian Alliance to End Homelessness. Many members 
of the MMFIM were involved in the federally funded At Home/Chez Soi project, which was a 
test of the effectiveness of Housing First throughout Canada and has been very influential in 
determining the (limited) federal program for homelessness. The RAPSIM was very much 
opposed to the project and its emphasis on Housing First, which was seen as being imposed on 
Montreal from above. Because of these disagreements, the governance of homelessness in 
Montreal is highly fragmented among three groups. 
Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto and Montreal have thus developed very different models 
for governing homelessness. There are a number of important lessons to be drawn from this 
study of homelessness in Canadian cities, which touch on the question of the role of cities (and 
the local level more generally) in Canadian intergovernmental relations, the current state of the 
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welfare state in Canada, and of course the question of what can be done about homelessness in 
Canada. The next section considers the practical implications, and the following will look more 
closely at theoretical implications. 
Practical implications: What works? 
Looking at these four very different models of governing homelessness, it is natural to 
ask if one “works” better than another, or if it is better to be homeless in one city than another. 
The short answer is not really. There are drawbacks to each governance model, as well as some 
advantages. This section reviews each governance model and considers the implications that it 
has for the social protection of the homeless in each city, before considering two successful plans 
on homelessness from Medicine Hat, Alberta and Finland. 
 The City of Vancouver is often seen as a Canadian leader when it comes to municipal 
responses to homelessness. This is true, and it took a great amount of political and financial 
capital to put homelessness on the local agenda in 2008. It further took great conviction for the 
city to continue to prioritize homelessness when it became increasingly clear that it was fighting 
a losing battle. The fight against homelessness requires great political will, and for demonstrating 
that will, Gregor Robertson and Vision Vancouver should be commended. In the process of 
putting homelessness on the city’s agenda, however, the issue became politicized in a very 
polarized city. This has arguably harmed the effectiveness of the response. Robertson’s HEAT 
team and emergency shelter system were very much set up in opposition to the Non-Partisan 
Association’s (NPA) previous strategy, Project Civil City, which was seen by many community 
groups as criminalizing homelessness. Robertson sought a new approach, which depended much 
more heavily on emergency shelters and on moving people from the streets into those shelters.  
Some NPA operatives admit that this was a compassionate policy move on Robertson’s 
part; it is important that Robertson’s initial launch into municipal politics came after a man died 
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in a fire on the streets of Vancouver after he was denied a bed in an emergency shelter. But the 
NPA aligned STHF has a different perspective on the role of emergency shelters in the solution 
to homelessness. Rather than depend on the emergency shelter system, the STHF prioritizes 
getting people directly into housing. This is, in theory, a noble effort. But the limited availability 
of housing means that people cannot get the help they need as quickly as they need it. 
Robertson’s promise to end street homelessness was intended to be the first step in the 
broader fight against homelessness. Ideally, shelters are the first point of access to a broader 
“system,” which should help a person to exit homelessness. In Vancouver, however, the severe 
lack of affordable housing means that there is often nowhere for a person to go once they are in 
shelter, and they end up being caught in homelessness. The city does have considerable housing 
related powers when compared with other cities, but it has nowhere near the resources to change 
this important reality of housing unaffordability.  
NPA representatives became increasingly critical of Robertson’s approach to 
homelessness as Robertson’s 2015 deadline approached. Confronted with this mounting 
criticism, Robertson doubled down on his promise. Moving people from streets into shelters 
became a goal in itself so that the annual homeless count would find fewer people sleeping on 
the streets. This is an expensive response, and one that only pushes the problem of chronic 
homelessness under the carpet. Further, as new supportive housing buildings – built in 
partnership between the province, the city, and the STHF – began to open in the city, Robertson 
saw an opportunity to accelerate the decrease in street homelessness. As mayor, he has control 
over the people to whom these new units are targeted. Originally, these new buildings were 
intended to be for a mix of low-income people and homeless people. As the 2015 deadline 
approached however, Robertson dramatically changed the formula for the occupancy to “50-30-
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20”; 50% of the new occupants would come directly from the streets, 30% from shelters, and 
20% from the at risk population. Service providers in charge of providing social supports in these 
new buildings note how disastrous it was to put so many high needs people in one building 
without the adequate supports, and the police were called multiple times a day (personal 
interviews 2014). 
The fact that homelessness is so political in Vancouver is in some ways a good thing; for 
example, all political parties, during the most recent election in 2014, had developed their own 
homelessness strategies, prompting debate and innovation. And indeed, an effective solution to 
homelessness requires an urgent, rapid response. But the specific goal of ending street 
homelessness in contrast to the STHF’s goal of ending chronic homelessness in 2018 meant that 
some decisions were rushed. Further, once politicized, it created divisions among actors who, to 
be truly effective, ought to be more thoughtful and pull in the same direction. This is not to say 
that Robertson should have never prioritized homelessness, but rather to highlight how, when 
lacking the adequate tools to properly respond to the problem (and in the absence of a federal 
partner to help with this), the issue of homelessness became politicized to the detriment of its 
proper solution. 
The CHF has a great deal of control over the issue of homelessness. Because of the 
funding that it controls, it is effectively able to impose its plan throughout Calgary. This ability 
to impose solutions top-down in a city where resources and housing are greatly limited has 
forced agencies to align their efforts to a certain extent, but it has also caused problems for 
homeless people. Agencies in Calgary are free to align with CHF priorities or not, but those that 
do not risk having their funding affected. One of the main priorities of the CHF recently has been 
“systems planning,” an approach to homelessness developed in Australia and the United States, 
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which attempts to un-silo the responses to homelessness. Systems planning is defined in the 
following terms; “rather than relying on an organization-by-organization, or program-by-
program approach, system planning aims to develop a framework for the delivery of initiatives in 
a purposeful and strategic manner for collective group of stakeholders” (Turner 2014). Some 
authors argue that is “arguably necessary to better understand and improve the coordination, 
integration and intersection between and amongst specific service components” (Milaney 2016, 
483). This seems intuitive for an issue such as homelessness, which involves a wide variety of 
policy areas such as housing, health, criminal justice, and welfare; each of these parts, to be 
effective, must work together or at the very least not contradict one another. 
Implementing a systems approach to homelessness is difficult and controversial (Milaney 
2016; Turner and Rogers 2016), as different services have developed their own approaches to 
homelessness that they believe work. They might even have pride in their way of doing things, 
meaning they will resist outsiders telling them what to do. The CHF nevertheless worked hard to 
implement a systems approach to homelessness throughout the city, and has been successful in 
doing so. Prior to the systems approach, homeless services through Calgary were poorly 
organized and difficult to navigate, making it difficult for homeless people to find the supports 
they needed. The system was also seen as wasteful and ineffective; “homeless individuals were 
often being served by multiple agencies and sat on multiple waitlists for housing, each of which 
was accessible only through the program itself” (Dressler 2016, 19). The systems planning 
framework was designed to address this problem.  
An important component of the systems planning effort was the development of the 
Coordinated Access and Assessment (CAA) system, “a single point of entry for Calgarians 
experiencing homelessness” (Dressler 2016, 18). If homeless people give their consent, their 
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personal information is shared with other services and systems through a centralized data-
gathering tool. This tool creates one file for each homeless person, which is shared among 
various service agencies. This allows them to coordinate and to prioritize those in greatest need 
for services. Previously, some services were “cherry-picking” their clients, helping people with 
moderate needs (who were therefore easier to help) as opposed to prioritizing those who required 
the most support. 
The details of the CAA are technical and space does not permit a full discussion here34. 
But these efforts to coordinate at the local level can prevent people from getting lost in a system 
or from bouncing around from service to service without ever getting the help he or she needs, 
because the person’s interactions with the system are being tracked and shared. But there are also 
important weaknesses with this approach. First, even actors involved in the implementation of 
the CAA note that the lack of health and social resources in Calgary makes it difficult to actually 
provide the supports for those who need it the most. Once the highest-needs people are identified 
through the CAA, there is often no organization that has the capacity or resources to provide the 
person with the supports that he or she needs. In a case study of Calgary’s CAA, one author 
noted, “on several occasions it was observed that the majority of spots available at both high- 
and mid-acuity placement committee meetings were available only to clients interested in or 
already maintaining sobriety from drugs or alcohol” (Dressler 2016, 27). The author continues to 
note that this mismatch meant that those in greatest need do not always get the services they 
need; “much lower acuity clients interested in sobriety received placement above those who were 
higher in acuity and in greater need of housing” (ibid). In a city where the crucial supports, 
notably housing and health supports, are lacking, even the fanciest state of the art systems design 
                                                
34 See Dressler 2016 for details 
 278 
will not ultimately help those who need it the most. Real investments in housing, social and 
health services are needed before a systems response can work. 
Another problem with this highly centralized system was raised during an interview with 
an actor who is very closely aligned with the CHF. The actor said that, because services are so 
centrally controlled, people who are at risk of homelessness or even those with few support 
needs have a very difficult time finding support because they are not identified as priority people 
through the CAA. The system prioritizes the most chronically homeless with the most severe 
barriers, meaning those who are homeless simply because they are poor have little support in 
Calgary. The actor said, “say you were poor and you’re going to get evicted. It is easier to go to a 
shelter and wait your time to get subsidized, if you are ok with that… For some people who are 
really poor, you’ll hear caseworkers here say ‘go to the shelter for a few days, or else we can’t 
help you’” (interview #31). 
There is no doubt that these caseworkers are trying to help as best they can. And it is true 
that the majority of people who use an emergency shelter are there for a very short period of time 
before finding and maintaining housing (Aubry et al. 2013). But this advice – go to the shelter 
for a few days – can be potentially disastrous for an already vulnerable person. The social and 
health risks of homelessness are well known; “street homelessness and institutionally mediated 
homelessness (e.g. shelter living) make it very difficult for people to take care of their physical 
health, access labour market opportunities, establish trusting relationships, self-advocate or 
exercise their rights as political citizens” (Doberstein and Nichols 2016). For some people, a few 
days in a shelter can lead to a rapid deterioration in their mental and physical health, and it can 
very quickly become a trap. This highly controlled and centralized system has of course helped 
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many chronically homeless people, but given its limited support to those with fewer needs or for 
prevention, it might also contribute in some way to the creation of more homelessness. 
 The city is the most important actor in the governance of homelessness in Toronto. This 
is in many ways a logical governance choice; homelessness is an intensely localized 
phenomenon, taking different forms even from one neighbourhood to the next. Local 
governments have deep knowledge of the local needs and how services should be adapted 
throughout the city, and they have the legitimacy to enact citywide policies. Though Harris’s 
decision to download housing to the local level was partly an after-though and partly a cost 
reducing measure, the local level of government is very well placed to address homelessness 
given its proximity to the issue. But it is simply a pipe dream to expect local governments, with 
their current resource base, to deal adequately with homelessness. The province set the city up 
for failure, and the city is barely keeping its head above water when it comes to meeting even the 
most basic needs of the homeless population. This is the single most important weakness of this 
governance model; giving any actor or agency a mandate for housing and homelessness without 
sufficient resources to meet the needs of the homeless population is a recipe for failure. One 
former bureaucrat, looking back on the city’s role, noted: “Could we have done better? 
Absolutely. But we needed more money” (interview #52). 
 With an under-resourced city, a substantial homelessness problem and a poorly organized 
civil society, a network of faith communities has emerged to fill the service gaps created by the 
city35. Out of the Cold (OOTC) is a network of 17 faith communities. Each of the 17 services 
opens its doors one night a week (during the winter months) to provide shelter to the homeless. 
St Matthew Our Lady Peace at Dundas and McCaul, for example, is open Sundays from 5:00pm 
                                                
35 Gaps that, to be fair, exist within the bigger gaps created by provincial and federal 
governments 
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- 8:00 am; The Holy Blossom Temple on Bathurst is open Thursdays from 6:30pm - 7:30am. 
Many of the locations are for men only, and none are for women only. OOTC trained staff are 
present at each location to help with particular needs of the homeless population (such as mental 
health or to help with descalation). 
 OOTC was originally designed to be “an emergency stop gap program so the city could 
figure out how to figure out housing” said an actor involved in the program, “but that never 
happened. So this is our 24th year.” The program receives little financial support from the city – 
“we just cobble together different kinds of funding” – and the faith communities themselves 
contribute substantial funding and volunteers (there are nearly 5000 volunteers involved in the 
program). The actor said that OOTC is unlikely to disappear in the coming years; “in the near 
future, [homelessness] is not going to end… this program is here for a while” (personal interview 
2014). Indeed, OOTC has expanded in the past few years as a result of a growing, and more 
diverse, clientele (interview #47). The program continues out of the goodness of the hearts of the 
volunteers, whose commitment to and compassion for the less fortunate is commendable. And by 
providing a warm space to sleep inside in the freezing winter months, when city shelters are at or 
above capacity, OOTC has undoubtedly saved lives.  
But a “cobbled together” system such as this has a number of weaknesses. Each centre is 
open only one night a week, so every day, homeless people must pack up their belongings and 
move to another next site. They are given a bus token so they can get to the next location, which 
may be on the other side of town. In most institutionalized shelters, such as city run shelters, 
people do have to leave every day and are usually required to take their belongings with them, 
but they do not need to travel around the city during the day to get to the next location. They can 
stay at the shelter’s drop-in centre, for example, or go to a coffee shop or public space near by. In 
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a large city like Toronto, people must in some cases spend considerable time and energy 
commuting from one shelter to the next. Packing up and moving around the city every single day 
for the entire winter season is extremely demanding, considering the fact that homeless people 
have a number of other priorities, such as job interviews, housing appointments, medical 
appointments, etc. The OOTC system, while well intentioned and successful, is barely filling the 
gaps in the system, and is possibly making day-to-day living more challenging. But the city has 
come to rely on the program during the winter months. 
The OOTC system also illustrates that community groups who are familiar with the 
homeless population are so busy responding to emergency needs of homeless people that they do 
not have the time to participate in the development of a longer-term solution. Indeed, one actor I 
interviewed for this dissertation said that his church was a part of the OOTC network in the past, 
but the congregation found it too draining in terms of energy and resources. Where there is 
coordination among homeless serving groups, it is to respond to the emergency situation that 
presents itself every winter, rather than using their expertise and passion to participate in the 
governance of homelessness and the creation of long-term solutions. 
 The governance of homelessness in Montreal is highly fragmented among a number of 
different groups with very different priorities and approaches. In a city with over 100 homeless 
service providers, disagreements can allow for the space to innovate and develop diverse 
responses to homelessness. The homeless population being itself very diverse, a multiplicity of 
responses is in some respects a strength of the Montreal model. As one actor put it, “on pense 
que la diversité des interventions est une richesse. Oui, il y a des petits organismes mais qui vont 
répondre à des besoins qu’un autre organisme n’arrive pas à combler” (interview #58). 
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 But in Montreal, there is no one agency or organization in charge of homelessness. In this 
situation, people can easily get lost in the system, which has very real consequences. The recent 
inquest into the death of Alain Magloire is a case in point. Magloire was a microbiologist whose 
life was slowly unraveling in 2013 due to a severe and untreated mental illness. He was killed on 
the streets in February 2014 by Montreal police following a mental health crisis. An inquest into 
his death reveals just how disorganized the system is for homeless people, particularly those with 
mental illnesses, and how preventable Magloire’s death was. In his final report, Montreal coroner 
Luc Malouin wrote that Magloire’s mental health was clearly deteriorating in the months 
preceding his death. In late 2013, Magloire had been admitted to a number of different Montreal 
hospitals for psychiatric care, where he had two psychiatric examinations and one evaluation by 
a social worker. There was no mechanism for sharing this important information regarding 
Magloire’s mental health, a fact that is repeatedly raised in Malouin’s report as a contributing 
factor to Magloire’s death. Malouin writes, “Si le dernier médecin l’ayant rencontré avait eu 
toutes les informations médicales, il aurait noté une augmentation de la fréquence des crises de 
M Magloire et aurait pu proposer un autre traitement.” He continues, “Je suis convaincu que ce 
dernier aurait pu le soigner de façon beaucoup plus efficace et qu’on aurait peut-être évité les 
évènements de février 2014” (Malouin 2016, 31–32). 
 The lack of communication between hospitals regarding the mental health of someone 
clearly in need in Montreal was a big problem underlined by the Coroner, but the overall silo-ed 
nature of homeless services is also an important theme of his report. Concerns over privacy play 
a central role in current discussions regarding the organization of homelessness services in 
Montreal, where agencies gather information regarding their clients but do not share this 
information with other services or agencies. In a system where no one is responsible, someone 
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like Alain Magloire can have a mental health crisis, and can display several cries for help, but 
can remain completely lost and unassisted.  
 The expertise and innovation that exists in Montreal, among RAPSIM and MMFIM 
members alike, is extraordinary. This is, as noted above, the great strength of the Montreal 
model. In this system, it is very unlikely that anyone would ever be told that in order to get help, 
he or she must go to a homeless shelter in order to be prioritized (as is the case in Calgary). 
Concerns over privacy are important and must be considered seriously, but the at times fatal flaw 
in this model is an unwillingness of agencies to talk to one another (a strength of Calgary’s more 
controlled and centralized model). 
There have been important successes in the fight against homelessness in these four cities 
– in Calgary, homelessness stopped growing after the CHF put its plan in place, for example. But 
the promise to end homelessness appears to be largely unfulfilled so far. As the above has 
argued, this is in part due to weaknesses inherent in each of the governance models. But it is 
entirely unfair to place exclusive blame for this on the local level. The local level, though 
engaged and passionate about fighting homelessness, is simply not equipped with the legal and 
financial resources it needs to fight homelessness effectively. Indeed, no single level of 
government can adequately respond to homelessness on its own. Good will goes a long way; 
existing services can be reorganized to make it easier for homeless people to find housing (and 
stay housed), and rules can be changed to allow greater access to emergency shelters.  
In all four of these cities (though less so in Montreal), affordable housing is in short 
supply. Housing is one of the most expensive areas of infrastructure and requires some form of 
long-term commitment financial from provincial and federal governments, if only because these 
are the levels of government with sufficient taxation and revenue generating powers. For over 
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twenty years, a key player – the federal government – has been absent from long-term policy 
discussions regarding housing and homelessness. Further, given the sometimes very challenging 
health needs of chronically homeless people related to addictions and severe mental illness, an 
effective solution to homelessness requires very trained and flexible medical professionals, 
notably psychologists. Psychologists are not cheap and cannot be hired by the local level alone. 
For a complex problem like homelessness, the unwillingness of the federal government to 
engage and to commit funding is enough to almost guarantee that any efforts to reduce 
homelessness will be limited or short-lived.  
Homelessness is an example of a wicked problem or what Bradford (2005) and Smith and 
Torjman (2004) call a complex file. A wicked problem is one that “cross[es] departmental 
boundaries and resist[s] the solutions that are readily available through the action of one agency” 
(6 et al. 2002). Bradford gives the example of income inequality as a pressing wicked problem, 
and notes “any effective solution to social exclusion and spatial isolation will need to co-ordinate 
the efforts of many actors, agencies and governments” (2005, 4). The very same thing can be 
said for homelessness. The local level cannot respond adequately to homelessness on its own, but 
must also work in coordination with other governments and local actors. Some provinces 
(notably BC and QC and more recently Alberta) have been willing to invest and partner with 
municipalities, but their interventions have been inadequate without the resources and support of 
the federal government as well. 
 Horak (2012), considering the effectiveness of multilevel governance policy processes in 
Canada, concludes, “two basic things need to be coordinated in multilevel policymaking: policy 
power (that is, authority and resources) and policy agendas. Each of these can be more or less 
fragmented in relation to a given set of policy objectives” (2012a, 361). He continues to stress 
 285 
the importance of aligned agendas; “agenda fragmentation appears to be a particularly strong 
determinant of policy failure” (362). Effective solutions homelessness require the agenda 
coordination of all levels of government as well as local social forces, which has not been the 
case throughout the 1990s and 2000s.  
The results of Horak and Young’s cross-Canada study conclude that the private sector is 
very involved in multilevel policymaking, but third sector actors are less so (see Horak and 
Young 2012). Further, the private sector tends to be involved not just in policy implementation, 
but also in policy development, whereas the third sector, due largely to a lack of resources, tends 
to be involved just in implementation. But Horak notes that for multilevel policy making to be 
responsive to local needs, local social forces must be involved throughout the policy process and 
not just during implementation. Though the third sector is limited in terms of financial resources, 
it is often rich in expertise, which is a valuable contribution to the policymaking process. Horak 
notes that for policies to be responsive to local needs, the third sector should use this expertise to 
contribute not just to policy implementation, but to policy development as well. These two 
conclusions regarding the importance of agenda coordination and third sector participation are 
important in understanding why most plans to end or reduce homelessness in Canada have not 
succeeded, and also in understanding why Finland and to a lesser extent Medicine Hat have been 
more successful. 
What Has Worked? 
Effective, lasting solutions to homelessness require big commitments from the provincial 
and federal governments and strong input from all aspects of the local level.  Because of 
competing agendas and priorities among these groups, the fight against homelessness faces an 
uphill battle, and that is the case not only in Canada but also in the United States and in Europe. 
Some cities or states in the US have been successful at reducing veterans’ homelessness (which 
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has been an important priority of the Obama administration), but this is only a small fraction of 
the overall homeless population. Looking around those two continents, there are only three 
examples of successful homelessness fighting plans: Medicine Hat, Alberta; the State of Utah; 
and Finland.  
Utah got major coverage in 2015 when it announced that it had ended chronic 
homelessness. Reports from NPR (McEvers 2015) and even Jon Stewart of the Daily Show 
(Goldberg 2015) praised the Housing First model for lowering the number of chronically 
homeless people in the conservative state from 2000 in 2005 to 200 in 2015. Recent reports and 
analyses have, however, suggest that this huge drop in homelessness is “fiction” (Cortez 2016) 
and that it is due more to changing math and technical issues (such as definition) than it is to a 
real reduction in homelessness. Medicine Hat and Finland are better examples of successful 
plans to end homelessness. These two examples are of course very different from the four big 
cities studied here, but there are nevertheless governance lessons to be learned from their 
successes.  
Finland36 
Finland has been tracking and studying its homeless population since the 1980s, and has 
been able to track not just those who are visibly homeless, but also those who are hidden. This 
hidden homeless population finds housing with families or friends (often couch-surfing or living 
in overcrowded environments), but has no adequate, affordable housing of their own. For this 
reason, they are considered homeless; Finland’s definition of homelessness is comparatively very 
broad.  
                                                
36 A portion of this section, translated into French, has been published as a blog 
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In 1987, just over 18,000 people experienced some form of homelessness in Finland (at 
the time, the country’s population was 4.9 million people). By 2010, following efforts to reduce 
homelessness, the number of homeless people in Finland had decreased significantly. Despite 
this success, the number of chronically homeless people remained relatively stable throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s, and was making up a larger and larger portion of the overall homeless 
population; of the 7,877 people who were homeless in the mid-2000s (including those who were 
hidden homeless), 3,079 were long-term homeless. To address this problem, in 2007 the central 
government set up a four-person “group of the wise” to write a plan to reduce long-term 
homelessness. The members of the group of the wise were a Member of Parliament, the director 
of Helsinki’s social services, director of the influential housing agency the Y-Foundation, and 
the Bishop of Helsinki (Busch-Geertsema 2010). The group of the wise introduced a 3-year 
strategy on homelessness from 2008-2011 (PAAVO I) and then a second plan from 2011-2015 
(PAAVO II), funded with 200 million Euros. The majority of this funding (170 million Euros) 
came from the national government, with the municipalities and lottery commission contributing 
the rest. 
The 2008-2011 policy set out to reduce long-term homelessness by 50% and to provide 
1250 new units of supported housing, while the second plan aimed to eliminate long-term 
homelessness and provide another 1250 supported housing units by 201537. Between 2008-2014, 
Finland was able to reduce the number of people experiencing chronic homelessness by 26%; in 
so doing, some emergency shelters in Helsinki were closed and, amazingly, turned into 
supportive housing. Given the broad definition of homelessness, this reduction of 26% is, by 
North American standards, incredible. These plans were, however, not fully successful in their 
                                                
37 For a longer history of Finland’s efforts to end homelessness see www.housingfirst.fi 
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stated goals of ending homelessness, and there is still some homelessness in Finland. A review of 
the two policies notes, “[w]hile Finland has brought down the numbers of people experiencing 
long-term homelessness by 26% between 2008 and 2014, and reduced the proportion of 
homeless people who are long-term homeless from 45% in 2008 to 29% in 2014, long-term 
homelessness was still occurring at what, from a Finnish perspective, was an unacceptable rate” 
(Pleace et al. 2016, 434–435).  
It is important to put this “failure” into context. While there is still homelessness in 
Finland, it is, by international standards, a very small amount. Pleace et al. estimate that while 
approximately 5.6% of the Canadian population experiences homelessness over the course of a 
given year, only .14% of the Finnish population does. They write, “Finland has moved from a 
position in 2008 when it had a comparatively very small homelessness problem to a position 
where it has further reduced homelessness” (2016, 434 emphasis original).  
Part of the success of the Finnish experience with the fight against homelessness is 
undoubtedly its broad definition of homelessness, and its ability to track the evolution of hidden 
homelessness. This is common in most Scandinavian countries, where the method to enumerate 
the homeless population is much more rigorous than what is done in North American Point-in-
Time counts (Smith 2015a); this is in many ways the result of less information sharing and 
restrictive privacy frameworks in North America. A Europe-wide study of homelessness policies 
notes that a broad definition is very important; “it is important that indicators for monitoring are 
rooted in a broad definition of homelessness and a clear ambition to reduce progressively all 
forms of homelessness. Without this, there is a risk that progress in one area may create or mask 
an increase in another area” (FEANTSA 2012, 24).  
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This is no doubt part of the failing of Robertson’s plan to end street homelessness in 
Vancouver. Moving chronically homeless people into a shelter might reduce street homelessness, 
but those people, even when they are in shelters, remain the most vulnerable of the homeless 
population. In other words, they could very easily slip back onto the streets if they are not 
immediately connected with housing and social supports (which, in Vancouver, is difficult). 
Finland carefully monitored and aimed to reduce all forms of homelessness, including hidden, 
while prioritizing chronic homelessness. This is important because efforts to fight chronic or 
visible homelessness could be undermined by a huge but unnoticed increase in hidden 
homelessness, which would be just a ticking time bomb if untreated. 
The second element of success in Finland was the coordination between the national 
government, municipalities, and important third sector organizations38, and the important 
financial contributions that they all brought to the fight against homelessness. Paavo I and II, 
created by the group of the wise, brought together highly respected representatives from each of 
these sectors, and together they created Finland’s plan; “[i]t was through the building and 
maintenance of political cooperation that the strategy was able to deliver significant reductions in 
homelessness” (Pleace et al. 2016, 436). The fact that Finland is a unitary country certainly made 
this coordination easier; in Canada, any national strategy must also coordinate with ten 
provincial governments, many of whom might have different agendas of political goals. 
Community groups in Finland were also treated as full partners all throughout the policy process; 
group of the wise member Juha Kaakinan, president of the influential housing organization the 
Y-Foundation, was directly involved in not just the implementation but also the development of 
the homelessness strategy. The coordination of the agenda of the different levels of government 
                                                
38 The private sector was not very involved in the fight against homelessness in Finland. 
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and third sector involvement at various stages of the policy process is, for Horak, key to making 
a policy successful and responsive to local needs. While Finland has not fully ended 
homelessness, its efforts have resulted in the most significant reduction of chronic homelessness 
in Europe. 
Medicine Hat39 
The one Canadian city that has seen success in ending homelessness is Medicine Hat, a 
small city in Southern Alberta, with a population of around 61,000 and, in 2010 a homeless 
population of 1000. By 2015, the number of people experiencing chronic homelessness in 
Medicine Hat was nearly zero in (The Economist 2014; Wong 2015) The city only tackled the 
problem of chronic and visible homelessness and has been silent on the question of hidden 
homelessness. The Finnish experience tells us that this might be a problem in the future, and that 
celebrations of Medicine Hat’s success at ending homelessness might be premature. But to be 
sure, the story of the fight against homelessness in Medicine Hat is an impressive one, full of 
twists and turns and changes of heart.  
As was the case in other cities throughout Alberta, homelessness was growing rapidly in 
Medicine Hat during the mid-2000s. Actors at the local level had long been concerned about 
homelessness in their community, but faced important obstacles when they tried to get it onto the 
public’s agenda. The electorate in what is sometimes called Canada’s most conservative city had 
been taught to pull themselves up by their bootstraps and to believe others should do the same; 
spending taxpayer money on homelessness did not immediately resonate with them.  
This portion of the electorate found a loyal representative in then City Councilor Ted 
Clugston, who opposed Housing First and homelessness spending as a matter of principle. “I 
                                                
39 A portion of this section, translated into French, has been published as a blog 
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used to say things like ‘I don’t have granite countertops, why should they?’” he told The Tyee 
(Wong 2015). But homelessness activists worked hard to change his mind, relying largely on the 
economic arguments for ending homelessness that were also used in Calgary. By the time he had 
become Mayor of Medicine Hat, Clugston was convinced that ending homelessness was the right 
thing to do. Once Clugston was fully on board, activists worked with the city to develop 
Medicine Hat’s homelessness plan, which relied greatly on Housing First and systems planning. 
Canadian researchers and practitioners alike have asked Medicine Hat for its “recipe” for 
ending homelessness, hoping to repeat its success. A case study of Medicine Hat’s experience 
highlights certain key ingredients, such as the importance of coordinating efforts, collecting data, 
and being flexible if things do not go as planned (Turner and Rogers 2016). The case study also 
notes the importance of shared community ownership and focusing on the homeless people 
themselves, and further credits the plan’s success to an early transition to Housing First 
(compared to other Canadian cities). There is, of course, no secret recipe to ending homelessness, 
and Turner and Rogers are clear while that these are some of the important ingredients to 
success, each city and community will be different. 
Skeptical councilor turned supportive Mayor Ted Clugston brings another perspective to 
the success seen in Medicine Hat. Following the promising signs that Medicine Hat was about to 
end homelessness, Clugston’s office was inundated with interview requests from around the 
world with news sources that called him the Mayor who ended homelessness – “not bad for a 
guy who tried to scuttle the project” he told The Globe and Mail (Maki 2014). Speaking through 
international news sources such as The Economist, Clugston’s comments on the success in 
Medicine Hat are insightful and point to the importance of resources, coordination and 
alignment. He first highlights the city’s unique resource base, meaning it was uniquely well 
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suited to end homelessness; “This city is a wealthy city. We have advantages over other cities” 
he told The Tyee, highlighting the fact that the city owns its own oil and gas companies (Wong 
2015). 
Many researchers and activists are quick to note that, on a per capita basis, the scale of 
chronic homelessness in Medicine Hat was very comparable to what it was in other Alberta 
cities. But Clugston himself notes that the size of Medicine Hat, 61,000 people, was a key factor 
that allowed the important actors to come together quickly and easily. “We’re small enough that 
we can work together and large enough to make a difference,” he said (Maki 2014). This is not 
the case in a larger city, where there is often a high concentration of homelessness in particular 
neighbourhoods, which can created entrenched problems that are more difficult to resolve (the 
Downtown Eastside is perhaps the most obvious example of this). Further, as Clugston alludes 
to, getting everyone, even just from the local level, on the same page about an approach and a 
plan to end homelessness is more difficult in a large city. In other words, coordinating (or 
aligning agendas, as Horak would say), is easier in a city of 61,000 people. This is certainly the 
case for many of the cities under study here, where early divisions between actors meant that key 
voices were not always included in the policy-development process. Medicine Hat was able to 
reduce chronic homelessness without substantial support from the federal government, which is 
impressive and speaks to great commitment of the local actors. But the small size of the city was 
likely a very important factor in the success that was seen in Medicine Hat, making a repetition 
of its experience in other bigger Canadian cities unlikely. 
These two cases, but particularly Finland, illustrate the importance of coordination and of 
agenda alignment, as Horak argues. Repeating this success in Canada’s largest cities will be 
difficult, in part because of the sometimes very deep divisions between local level community 
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groups that were highlighted in Chapter 7. There is room in an effective solution for 
disagreement, and of course information and passionate debates between competing points of 
view can make policy solutions much more effective. A local actor opposed to a plan on 
homelessness that is supported by the majority of the other major actors might not be enough to 
lead to its failure, but it can impose obstacles. Because Canada has an extra layer of government 
to coordinate with – the provinces – repeating the success seen in Finland will be difficult, but 
with a federal government willing to commit resources to housing and homelessness, the future 
will likely see interesting and successful collaborations across the country. 
Theoretical Implications 
 
When I first worked on this subject, I was vexed by the tendency – among political scientists, 
activists, theorists, observers, and commentators – to dismiss “the local” as a venue for political 
activity and to ignore what local government did, how it worked, and how it shaped our political 
possibilities. I am still vexed about these things. I look at textbooks on Canadian politics that say 
nothing at all about the local state and offer no analysis whatsoever of the ways in which people 
engage – or fail to engage – with it, and I sigh in despair (Magnussen 2015, 16). 
 
It is undeniable that cities, and local actors more generally, are playing an important role 
in the Canadian welfare state and within the Canadian intergovernmental framework. Cities and 
their respective urban governance dynamics are not the same across the country, but rather 
reflect a different distribution of powers, contrasting interests, and even ideologies. In short, 
cities are behaving very much like governments, and as Graham et al argued nearly 20 years ago, 
they should be treated as governments in the literature (1998). 
There are two important conclusions to be drawn from this conclusion regarding the role 
of cities in the intergovernmental framework. The first is that cities, and the local level more 
generally, are important producers of social protection in Canada. The federal and provincial 
governments are, and always will be (and always should be) main actors in the welfare state. But 
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the inability (or unwillingness) of these levels of government to respond to the new social risk of 
homelessness has made the local level a more important producer of social security, and actors at 
the local level are being remarkably creative at stitching the frayed safety net back together with 
a severe shortage of funding and tools. The local level is a particularly important producer of 
social security for the other 1%; they are the first and last line of defence for these most 
vulnerable Canadians, and in order to fully understand the welfare state, their role should be fully 
considered. 
The second conclusion to be drawn, however, is more in line with traditional studies of 
intergovernmental relations and the welfare state. A quick look at the results of Chapter 6, 
notably those regarding housing related powers, clearly shows that Canadian cities have very 
different legal and political powers, but they remain remarkably constrained by a lack of 
financial tools. The housing related tools that cities have and the financial resources at their 
disposal are determined by the provinces. Some provinces, notably BC, have been permissive 
with their municipalities and have given them some useful tools and autonomy and have even 
recognized municipalities as an order of government. Many provinces, however, have chosen to 
keep municipalities on a very short leash by refusing to grant certain powers, such as 
inclusionary zoning (though this has changed recently in Toronto). Cities are innovating with the 
few tools that they have, and they are proving that they are capable and knowledgeable actors, 
but they ultimately do not have the powers or the resources to engage and fully autonomous and 
equal partners. This is the result of provincial decisions and the fact that provinces still wield 
extraordinary power over municipalities. 
The frustration with this situation of continuing provincial control is palpable at the local 
level across the country. A current city councilor explained that this situation is wildly outdated: 
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“When I look at who we are as a country, 80% of us live in urban areas now, and I say we have a 
governance structure that no longer reflects the reality of where we live. The governance 
structure reflects who we were 100 years ago, but not who we are now” (interview #23). When 
asked what he thinks should happen to change this situation, he responded, “I think the federal 
and provincial orders need to recognize that municipalities are grown ups. As simple as that. I 
work very hard not to say ‘other levels of government’ because that implies a hierarchy, so I say 
‘other orders of government’.  There is a very patriarchal relationship with other orders of 
government that has to stop. We are grown ups”. The same sentiment was present in other cities, 
where municipal actors feel that the other orders of government do not trust them to make 
decisions on their own. 
To give an analogy, big cities in Canada seem to feel like young adults returning to live 
with their parents after finishing an undergraduate degree away from home. The parents, in this 
analogy, are of course the provincial and to a lesser extent federal governments. This young 
graduate, call him X, has finished an undergraduate degree in a city that was not his hometown. 
He lived on his own, did his own laundry, cooked decent food for himself, made some mistakes 
and bad decisions, but finished his degree on the Dean’s list. While at university, he used some 
of his free time and income to support local social initiatives, including raising awareness and a 
small amount of funding for homelessness, but he wants to contribute to more sustainable 
solutions through some type of socially-minded career. He has now moved back home to live 
with his parents while he figures out what to do next. His parents are glad to have him home but 
worry about him and his future. They do not think he is ready to live life as an autonomous 
grown up and have implemented a number of autonomy limiting rules. They make him take out 
the garbage and do his own laundry, but they also buy his groceries and constantly remind him to 
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clean his room and tell them where he is going whenever he leaves the house. X and his parents 
fight a lot, mostly at home but sometimes in public as well. 
X is caught in a very uncomfortable transition between being a youth and being a grown 
up, and feels deeply the frustrations and insecurities that come with being neither fully. Like 
Canada’s big cities, X has ambitions, a sense of responsibility, and some training from his 
university days to become an autonomous adult. However, while he is capable of living on his 
own independently and while he usually makes the right choices, he has not been faced with the 
truly difficult decisions, responsibilities and consequences of adulthood. Further, like Canada’s 
big cities, X does not have a sustainable source of income; he has a minimum wage job that does 
not nearly cover what he wishes to do, including travel and buy an environmentally friendly car. 
For these broader goals, he is financially dependent on his parents (or provincial and federal 
governments), who are not keen to write him a blank check.  
In reality, X is neither a youth nor a grown-up; rather, he has the ambitions of a grown up 
with the resources and responsibilities of a youth. This situation is frustrating for both X and his 
parents. A similar frustration – “we are grown ups” – is felt at the local level across Canada, 
where municipalities have great ambitions – to fight homelessness and climate change for 
example – but do not have the resources to do so. A former mayor of a big city explained, “you 
are a professional beggar when you are a mayor. That is what you do, you are always on the hunt 
for money. There are only three places to go. Either the current taxpayer, the province or the 
federal government. So every time you go, it is cap in hand and you are always asking for 
support” (interview #24).  
This frustration is perhaps most strongly felt in Toronto, where elected officials and 
bureaucrats alike mentioned at a number of points in various interviews that Toronto is Canada’s 
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5th largest government. Elected officials and bureaucrats alike feel very much like government 
officials (or grown ups), and are annoyed that they are not treated that way by other governments 
in the country. Miller spoke of his efforts to get Toronto a seat at the table at provincial 
intergovernmental meetings on homelessness, and remains perplexed at their refusal to allow 
“Canada’s largest housing owner” a voice, or even observer status. Further, while praising the 
influence of activists, city bureaucrats insisted that the real responsibility for housing lies with 
the government, and they are very protective of that responsibility. In this case, Toronto is like 
the first of her youth/grown-up friend group to get a car. She is fiercely proud of her car, and is 
intensely protective of it; she never lets her friends, and certainly not her parents, drive it. She 
sees it as a sign of adulthood, responsibility, and independence, and her friends (and some of 
their parents even) agree. In this way, the city has been protective of its turf in other policy areas 
as well (see Horak 2012); in areas where the city is treated as a real government with real 
responsibilities, the city takes that very seriously. Having a real power, like the power over 
housing, is, to Toronto, a sign that it is capable of dealing with grown up responsibilities. The 
city guards that power very carefully, as though to prove to itself and to others that it is indeed a 
grown-up government. 
This situation would appear to be changing, though it is not at all clear that cities will get 
all the tools they are seeking, nor is it clear that the change will happen at a pace that the cities 
want. In early 2016, however, the province of Ontario finally announced that it would give 
municipalities the power to mandate inclusionary zoning in new developments, a tool that has 
been requested for years. The provinces of Quebec and Alberta are considering special status for 
their largest cities, which would allow them more autonomy and freedom. This might well be a 
transition to a reality where municipalities play a more important, and more formal, role in the 
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governance of Canada. For now, however, resources and responsibilities are limited by the 
provinces, who continue to treat cities as their creatures. Cities have been creative and have had 
to work with other local sectors to build coalitions to develop policies regarding homelessness, 
looking beyond just the private sector and involving third sector actors as well. Even with its 
limited resources, the local level is an important actor in the intergovernmental system. To fully 
understand governance in Canada, studies should look not just to the usual suspects (provincial 
and federal governments) but also to the local level. 
 There are two further theoretical implications to be drawn from this thesis when it comes 
to the study of the welfare state. The first is regarding the importance of studying housing policy 
as a component of the welfare state; this means bringing the study of housing into the literature 
on federalism and intergovernmental relations and the welfare state. Historically in Canada (and 
around the world), the literature on the welfare state has been curiously silent on housing policy. 
The rise of visible homelessness across the country, however, has forced policy-makers and 
theorists to rethink housing as not just an economic policy or good, but also as a social policy. 
Indeed, most solutions to homelessness insist that housing must be at the heart of the solution.  
Studying housing from this perspective in many ways confirms what has already been 
written about the welfare state; the evolution of federalism has, up until the 1990s at least, 
largely determined which level of government was primarily responsible for housing policy. 
Banting’s confirms that this is largely the case for housing as well (1990). But studying housing 
policy from the perspective of the welfare state also highlights how there are new actors 
producing social security in Canada, primarily those at the local level. Bradford (2005) has noted 
that there is increasingly a concentration of “complex files” or “wicked problems” in cities, 
meaning problems that require broad partnerships across different levels of government and 
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sectors. Homelessness is a very obvious example of this, but there are others as well. A full 
understanding of solutions to this type of complex file, including the important question of how 
it is governed, requires that we also pay attention to the local level. This is not to take away from 
the provincial and federal orders of government, but rather to suggest that a multilevel 
governance perspective will become increasingly relevant to students and scholars of a welfare 
state that is as urbanized as Canada’s is. 
The second implication relates to the state of the Canadian welfare state, and its ability to 
protect vulnerable citizens from new social risks. Following decades of cuts and downloading by 
federal and provincial governments, the Canadian welfare state, especially for the bottom 1% 
who experience homelessness, is disorganized, patchy, and indeed very close to the ground. This 
is the case in all provinces and all cities, even in places where inequality and poverty have grown 
relatively slowly (like Quebec). Where there have been responses to homelessness, they have 
been either by actors with nowhere near the resources necessary to respond adequately to the 
problem (as is the case with the local level), or short-term and insufficient resources from 
provincial or federal projects.  
The National Homelessness Initiative, renamed the Homelessness Partnering Strategy, is 
a good example of this. As the context chapter outlined, this program was intended to be an 
emergency response measure for local communities, and the funding cycle was never made 
permanent. Rather, the NHI/HPS has been funded continuously since 1999 but only ever for 2-5 
years at a time. This has meant that local level actors using the funding have had to work on 
short term projects, which are often not their real priorities (Canada, Human Resources and 
Skills Development Canada 2008). Further, the funding that the federal government has allocated 
(which is matched by local level actors), cannot be used to build or purchase housing; this is in 
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part a policy decision to only focus on emergency responses such as shelters or drop-ins. But the 
funds available through the NHI/HPS are also wholly inadequate to build even a modest amount 
of housing. As Leo (2006) accurately notes, the program was “doomed to be less than 
satisfactory” because it had nothing to do with housing. These interventions, due to inadequate 
resources and unrealistic timelines, did little to reduce chronic homelessness and ultimately 
protect the other 1%. Local actors have done their best to stich the safety net back together for 
the most vulnerable people, but their resources are simply too limited to be able to provide 
adequate protection for this population. 
Solutions to homelessness have more recently become targeted and specialized, notably 
through investments in Housing First, a promising approach to helping the most chronically 
homeless individuals find and keep housing (Currie et al. 2014). Many of the people who have 
successfully exited homelessness through a Housing First program remain vulnerable and poor, 
but safely housed. It is important to consider this in light of what Banting and others have 
identified as a new social paradigm that invests in human capital (Banting 2005b; Jenson and 
Saint-Martin 2003). The move to Housing First fits in many ways with this new paradigm. While 
the goal of Housing First is not necessarily to support people as they reintegrate in the labour 
market, it rather seeks to provide them with supports (mental health, detoxification, social 
services) that will help them exit the street. The promise of Housing First is that just doing this, 
investing in the person through social and health supports, will save the taxpayer money.  
Many actors intimately familiar with Housing First note that is it not a poverty reduction 
program, and many people who are housed through this program remain reliant on food banks, 
soup kitchens, and rent supplements. In short, they remain poor and vulnerable. As Banting 
writes of the overall trend in the welfare state towards investment in human capital, this turn has 
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not been accompanied by the equally important emphasis on income security and redistributive 
measures. In Housing First, there is no redistributive complement to this investment in human 
capital; social assistance benefits remain well below the Market Basket Measure, keeping people 
firmly trapped in poverty and vulnerability.  
Further, the very existence of chronic homelessness (which grew during the same time as 
the welfare state was retrenching and changing to a human capital paradigm) is powerful 
evidence of the concern that many scholars have with this investment in human capital paradigm. 
In investing in education and training, while failing to complement this approach with some form 
of income security for those who are currently poor or homeless, the new paradigm fails to 
respond to the needs of the most vulnerable people today. As Banting notes, “it exposes the 
unskilled of today… to a harsher world with weakened protection systems” (2006, 418). This 
narrative of the weaknesses of the new social policy paradigm is confirmed by the study of 
homelessness.  
Conclusions 
While this research has taken an explicitly and intentionally urban look at homelessness, 
it is clear that the local level alone cannot solve the problem. Up until recently, the story of the 
fight against homelessness has had a pessimistic ending regarding the possibility of ending 
homelessness in Canada, but that seems to be changing with new governments at all levels with 
policy agendas that include housing and homelessness. At time of writing, it seems that agendas 
of various levels of government (including federal) and actors are aligning, a key factor in 
determining the success of multilevel policy initiatives such as this. In Toronto, for example, it is 
clear that the Mayor, the Premier and the Prime Minister have strong relationships and have 
committed to making the fight against homelessness and the construction of more affordable 
housing a priority. The same is the case in many other major cities across the country.  
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Groups are also emerging, with or without the initial blessing of the local government, to 
institutionalize the voice of the third sector in the local governance of homelessness. The 
recently formed Toronto Alliance to End Homelessness, aims to bring the voice of service 
providers to the city’s policy making process, which should, according to Horak, increase the 
local responsiveness of Toronto’s policies. The City of Montreal has recently hired Serge 
Lareault to be the first “protector” of the homeless. This position was inspired by the role played 
by Judy Graves, a City of Vancouver bureaucrat who became a widely respected advocate for the 
homeless. Though she created the role for herself, when she retired, the city hired someone to 
replace her. Lareault’s role in Montreal will be to bring some coordination to the homeless 
serving system, but also to be a bridge between the experts in the fight against homelessness on 
the streets with the policy-makers at city hall. Institutionalizing the voice of the street in the 
governance of homelessness in Montreal will not end homelessness on its own, but it should 
make policies more responsive and sensitive to local needs. 
There will always be disagreements between the orders of government; Vancouver’s 
Mayor for example has fought very publicly with the Premier and with the housing Minister, 
even though the BC government is more engaged than most in the area of housing. And there 
will always be disagreements among community groups, if only because their passion for what 
they are doing to help the homeless is so strong. But current trends indicate that political agendas 
are aligning, in terms of recognizing the importance of housing and homelessness, and local 
governments are increasingly open to an institutionalized place for third sector experts in the 
governance of homelessness. The promise to end homelessness in Canada has so far (other than 
Medicine Hat) been unfulfilled, but optimists do not have to look too hard to find reasons to 
believe that that might have started to change. 
 303 
 
 
A final word on the welfare state 
 
My reflections on this research have recently been supplemented by my own interactions 
with the Quebec welfare state, beginning in September when I learned I was pregnant. My 
experiences with the welfare state stand in very stark contrast to the anecdotal experiences of 
homeless people here in Montreal and around the country. Quebec, and Montreal in particular, is 
a great place for women of all income levels to be pregnant. This is perhaps for political reasons: 
in the 1990s, the government of Quebec wanted to both increase its population and grow its 
economy. Helping women re-enter the labour market after having children was seen as the best 
way to do so, and the welfare state has thus been organized around these goals. To this end, 
women are supported by the welfare state throughout their pregnancies, immediately after 
through a provincially run maternity and parental leave system, and upon their reengagement 
with the labour market with the famous universal child care system. 
Two important themes characterize my experiences with the Quebec health and social 
security systems: trust and choice. First, the health and social services I have used have trusted 
me when I said I was pregnant, and immediately provided me with the services and support I was 
entitled to. At 3-months pregnant, I went to my neighbourhood Centre local de services 
communautaires (CLSC), a provincially run health and social services clinic, to learn what 
supports they had. When I told the receptionist that I was pregnant, she put me in touch with a 
social worker, with whom I met within 5 minutes. The social worker signed me up for free 
prenatal courses, gave me information about other resources available in Montreal, and made 
sure I had some key pieces of information. No one asked for proof that I was pregnant (and at 3-
months, I did not look pregnant); they just believed me.  
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I later signed up online for maternity benefits, which in Quebec are run through the 
province. To sign up for the benefits, I simply gave my expected due date and some other 
personal information, and the system immediately went into action and started directly 
depositing my bi-weekly benefits into my bank account. Again, the government did not ask for 
proof that I was pregnant (even though I have a doctor’s note to that effect); they just asked that I 
update my dossier when the baby is born by inputting his birthdate into the system.  
This is not the case with homeless people, many of whom (particularly women) do not 
look homeless. They are not trusted, but rather they are asked time and time again to prove their 
status, to prove that they need support. They are met with skepticism regarding their need for 
assistance. Of course people can take advantage of a system if it blindly trusts anyone who says 
he or she needs help, but the same could be said for the way the maternity benefits system is set 
up. But the system, organized around the goal of supporting women, errs on the side of trust. Of 
course, pregnancy is highly time sensitive, and it is important the supports be provided 
immediately for the health and well-being of both mom and baby. But the same again could be 
said for homelessness; the longer people stay homeless, the more difficult it is for them to find 
and keep housing. At the same time, the system for homeless people has been designed very 
differently. A choice has been made to not trust homeless people, and it is very difficult for them 
to get the supports they need as quickly as they need them. It is difficult to conclude that this is 
not because of assumptions regarding who is deserving and who is undeserving of support from 
the welfare state. 
The second theme in my experience with the Quebec welfare state is choice. At every 
interaction I have had with the welfare state, I have had a choice. Whether it was medical support 
through a midwife or a doctor, birthing location (home, birthing centre, or hospital), the timing 
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of my maternity benefits, the organization of my benefits (larger sums for 40 weeks or smaller 
sums for 52 weeks), I have had options and my choices have been respected. I even had the 
choice of when to receive my benefits, which were available following 26 weeks of pregnancy. 
Following the baby’s birth, nurses from the CLSC will come directly to my home to support me 
if I choose to breastfeed.  
The system is not perfect of course; my benefits are contribution-based and as a result are 
very low. The wait-time to see my doctor or to complete blood tests is often very long. This is, 
however, the case in other provinces as well. The important point is that the system has been 
organized to maximize my choices and to support my decisions. At a very high level, Quebec 
policy-makers have made a deliberate decision to prioritize young women with children, with the 
hope that through its social policies it can both increase the province’s population and increase 
the labour market participation of women (through the universal childcare program). Once the 
political commitment was there, different social and health services became coordinated around 
those goals. Rather than telling women what to do, the system has instead been designed to be 
flexible to help women of various income levels to have a family and work. This flexibility, 
which maximizes choice, has undoubtedly contributed to the success of the system (Liu 2012). 
Homeless people have comparatively very few choices. I remember learning this very 
quickly while volunteering at a homeless shelter in East Vancouver in 2009. People staying at 
the shelter would often ask me in the morning what we were serving for lunch. One day, after 
telling a woman what was for lunch, she responded, “There’s pizza at the Union Gospel Mission, 
I’m going THERE for lunch”. Offended that what we were offering at the shelter was not good 
enough for her, I later told a colleague at the shelter what the woman said. My colleague 
responded simply, “what to eat for lunch is probably the only choice she has today”.  
 306 
Often, homeless people are told what they need, what they should do, what they should 
not do. Their choices are intensely limited - the type of income support that is offered, where 
they will sleep, even when they will sleep, are all pre-determined. The social service supports 
that are available are also limited. Like my attitude back in 2009, the system seems to think that 
homeless people should be grateful for whatever they are offered. It does not consider how the 
limitations placed on their choices, and the fact that this means services will often be mismatched 
with people, will ultimately affect their success at finding and keeping housing. 
To a certain extent, the new policy orientation towards Housing First gives homeless 
people more choices, notably in terms of what kind of housing they have access to and the 
supports that they are given. In reality, however, these choices are severely limited by a lack of 
affordable housing and quality social supports. The choices can also be limited by people who 
adhere strictly to the original Housing First model (developed by Canadian psychologist Sam 
Tsemberis in New York City), and thus believe that people in Housing First programs should 
only have access to scatter site private housing. If choice is at the centre of this model, all forms 
of housing – co-op, congregate, social – should also be available.  
While Housing First provides more choices (in theory), the welfare state contains 
contradictions that make it difficult for people to permanently leave homelessness. Compared to 
maternity benefits, social assistance benefits are highly inflexible and keep people well below the 
poverty line. A political decision has been made to support women with children, and the 
relevant components of the welfare state have been organized around that goal. There is no 
reason that a political decision could not also be made to prioritize the reduction (or the end) of 
homelessness. 
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The direct comparison between pregnancy and homelessness is, of course, not perfect. 
But there are nevertheless important parallels to be drawn between these two interactions with 
the welfare state (which, it bears noting, is designed not just for the poor or for the homeless, but 
for everyone). A Calgary-based actor who opposed the Calgary Homeless Foundation’s approach 
told me in an interview for this thesis that the business heavy board “felt that it needed a business 
model to turn homelessness around. What they didn’t realize is just how complex human 
behaviour is” (personal interview 2014). This is an insightful point, and is true not just of 
homeless people but all people. Human behaviour is complex. Looking at the success that the 
province of Quebec has had with its family oriented policy and at supporting women during and 
after pregnancy, it seems that a key ingredient to successful policy outcomes might be linked to 
this complex human behaviour. Social policies can incentivize certain behaviours, of course. But 
rather than attempting to control or change complex human behaviour, policy-makers might 
rather take that complexity into consideration by maximizing and supporting the choices that 
people make for themselves, erring on the side of trust and autonomy. 
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Appendix 1: List of interviews 
1. Member of Vancouver Mayor’s Task Force on Homelessness, Aboriginal steering 
committee on homelessness  
2. Member of Vancouver Mayor’s Task Force on Homelessness, senior City of Vancouver 
official working in the area of homelessness 
3. Member of Vancouver Mayor’s Task Force on Homelessness, City of Vancouver 
councillor  
4. Senior City of Vancouver official working in the area of housing 
5. Senior City of Vancouver official working in the areas of housing and planning 
6. Greater Vancouver Regional Steering Committee on homelessness member 
7. Vision Vancouver member, Provincial MLA 
8. Former Provincial MLA, former senior City of Vancouver official working in the area of 
homelessness, former StreetoHome Foundation Board member 
9. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Vancouver 
10. City of Vancouver police 
11. Member of the StreetoHome Foundation board 
12. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Vancouver 
13. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Vancouver 
14. Former Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Vancouver 
15. Greater Vancouver Regional Steering Committee on homelessness member 
16. Senior official with BC Housing 
17. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Vancouver 
18. Director of a faith-based organization, Vancouver 
19. Former mid-size city Mayor  
20. Senior City of Vancouver official working in the area of housing 
21. Former City of Vancouver Mayor 
22. Former Vice-President, CHF 
23. City of Calgary Councillor 
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24. Former City of Calgary Mayor 
25. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Calgary 
26. Senior City of Calgary official working on the Poverty Reduction Strategy  
27. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Calgary 
28. Former President, CHF 
29. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Calgary 
30. Senior official with the City of Calgary Housing Corporation 
31. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Calgary 
32. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Calgary 
33. Former President, CHF 
34. Former President, CHF 
35. City of Calgary Social Worker 
36. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Calgary 
37. Former President, CHF 
38. Director of a homeless serving organization, Calgary 
39. Provincial Interagency Council on Homelessness member 
40. City of Calgary police 
41. Senior member of the City of Lethbridge’s homelessness taskforce 
42. City of Toronto activist 
43. Former City of Toronto mayor 
44. City of Toronto, Street to Home staff 
45. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Toronto 
46. Former Senior City of Toronto official working in the area of housing  
47. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Toronto 
48. Senior City of Toronto official working in the area of housing  
49. Former Senior City of Toronto official working in the area of housing  
50. City of Toronto activist 
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51. City of Toronto Councillor 
52. Former Senior official with City of Toronto Social Services and Housing Administration 
53. Senior official with City of Toronto Social Services and Housing Administration 
54. Senior official with City of Toronto Social Services and Housing Administration 
55. Toronto researcher and physician 
56. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Toronto 
57. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Montreal 
58. City of Montreal official working in the area of housing and homelessness 
59. City of Montreal police 
60. Former Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Montreal 
61. Director of a homeless serving organization, Montreal 
62. City of Montreal official working in the area of housing 
63. Montreal area researcher 
64. Former Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Montreal 
65. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Montreal 
66. Official with the Provincial Housing association (la Société d'habitation du Québec) 
67. Former Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Montreal 
68. Former Canadian Prime Minister 
69. Senior official with the Federal Homelessness Partnering Strategy 
70. Federal Member of Parliament responsible for housing and homelessness  
71. City of Montreal Councillor 
72. City of Lethbridge department of housing and homelessness 
73. City of Calgary faith-based organization 
74. Former City of Vancouver mayor 
75. City of Vancouver official working in the area of housing 
76. Journalist, Megaphone magazine 
77. Former City of Calgary Councillor 
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78. Calgary based researcher 
79. Calgary based social worker 
80. Director of External Relations of a homeless serving organization, Calgary 
81. Calgary based journalist 
82. Executive Director of a poverty fighting organization, Calgary 
83. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Kelowna 
84. Executive Director of a homeless serving organization, Trois Rivières 	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